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Abstract 
The diversionary theory of war is one of the most speculated about and debated theories in foreign 
policy literature. The theory argues that government leaders who are confronted with public 
antagonism over domestic economic, social, and political problems sometimes start wars to divert 
their populaces‘ attention from domestic problems and therefore to survive politically.  Numerous 
foreign policy conflicts have been interpreted as being diversionary in nature and it has been 
commonplace for analysts to examine the domestic politics and problems of countries that engage in 
international conflict. Specifically, the use of force by US Presidents against external actors, such as 
U.S. President George H.W. Bush‘s operation against Grenada and the First Gulf War, and U.S. 
President Bill Clinton‘s operations against Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan and its supposed ―rally round 
the flag effect‖ have been investigated by foreign policy experts.  
In this dissertation, I address some limitations of the literature on the diversionary theory of war 
through some significant revisions. My revisions are intended to extend the scope and expand the 
content of the literature in order to transform the theory from a theory of war to a foreign policy 
theory. In addition, I try to contribute to the theoretical development of the literature by bringing 
the leader back into the diversionary theory and incorporating it into the current literature on foreign 
policy leadership studies. First, I argue that there are alternative ways for leaders to divert the 
attention of the domestic public other than the use of force, including  less aggressive, less risky and 
less costly strategies, such as crisis building and escalation and peaceful foreign policy initiatives, 
such as presidential dramas, summits, and peacemaking ventures. Experts on public opinion, voting 
behavior, and scholars of presidential studies have demonstrated in previous studies the rallying 
effect of these different foreign policy actions. And some of the more recent studies have indicated 
the possibility of the domestic use of overseas trips, peace conferences and peaceful foreign policy 
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gestures by US presidents. In fact, as scholars of foreign policy substitutability have stated, if there 
are alternative routes for foreign policy decision makers to attain their goals, then it would seem 
plausible that decision makers who are confronted with certain problems or subjected to certain 
stimuli would, under certain conditions, substitute one such route for another. In the context of 
diversionary behavior, a leader may employ one foreign policy response to divert attention from 
domestic problems in one circumstance, but then at a different time, employ a different foreign 
policy response. In fact, the idea of substitutability gives multiple foreign policy options for leaders 
to divert the domestic public‘s attention from domestic problems and this should be taken into 
consideration theoretically. In my study, I bring together the findings of different studies with 
diversionary literature in order to attain a more integrative approach in domestic politics and foreign 
policy linkage.  
In addition, most of the studies on the diversionary theory of war have been conducted on the 
political use of force by US presidents, which rests on a false assumption that only US presidents 
have employed this strategy in their dealings with domestic opposition, that only leaders of 
democracies would need to use this strategy, and that only democracies with substantial economic 
and military power would be able to afford to use this strategy. The explanation advanced for these 
assumptions is twofold. First of all, the proponents of this view argue that authoritarian leaders can 
forcibly suppress any form of opposition or dissent in their countries and therefore need not be 
concerned with diverting the domestic public‘s attention away from domestic problems, whereas 
democratic leaders do not have the capacity to use excessive force against their citizens and 
therefore, in order to survive politically, must deflect the domestic public‘s attention away from 
domestic problems. Secondly, they argue that implementing foreign policies for domestic purposes 
may be extremely costly and risky and therefore only leaders of relatively affluent nations with 
considerable military power can use these strategies.  
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Contrary to these assumptions, studies on authoritarian regimes and authoritarian leaders have 
demonstrated that even the most authoritarian or totalitarian leaders have certain constituencies to 
whom they must pay attention and have accountability, such as the politburos, the political elites, or 
institutions, such as the military. Similar studies have shown that such leaders are also concerned 
about possible mass uprisings and therefore try to take into consideration people‘s reaction to their 
policies. In addition, as I argue above, there are ways of diverting the domestic public‘s attention 
that are less costly and risky than the strategies on which the diversionary theory has traditionally 
focused and therefore accessible to countries that are not affluent.     
After these amendments, I focus on the relationship between political leaders and diversionary 
strategies, which has been neglected by scholars in the field. Mainstream scholarship has considered 
the act of diversion as an externalization of domestic problems and conflict to the realm of foreign 
policy. Most scholars who have propounded the diversionary theory of war have regarded political 
leaders, especially US presidents, as empty vessels in this process. Despite red flags by some 
reviewers of literature, these studies have neglected the role of leaders and the impact that political 
leaders can exert on this process. However, studies on leadership and literature on foreign policy 
decision making have manifested that leadership traits and styles matter in the making of foreign 
policy. These studies have also shown that although numerous domestic and international factors 
influence foreign policies, these influences are channeled through a decision maker who creates and 
implements the foreign policy. Bringing agency back into diversionary scholarship will shift the 
research focus from a simple question of whether domestic unrest provides leaders with an incentive 
to engage in diversionary conflict abroad to when it does, how their  leadership style will influence 
the diversionary strategy chosen and implemented. In order to understand this relationship, we need 
to open the black box of the government and analyze the leadership traits of decision makers.  
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This dissertation focuses on Middle Eastern leaders who used diversionary strategies during the First 
Gulf War in 1991 and in its immediate aftermath. Some of the foreign policies of Hafiz Assad of 
Syria, King Hussein of Jordan, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq during this period have been interpreted 
as intended to divert the attention of their people and unify their people around their flags. These 
foreign policies will be analyzed in relation to the leadership traits of the three Middle Eastern 
political leaders.    
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INTRODUCTION  
 
The diversionary theory of war is one of the most speculated about and debated theories in foreign 
policy literature. The theory argues that government leaders who are confronted with public 
antagonism over domestic economic, social, and political problems sometimes start wars to divert 
their populaces‘ attention from domestic problems and therefore to survive politically.  This theory 
of externalization has been widely discussed among foreign policy scholars, including Levy (1989), 
James and Hristoulos (1994), Stohl (1980), Ostrom and Job (1986), James and O‘Neal (1991), Wang 
(1996), DeRouen (1995), and Morgan and Bickers (1992). Numerous foreign policy conflicts have 
been interpreted as being diversionary in nature and it has been commonplace for analysts to 
examine the domestic politics and problems of countries that engage in international conflict. 
Specifically, the use of force by US Presidents against external actors, such as U.S. President George 
H.W. Bush‘s operation against Grenada and the First Gulf War, and U.S. President Bill Clinton‘s 
operations against Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan and its supposed ―rally round the flag effect‖ have 
been investigated by foreign policy experts.  
In addition to being the subject of many scholarly writings and policy analyses, the diversionary 
theory has been a source of criticism to the aggressive foreign policy actions of states. Especially, it 
has provided an ample amount of raw material to novelists, writers, and directors to describe the 
domestic motivations of international conflicts and wars. An early example was George Orwell‘s 
seminal book, 1984. In 1984, Orwell told the story of a government of a fictional country that 
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mobilizes its people against an unknown enemy and for an unknown conflict. The government 
constantly used this unknown enemy in order to rally its people and solidify their allegiances and 
loyalties. More recently, popular culture has witnessed a rapid rise in satirical fictional political 
productions about the diversionary motivations of political leaders. Most prominently, Wag the Dog, a 
film directed by Barry Levinson and starring Robert De Niro and Dustin Hoffman, described the 
attempts of a fictional president‘s aides to create a fake war with the state of Albania, in order to 
divert the public‘s attention from a White House sex scandal during an election year (Levinson, 
1997).  The film was said to be inspired by a 1993 novel by Larry Beinhart entitled American Hero, 
which speculated that Operation Desert Storm was a plot to rally the American electorate around 
George H.W. Bus (Beinhart, 2004). However, after the film was released in 1997, many analysts 
believed that it more closely resembled President Clinton‘s purported use of Operation Infinite Reach to 
divert attention from the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal. In another example, Canadian Bacon, the 
director Michael Moore told the story of a fictional US president who wages war against Canada in 
order to distract the public‘s attention from domestic economic and social problems in a post-Cold 
War environment (Moore, 1995).  
Despite the burgeoning literature and numerous case studies on the diversionary theory and the 
increasing circulation of the theory through journalistic accounts and popular culture, there is still 
not a consensus among scholars about the nature, timing, and consequences of diversionary wars. 
Theoretical and methodological discussions about the studies on the diversionary theory of war are 
occurring in the discipline of political science with the contributions of sociologists, historians and 
psychologists. Despite the presence of discord in the literature, the theory still receives considerable 
attention from both academic and policy circles, mainly because it accords with an intuitive sense of 
how politics works.  
12 | P a g e  
 
In this dissertation, I address some limitations of the literature on the diversionary theory of war 
through some significant revisions. My revisions are intended to extend the scope and expand the 
content of the literature in order to transform the theory from a theory of war to a foreign policy 
theory. In addition, I try to contribute to the theoretical development of the literature by bringing 
the leader back into the diversionary theory and incorporating it into the current literature on foreign 
policy leadership studies. First, I argue that there are alternative ways for leaders to divert the 
attention of the domestic public other than the use of force, including  less aggressive, less risky and 
less costly strategies, such as crisis building and escalation and peaceful foreign policy initiatives, 
such as presidential dramas, summits, and peacemaking ventures. Experts on public opinion, voting 
behavior, and scholars of presidential studies have demonstrated in previous studies the rallying 
effect of these different foreign policy actions. And some of the more recent studies have indicated 
the possibility of the domestic use of overseas trips, peace conferences and peaceful foreign policy 
gestures by US presidents. In fact, as scholars of foreign policy substitutability have stated, if there 
are alternative routes for foreign policy decision makers to attain their goals, then it would seem 
plausible that decision makers who are confronted with certain problems or subjected to certain 
stimuli would, under certain conditions, substitute one such route for another. In the context of 
diversionary behavior, a leader may employ one foreign policy response to divert attention from 
domestic problems in one circumstance, but then at a different time, employ a different foreign 
policy response. For example, a leader may rally the people around a common cause instead of 
against a common enemy and a diplomatic victory can provide as much popularity as a victory on 
the battleground.  In fact, the idea of substitutability gives multiple foreign policy options for leaders 
to divert the domestic public‘s attention from domestic problems and this should be taken into 
consideration theoretically. In my study, I bring together the findings of different studies with 
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diversionary literature in order to attain a more integrative approach in domestic politics and foreign 
policy linkage.  
In addition, most of the studies on the diversionary theory of war have been conducted on the 
political use of force by US presidents, which rests on a false assumption that only US presidents 
have employed this strategy in their dealings with domestic opposition, that only leaders of 
democracies would need to use this strategy, and that only democracies with substantial economic 
and military power would be able to afford to use this strategy. The explanation advanced for these 
assumptions is twofold. First of all, the proponents of this view argue that authoritarian leaders can 
forcibly suppress any form of opposition or dissent in their countries and therefore need not be 
concerned with diverting the domestic public‘s attention away from domestic problems, whereas 
democratic leaders do not have the capacity to use excessive force against their citizens and 
therefore, in order to survive politically, must deflect the domestic public‘s attention away from 
domestic problems. Secondly, they argue that implementing foreign policies for domestic purposes 
may be extremely costly and risky and therefore only leaders of relatively affluent nations with 
considerable military power can use these strategies.  
Contrary to these assumptions, studies on authoritarian regimes and authoritarian leaders have 
demonstrated that even the most authoritarian or totalitarian leaders have certain constituencies to 
whom they must pay attention and have accountability, such as the politburos, the political elites, or 
institutions, such as the military. Similar studies have shown that such leaders are also concerned 
about possible mass uprisings and therefore try to take into consideration people‘s reaction to their 
policies. In addition, as I argue above, there are ways of diverting the domestic public‘s attention 
that are less costly and risky than the strategies on which the diversionary theory has traditionally 
focused and therefore accessible to countries that are not affluent.     
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After these amendments, I focus on the relationship between political leaders and diversionary 
strategies, which has been neglected by scholars in the field. Mainstream scholarship has considered 
the act of diversion as an externalization of domestic problems and conflict to the realm of foreign 
policy. Most scholars who have propounded the diversionary theory of war have regarded political 
leaders, especially US presidents, as empty vessels in this process. Despite red flags by some 
reviewers of literature, these studies have neglected the role of leaders and the impact that political 
leaders can exert on this process. However, studies on leadership and literature on foreign policy 
decision making have manifested that leadership traits and styles matter in the making of foreign 
policy. These studies have also shown that although numerous domestic and international factors 
influence foreign policies, these influences are channeled through a decision maker who creates and 
implements the foreign policy. Bringing agency back into diversionary scholarship will shift the 
research focus from a simple question of whether domestic unrest provides leaders with an incentive 
to engage in diversionary conflict abroad to when it does, how their  leadership style will influence 
the diversionary strategy chosen and implemented. In order to understand this relationship, we need 
to open the black box of the government and analyze the leadership traits of decision makers.  
This dissertation focuses on Middle Eastern leaders who used diversionary strategies during the First 
Gulf War in 1991 and in its immediate aftermath. Some of the foreign policies of Hafiz Assad of 
Syria, King Hussein of Jordan, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq during this period have been interpreted 
as intended to divert the attention of their people and unify their people around their flags. These 
foreign policies include Saddam Hussein‘s attempt to create a ―rally round the flag effect‖ in Iraq 
and in the Arab world by escalating tension with Israel and by sending missiles to Israeli cities, King 
Hussein‘s support to Saddam Hussein (despite pressures from Western powers and Arab states) in 
order to distract the attention of  his people from recurring economic problems and to unify them 
amid increasing social rift between Palestinians and native Jordanians, and Hafiz al-Assad‘s 
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participation to the peace talks  after the Gulf War and later his escalation of conflict with Israel  to 
shift the focus and agenda of the Syrian people. These foreign policies will be analyzed in relation to 
the leadership traits of the three Middle Eastern political leaders.    
The dissertation is organized into two main parts. In the first part, Chapter 1 reviews the literature in 
the field of diversionary theory of war and the theoretical reformulations offered in this study and 
Chapter 2 explains the methodology of the dissertation. The next three chapters in the second part 
of the dissertation contain three cases of the use of diversionary strategies in the Middle East. 
Chapter 3 covers Saddam Hussein‘s use of conflictual strategies, Chapter 4 outlines King Hussein 
and his use of cooperative strategies and Chapter 5 is on Hafiz al-Assad and the use of multiple 
strategies. Chapter 7 provides a conclusion and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
DIVERSIONARY THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP STYLES 
 
Review of the Literature 
In the international relations literature, and especially within its predominant theories including but 
not limited to neorealism, the role of domestic factors in shaping states‘ foreign policies has largely 
been ignored. For many years, models that depict the state as a rational unitary actor, billiard ball, or 
black box have dominated international relations theories and inter-state relations have been 
considered a separate realm from domestic politics. Contrary to the neorealist school in international 
relations which emphasizes the effects of exogenous factors and international variables, some 
scholars have stressed the significance of domestic variables in explaining the foreign policy 
behavior of countries (Zakaria, 1992; Jacobsen, 1996).1  Such scholars have tried to develop 
theoretical and methodological approaches in order to demonstrate the assumed relationship 
between the two realms (Levy 1988; De Mesquita; 2002: Putnam, 1988; and Fearon 1998) and 
outline the directions, stages, and outcomes of the interaction between these realms. These attempts 
have yielded sometimes complementary and other times contradictory results (Mack, 1975: 597). 
                                                          
1 Fearon (1998), in his analysis of  domestic politics and foreign policy interaction, points out the increasing 
number of  articles and books that more or less explicitly invoke domestic politics or domestic political factors 
in explanations of  foreign policy choices. According to him more than one third of  the articles in International 
Organization invoked domestic political factors as independent or intervening variables. He also listed some of  
the examples of  studies which argued the significance of   domestic political factors, including Huth (1996); 
Mesquita and Lalman (1992); Milner (1997); O‘Halloran (1994) and Verdier (1994).  
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Among these different attempts, the diversionary theory of war has been one of the most cited and 
debated subfields of studies on domestic politics/ foreign policy interaction.  
In its classical form, the diversionary theory states that a group‘s conflict with an external other is 
expected to bring internal coherence and unity to that particular group and divert the attention of 
the members of this group from domestic political issues to the foreign policy realm. Levy (1989), in 
his seminal review of the literature, which paved the way for a renaissance of studies on the 
diversionary theory, defined the theory as the ―idea that political elites often embark on adventurous 
foreign policies or even resort to war in order to distract popular attention away from internal social 
and economic problems and consolidate their own domestic political support‖ (259). In fact, the 
theory argues that leaders are prone to starting wars and international conflicts in order to divert 
their population‘s attention away from their domestic failures (Bronson, 1997). 2 
Although scholars have only recently begun to systematically study the diversionary theory, the 
diversionary strategy has been used by policymakers and leaders for centuries. Recent studies on the 
diversionary theory of war reveal the ancient roots of its practice by leaders. For example, in a recent 
study, Fear of Enemies and Collective Action, Evrigenis (2008) demonstrated the use of diversionary 
strategies during the rivalry between Rome and Carthage. According to him, Marcus Porcius Cato, a 
prominent Roman statesman (also known as Cato the Younger), regardless of the agenda, concluded 
each and every speech in the Senate with the call that Carthage be destroyed. Evigenis (2008) 
contended that, contrary to the popular belief that the in-group/out-group hypothesis is a recent 
sociological invention, the idea of metus hostiles, meaning that the fear of enemies promotes internal 
                                                          
2   For the review of literature on domestic and external conflicts, see Kegley, Charles W., Neil R. 
Richardson, and Gunter Richter "Conflict at Home and Abroad: An Empirical Extension."; Stein, Arthur A. 
"Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature"; Mack, Andrew. 1975. ―Numbers Are not Enough: A 
Critique of Internal and External Conflict Behavior Research‖; Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. 1968. ―Domestic and 
Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations‖; James, Patrick. "Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature 
and Recommendations for Future Research.". 
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social unity, was a well-known phrase in Ancient Rome, and that in fact the use of diversionary force 
is part of a very long tradition which recognized the benefit and utility of conflict with external 
others (xi). 
One can detect the traces of this long tradition by skimming through some major works on politics 
and interstate conflict written by scholars in different historical periods. For example, Jean Bodin 
stated centuries ago that ―the best way of preserving a state and guaranteeing it against sedition, 
rebellion and civil war is to keep subjects in amity with one another and to this end, to find an 
enemy against whom they can make a common cause‖ (Cited in Stohl 1980: 297). In addition, 
George Blainey, in his seminal book, The Causes of War, pointed out a book on the Crimean War by 
Alexander William Kinglake, who was an observer of the war, as the first example of the use of the 
diversionary theory. In this book, Kinglake argued that ―a major cause of the Crimean War was the 
internal troubles of the French regime. The invasion of Crimea was designed as a scapegoat to divert 
the eyes of the Frenchmen from their own government‘s weakness‖ (Blainey, 1973; 72). The theory 
was also used extensively to explain the involvement of countries in armed conflicts in the 20th 
century. Most notably, Kaiser (1983), in his analysis of World War I, claimed that some members of 
the political elite in Germany were eager for war due to the rising social democratic movement in 
Germany. Kaiser contended that for these people, war was a suitable way to distract the attention of 
the public from domestic issues and to shift the focus of the German people to outside. According 
to Levy (1989), Lenin also viewed World War I as ―an attempt by the imperialist classes to divert the 
attention of the laboring masses from the domestic political crisis and Marxist-Leninists argue more 
generally that imperialism and war are instruments by which the capitalist class secures its political 
position and guarantees its economic interests against revolutionary forces internal to the state‖ 
(259-260). But one of the most straightforward statements of diversionary intention was delivered by 
the Russian interior minister on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Under the threat of a 
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revolution, the minister stated, ―What this country needs is a short victorious war to stem the tide of 
revolution‖ (Levy, 1988).  
Despite this long tradition of political leaders‘ creation of international conflicts to divert the 
public‘s attention from domestic problems, the systematic study of the strategy did not begin until 
the mid-1950s. It was George Simmel (1956) who approached the subject systematically for the first 
time in the mid-1950s with a study in which he argued that a conflict with an out-group increases the 
cohesion and political centralization of an in-group. He extended this sociological finding to 
international relations and suggested that ―war with the outside is sometimes the last chance for a 
state ridden with inner antagonisms to overcome these antagonisms, or else to break up definitely‖ 
(Simmel, 1956). For Simmel, a political leader‘s feelings of insecurity about his political survival may 
provoke his starting hostilities with an external group in order to trigger a rally effect within his own 
group and bolster his own group‘s support of him (Levy and Thompson, 2010: 100).  
Simmel‘s in-group/out-group hypothesis was later revised by Coser (1956) who proffered that while 
externalization sometimes leads to group cohesion, other times it increases the antagonisms within a 
country. In his study, he listed several conditions that must exist in order for externalization to bring 
group unity and foster in-group cohesion. Levy (1989), in his review article, summarized the 
conditions as follows. Firstly, there must be an existing group that perceives itself as a group and has 
some minimal level of internal cohesion. Secondly, the group must consider the preservation of the 
group to be worthwhile and believe that the external threat is a threat to the in-group as a whole 
(261). According to Coser (1956), if these conditions do not exist, the external conflict may cause 
the disintegration rather than the integration of the group. These findings of Coser and Simmel were 
later confirmed by other scholars in the field and some even asserted that the in-group/out-group 
interaction is more than a relationship and it is almost a law. For instance, Dahrendorf (1968), in his 
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study Class and Class Conflict, stated, ―It appears to be a general law that human groups react to 
external pressure by increased coherence‖ (58).  
The findings of sociologists on in-group/out-group interactions, and especially Coser‘s arguments, 
were picked up by students of international politics after a very brief period of time. For example, 
Haas and Whiting in their Dynamics of International Relations, stated that ―statesmen may be driven to a 
policy of foreign conflict-if not open war- in order to defend themselves against the onslaught of 
domestic enemies‖ (1956: 62). Rosecrance also raised a similar argument in his Action and Reaction in 
World Politics and indicated the correlation between domestic conflict and international conflict. For 
him, one of the most significant causes of wars and international conflicts is the domestic insecurity 
of political elites (1963). In another study on wars, Quincy Wright described war as a ―necessary and 
convenient means…to establish, maintain, or expand the power of a government, party, or class 
within a state.‖  According to him ―by creating and perpetuating in the community both a fear of 
invasion and a hope of expansion, obedience to a ruler may be guaranteed…Rulers have forestalled 
internal sedition by starting external wars.‖ And moreover ―there is no nation in which war or 
preparations of war have not to some degree or at some time been used as an instrument of national 
stability and order‖ (Cited in Tanter 1966: 42). In fact, in the early 1960s, it became commonplace 
for scholars to try to explain international conflicts with some form of domestic conflict.  
Although the studies above welcomed and accepted the diversionary theory as a reasonable account 
of the initiation of wars and international conflicts, the behavioral revolution in social sciences and 
the increasing employment of quantitative methodologies in political science brought a new 
dimension to the study and analysis of the theory.  The preliminary quantitative studies yielded 
contradictory findings on the question of the relationship between domestic and international 
conflict (Burrowes and Spectator, 1973; Wilkenfeld 1973). For instance, Rummel, who conducted 
21 | P a g e  
 
one of the earliest quantitative studies in this field, found no relationship between domestic and 
external conflict. In his research, he analyzed data for 77 states over the period of 1955-1957 and 
reached the conclusion that ―foreign conflict behavior is generally completely unrelated to domestic 
conflict behavior‖ (1963: 24). A few years after this study, Tanter replicated Rummel‘s study for a 
later period (1958 – 1960), and concluded that ―there is a small relationship between 1958-1960 
domestic and foreign conflict behavior‖ (1966, 51-62). Rummel, in a second study with a slightly 
different research design, found that there was ―a positive association, albeit small, between 
domestic conflict behavior and the more belligerent forms of foreign conflict behavior‖ (1966: 101-
102). In a later study, Wilkenfeld found a relationship between external and internal conflict 
behavior; there were changes however in the degree of this relationship depending on the nature of 
the state. According to him, ―there is no particular relationship between any pair of internal and 
external conflict dimensions which holds for all groups equally well‖ (1968: 66). Wilkenfeld 
substantiated his results with two succeeding studies (Wilkenfeld and Zinnes, 1971 and Wilkenfeld, 
1973).  
In the mid-1970s, Hazlewood presented a new model to study the relationship between domestic 
and external conflict. In his model, instead of propounding a positive or negative relationship, he 
proffered a curvilinear relationship. In his conclusion, he stated that opposition and domestic 
conflict in a country can be diverted to the external realm up to a certain point, but ―as threats to the 
incumbent elite become more severe, the utility of conflict management through diversion slowly 
decreases. Ultimately, the elites and their factions become so divided that the use of diversion 
mechanisms is no longer feasible. Once this threshold has been crossed, an inverse relationship 
between extreme elite instability and foreign conflict is likely to occur‖ (Hazlewood, 1975: 227). 
However, Hazlewood‘s study was later challenged by other scholars, such as Kegley, who replicated 
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Wilkenfeld‘s study and argued that there was no or an insignificant relationship, between domestic 
and external conflict.   
The quantitative studies of the diversionary theory that were conducted in the 1960s and the 1970s 
did not provide a cumulative and persuasive case for the diversionary theory. Levy (1989), in his 
review essay, criticized these quantitative studies as follows: 
[T]here is still little convergence among the findings of different studies using 
different measures of internal and external conflict, different data sources, different 
temporal spans, and different statistical techniques. One fears that this mass of 
unstructured and often contradictory findings may be the artifact of particular data 
sets, measurement procedures, or statistical techniques……….It is generally agreed 
that a decade and half of a quantitative research on the relationship between the 
internal and external conflict behavior of states has failed to produce any cumulative 
results. We have a set of findings that are scattered and inconsistent, and these 
inconsistencies have yet to be resolved or explained. The failure of quantitative 
empirical research to uncover any indication of a strong relationship between the 
internal and external conflict behavior of states is disturbing for a number of reasons. 
It is in contrast with the empirical findings from other social science disciplines, 
which provides considerable evidence as to the validity of the conflict-cohesion 
hypothesis…... As Hazelwood (1975, 216) notes in developing a point made by 
Burrowes and Spectator (1973, 294-295), ―in no other instance do the arguments 
present in international relations theory and the results recorded through systematic 
empirical analysis diverge so widely as in the domestic conflict- foreign conflict 
studies‖ (263). 
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For Levy and many others, the gap between theory and empirical research was disturbing because 
evidence from a large number of historical cases suggested that decisions in international conflicts 
were mostly influenced by the interests of domestic political elites who faced challenges to their 
political authority (263). The majority of the quantitative studies appeared to be driven by method 
and data availability instead of theory, and most of them were more concerned about replicating, 
confirming, or disconfirming Rummel‘s initial findings on the relationship of domestic and external 
conflict (266). 
One of the most significant studies in the 1970s on the relationship between domestic and foreign 
policy was conducted by John Mueller. Unlike previous studies which were conducted cross-
nationally, Mueller focused solely on US presidents and their use of force. In a 1970 article in the 
American Political Science Review, Mueller coined the term ―rally round the flag‖ in order to explain the 
increase in presidential popularity during an external crisis. In his article (1970), and later in his book 
(1973), he underlined three conditions that need to be met to produce a rally phenomenon. For him, 
a rally point needs to be associated with an event which ―(1) is international; (2) involves the United 
States and particularly the President directly; and (3) is specific, dramatic, and sharply focused‖ 
(1970: 21). According to Mueller, the event needs to be international in order to rally people around 
the flag of the president because domestic disturbances create more division than unification. In 
addition, the US needs to be directly involved in the international event in order to create a rally 
effect within the United States, because the American people are likely to find these events more 
relevant to them. Finally, for him, the international event needs to be specific, dramatic and sharply 
focused in order to capture the public‘s interest and attention. In the conclusion of his study on the 
relationship between public opinion and war during the Korean and the Vietnam War, Mueller 
stated that there was a ―rally round the flag‖ effect, which he defined as a short-term boost to a 
president‘s popularity as a result of a dramatic international crisis (1973: 267).  
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The ―rally round the flag‖ phenomenon was later studied extensively by scholars, including Kernell 
(1978) and Lee (1977). Most of these studies reached similar conclusions about the effects of 
specific, dramatic, and sharply focused international events on a president's public approval ratings, 
and they even went  beyond this and expanded on the conditions that must be met for an 
international event to constitute a rallying point. For instance, Kernell (1978) argues that the 
international event needs to be on the front page of the newspapers for at least five consecutive 
days, which will guarantee widespread public awareness about the event (513). Lee, on the other 
hand, challenges some of Mueller‘s assumptions and contends that not all international events that 
meet Mueller‘s conditions creates identical rally effects. Instead, his study examines the impact of 
major international events on presidential popularity on a case-by-case basis in order to identify 
patterns in the public‘s reaction to the President (1977: 252). 3 The studies of these scholars were 
later also challenged by others, including Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Brody and Shapiro 
(1989), who casted doubt on the importance of the rally effect in explaining substantial variations in 
presidential popularity (Baker and Oneal, 2001).    
Mueller‘s studies in the 1970s started a new track in scholarship on the diversionary theory, which 
became the dominant school in a very short period of time.  His study paved the way for the 
development of studies on the diversionary use of force by US presidents.  While cross-national 
studies were prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s, by the 1980s, scholars, such as MacKuen (1983), 
Brody (1984), and Ostrom and Simons (1985) were presenting studies that focused on the rally 
effect and the relationship between foreign policy and domestic politics in the context of the United 
States and US presidents. The real breakthrough in studies on the US presidential use of force came 
with Ostrom and Job‘s article in 1986.  
                                                          
3 For a comprehensive review and evaluation of  the arguments of  Mueller, Kernell and Lee see Brody, 
Richard A. 1991. Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support. 
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In their article Presidents and Political Use of Force, Ostrom and Job (1986) evaluated different 
explanations for presidential use of force and compared the domestic and international sources of 
using force. They found that, contrary to the claims of neorealists, international factors are less 
important than some domestic factors, including the economy and the president‘s standing in public 
opinion polls. Ostrom and Job‘s article not only challenged the neorealist premises and presented 
new questions about the interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics, but it also started 
a new debate about the political use of force by the US presidents. Almost all of the studies that 
emerged in the 1990s and focused on the presidential use of force, including James and Hristoulas 
(1994), Hess and Orphanides (1995), Meernik (1994), Meernik and Waterman (1996), Lian and 
Oneal (1993), DeRouen (1995), Gowa (1998), Prins (1999), Baker (1999), and DeRouen and Peake 
(2002), in one way or another, aimed to respond to the findings or replicate the tests of Ostrom and 
Job. 
In one of the early tests of Ostrom and Job‘s study, James and Oneal reexamined their argument by 
introducing a new indicator, namely a measure of the severity of ongoing international crises. They 
reached a similar conclusion to Ostrom and Job. They asserted that domestic political factors are the 
most consequential factors in presidential use of force (1991). However, Ostrom and Job and James 
and Oneal were later challenged by Meernik who argued that international conditions have a greater 
effect than domestic conditions on the presidential decision to use force abroad. His results 
indicated that ―when balancing domestic and international conditions, presidents‘ decisions are more 
often motivated by national interest than personal political gain‖ (1994: 136). In addition to these 
two schools, a third group of scholars that included James and Hristoulas (1994) claimed the 
interdependence of domestic and international factors. James and Hristoulas found that ―significant 
internal influences, with potential cross-national relevance, include explicit forms of behavior by the 
public, perceptions of international tension and public approval of the president. At the external 
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level, the gravity and importance of crises underway in the system affect its receptiveness to activity 
by the United States‖ (1994: 327). 
While the debate over the nature of the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy was 
proceeding, some scholars, including DeRouen (1995), Hess and Orphanides (1995) and Fordham 
(1998), attempted to reach a more accurate description of the domestic factors that influence the use 
of force in the US. Although they failed to reach a consensus, they detected several potentially 
overlapping causes of diversionary behavior (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005: 24). One of the most 
tested and debated causes of diversionary behavior has been the economy and economic problems 
of a country. After the early studies on the effect of economic problems on presidential use of force, 
including Ostrom and Job (1986), Russet (1990) and James (1988), these studies began focusing on 
identifying the extent and nature of this relationship. Some of them found a fairly straightforward 
relationship between economic problems and the external use of force, whereas others described the 
relationship as being more indirect. For example, Fordham argued that there is a direct relationship 
between economic conditions and the presidential use of force (1998), whereas for DeRouen, this 
relationship is an indirect one. He stated that ―there is a significant direct linkage between the 
economy and presidential approval, a nonrecursive linkage between presidential approval and force, 
and indirect linkage between the economy, presidential approval and uses of force. There does not 
appear to be a direct link between the economy and the use of force‖ (1995: 689).  In a later study, 
DeRouen and Peake underlined this indirect effect and argued that ―uses of force by the president 
have a notable agenda-setting effect, shifting public attention away from the economy. The shift in 
attention also causes a long-term effect on the president's public-approval rating‖ (2002). Hess and 
Orphanides also contributed to this debate by developing and testing an economic theory of the use 
of force that links the election cycle, war decisions, and economic performance. According to them, 
―the probability of conflict initiation or escalation exceeds 60 percent in years in which a president is 
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up for reelection and the economy is doing poorly‖ (1995: 841). Wang also reached similar 
conclusions; however, he also added Congressional support as a variable. For Wang, the electoral 
cycle, economic difficulties, and presidential support in Congress affect crisis decision making. Wang 
stated, ―Once involved in a crisis, presidents select more intense responses when the economy is 
doing badly, when they are in the later stages of the electoral cycle, and when their general support 
in the Congress, at least in terms of party membership, is high‖ (1996: 92).  
The debate about domestic factors in U.S. Presidents‘ use of force later became more specific as 
scholars started to investigate specific issues within the economy that might increase the probability 
of the use of force. Some scholars, such as DeRouen (2000), Fordham (1998a) and Fordham 
(1998b), demonstrated that unemployment in the US could provide an important incentive for US 
presidents to use force against an external other. For instance, Fordham, in his study (1998a), 
indicated high unemployment and a president‘s re-election years as the most significant causes of 
external use of force. DeRouen, in his study, also confirmed the positive relationship between 
unemployment and external use of force (2000). In another study, Fordham (1998b) took into 
account party differences and demonstrated that Republican presidents‘ use of force was positively 
correlated with high unemployment, whereas Democratic presidents‘ use of force was positively 
correlated with high inflation.  
In addition to embarking on this quest for an explanation of diversionary behavior, scholars 
identified new intervening variables that might increase or decrease the level of the rally effect in the 
US during and after an international event. For instance, Lian and Oneal found that a rally effect is 
only likely when the foreign policy action is reported prominently by the media. Lian and Oneal also 
suggested some other conditions for higher rally effects, including bipartisan support for the 
president and a low level of popularity of the president. In addition, according to them, in order to 
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have a higher boost in approval rates, the country should not be at war during the diversionary use 
of force and the society should not be fatigued by war (1993). Oneal, in another study with Anna 
Bryan, looked more specifically at the impact of media on the rallying effect. According to them, 
―the greatest influences on the rallying effect of a crisis is whether or not the United States is 
involved in an ongoing war, and especially the New York Times’s coverage of the president‘s major 
response to a crisis.‖ They argue that when the message of the president is covered in the headlines, 
the rallying effect is 8 percentage points greater than when it is not reported on the front page (1995: 
379). Oneal, in a more recent study with Baker, found that although the public does not 
automatically respond favorably and rally behind the president after his use of force, when the White 
House actively tries to draw attention to the international conflict, the likelihood of a rally effect 
increases. Oneal and Baker stated, ―for example, if the president personally makes a statement 
regarding the situation- thereby making it more likely that the conflict will be prominently featured 
on the front page of the New York Times- he can expect to increase the rally by about 2%‖ (2001: 
683). Recently, Rottinghaus and Tedin (2010) also emphasized the influence of the media tone and 
coverage both on the magnitude of the rally effect and its duration.  
The academic revival in the field of diversionary use of force in the 1990s after Ostrom and Job‘s 
1986 piece coincided with the increasing number of military operations by the US government 
during these years.  The Bush administration‘s military operations in Panama and Operation Desert 
Shield and Operation Desert Storm against Iraq fostered a public debate about the use of force for 
domestic political ends by US presidents. The military operations against Panama were especially 
controversial in terms of their timing and goal. Many in the US and around the world interpreted the 
invasion into Panama as a form of diversionary war and argued that it was motivated by a need to 
solve ―domestic political problems‖ rather than to achieve strategic goals (Cramer, 2004a; 2004b; 
2006). In addition, although strongly denied by President Bush and Vice President Quayle, several 
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analysts and journalists linked the war in Iraq with the budget deficit and the savings and loan 
scandal in the United States (Oresekes 1990; Mintz 1993; Lian and Oneal, 1993: 278). Even after the 
Gulf War, there were some expectations of another attack against Iraq to provide a longer rally 
effect that could bring victory for the Bush administration in his reelection campaign. In fact, just 
before the Republican National Convention, the New York Times reported that the Bush 
administration was planning another raid on Iraq to boost the president‘s campaign for reelection 
(Tyler, 1992). Clinton‘s presidency and the political events, including the White House sex scandal, 
the impeachment debates and subsequent military strikes on Afghanistan, Sudan and Serbia, further 
intensified the use and circulation of the diversionary theory of war and bolstered the event-driven 
nature of political science research and intensified studies on diversionary strategies and wars 
(Hansen, 2004; Hendrickson, 2002). 
However, these political developments did not mark an end to the discrepancies between the 
findings of case studies and quantitative analyses. For example, amid the wide circulation of the idea 
of diversionary use of force by US presidents during the Clinton era, scholars like Meernik and 
Waterman (1996) rejected these claims and asserted the significance of other factors in presidential 
use of force. In their article The Myth of Diversionary Use of Force, they identified several important 
problems with the literature including the absence of any direct link between domestic political 
conditions in the United States and uses of force or international crises (1996: 573). According to 
them, it is more likely that a president is compelled to act on the basis of national interest or in 
accordance with the United States‘ responsibilities as a superpower (589). Several other scholars 
reached similar conclusions and asserted that international variables and external factors are more 
important in the use of force by US presidents than domestic factors (Meernik, 1994; 2001; Gowa, 
1998; Moore and Lanoue, 2003). For example, Moore and Lanoue argued that international politics, 
not domestic politics, was the primary determinant of the US‘s use of force during the Cold War era. 
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According to them, previous studies in this field were mistaken, mainly because of their 
inconsideration of the hostility of other countries towards the United States (2003, 376-392). In 
addition to this, Gowa (1998) indicated that ―neither political-military cycles nor partisan politics 
have had any observable effect on US recourse to force abroad between 1870-1992‖ (320). Some 
other scholars in this field also continued to respond and to replicate the studies of Ostrom and Job 
(1986) and in that context, refute the claims of interaction between domestic politics and foreign 
policy. Meernik (2001) and Mitchell and Moore (2002) authored two of those studies, which negated 
the significance of domestic factors in the presidential use of force and indicated the existence and 
significance of some other variables. The findings of these scholars were later challenged and revised 
by scholars like Fordham who modified some of Gowa‘s arguments and suggested that ―Gowa‘s 
conclusions should be amended to consider the influence of economic conditions on the use of 
force, something that was not evident in her empirical results‖ (2002: 593).   
Contrary to the findings of these quantitative large-n studies, qualitative political and historical 
studies indicated a form of relationship between domestic problems and international conflicts. 
Earlier historical studies conducted by historians and political scientists revealed the instrumental use 
of force by some presidents for domestic ends. Among those, historian Frank Kofsky, in his study 
on Truman, contended that President Truman fabricated a Soviet threat towards the West in order 
to get Congressional support for his policies (1995). William F. Mabe and Jack S. Levy, in their 
research on the United States‘ role in the Quasi-War of 1798 and the War of 1812, analyzed the 
opposition to war during the diversionary use of force by US presidents (1999). In addition, some 
other qualitative studies on the use of force by George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton have 
contributed to the methodological discussions in the field. In his piece on Clinton‘s military strikes 
in 1998, Ryan Hendrickson put forward four propositions in order to set some standards to 
qualitatively evaluate the validity of the claims about the diversionary nature of these attacks, 
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including the president‘s relationship with his advisors and with the opposition in Congress. Later, 
Cramer, in her study of the US invasion of Panama, tried to improve and refine these standards. 
Both of these researchers tried to develop a standard qualitative method for assessing the possibility 
of diversionary uses of force in two different American military actions (2004a; 2004b; 2005). 
Despite these researchers‘ US-centric orientation, their research made important strides in shaking 
up the hegemony of the use of quantitative methodologies in the field.  
In these years, another group of scholars started to ask new questions about the variables and the 
earlier studies and came up with new research designs. Some of these studies were early attempts to 
modify the theory, mostly in accordance with Levy‘s suggestions in his review essay (1989).  They 
tried to refine the concept of ―rallying‖ and to respond to some of the questions regarding the 
nature and identity of the ―ralliers.‖ For instance, Morgan and Bickers, in their study, discussed the 
idea of the ―in-group‖ and came up with some conditions for the emergence of a diversionary 
tendency on the part of political leaders.  They argued that ―a state leader will treat an erosion of 
domestic support more seriously when it comes from within segments of society that are critical in 
the maintenance of the leader‘s ruling coalition than when it comes from other domestic groups‖ 
(1992: 25).  James and Rioux, in their analysis, also challenged the assumption of unitary public 
reaction and discovered that different sections of the US electorate respond differently to the 
presidential use of force. For them, the president‘s ―ruling coalition,‖ as well as independent voters 
rally around the president, but the opposition party voters usually do not rally around the president 
in response to the president‘s external use of force. James and Rioux also found that it is the level of 
the force that determines the extent of the rally effect. They argued that ―a potential rally effect is 
sensitive to the actual use of force. If force is used, then any rally effect disappears and the 
presidents may even suffer a loss at the polls if the use of force is great enough‖ (1998, 801). 
Furthermore, Baum, in his analysis, tried to paint a clearer picture of the ―rally round the flag‖ 
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phenomenon and proffered a more nuanced explanation. According to him, in response to a foreign 
policy action intended to rally the population, those who are closest to the point of ambivalence 
between approval and disapproval are most likely to change their opinion. He also discovered some 
other differences between Republicans and Democrats in terms of rallying. For him: 
First, Republican presidents typically enjoy larger rallies than Democrats following a 
use of force abroad. But this is not necessarily because Republicans are, or are 
perceived to be, better stewards of foreign policy. Rather, the true explanations for 
this difference appear to be greater political awareness-and hence ideological 
constraint-of average Republicans. Highly educated respondents are least likely to 
rally. And these respondents are more likely to be Republicans than Democrats. 
Conversely, moderately aware individuals…are most likely to rally and are more 
likely to be Democrats than Republicans. It is therefore unsurprising that a majority 
of the relationships reported above were strongest during Republican administration.   
Secondly, both Democrats and Republicans are most likely to rally behind a 
president of the opposition party. In fact, the exception to the previously noted 
pattern of a stronger relationship during Republican administrations consisted of 
Republican identifiers rallying behind a Democratic president during times of high 
inflation… 
Third, divided government appears to work to a president‘s advantage, at least in 
terms of maximizing the rally effect among the opposition identifiers. Once again, 
the explanation for this surprising pattern lies in the relatively low pre-rally approval 
ratings for presidents confronting Congresses controlled by the opposition party, 
combined with the relatively greater media coverage of opposition party statements 
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in support of the president when foreign crises arise during the divided government 
(2002: 288-289). 
The 9/11 attacks against the United States and the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq also 
contributed to the extension and diversification of literature on the ―rally round the flag‖ 
phenomenon. Particularly, 9/11 and its aftermath, including the skyrocketing approval rates of 
President Bush and Mayor Giuliani, were examined by scholars (Feinstein, 2010; Landau et al., 2004; 
Gaines, 2002; Schubert et al 2002). Some of these studies confirmed certain dimensions of earlier 
studies on the ―rally round the flag‖ phenomenon. For instance, Schurbert et al, found in their 
experimental study that the president‘s keynote speech on a certain foreign policy action is more 
significant than any other factor in the yielding of a rally effect. For them, Bush‘s September 11th 
speech was the most critical factor in producing this rally effect in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 
(2002). In another study, Gaines argued that the 9/11 rally effect was different than any other 
foreign policy-related ―rally round the flag‖ phenomenon in American history. According to him, 
9/11 and its aftermath demonstrated that the rally effect can last for a lengthy period of time. He 
stated that ―the American public continues to rally around the president eight months after a few 
tragically efficient terrorists shocked the nation. The rally has been long-lived and somewhat deep, 
insofar as it seems to encompass the Cabinet, and maybe even Congress, albeit in a much muted 
form‖ (2002: 535). 
Recently, scholars have also started to raise some questions about Congress and its function and role 
during the diversionary foreign policy process. For instance, Brule‘s study, entitled US Congress and 
Presidential Use of Force, demonstrated that although Congress has the ability to exact serious 
limitations on the president‘s use force, ―when the economy is deteriorating, such constraints appear 
to compel the president to demonstrate his leadership skills in the foreign policy arena. The 
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President‘s efforts to demonstrate his competence seem to be coupled with a readiness to support 
US threats and promises with military force, resulting in a greater likelihood of forceful dispute 
initiations.‖ He argued that ―the president is more likely to use force in response to economic 
decline when facing an opposition in Congress than during years in which he enjoys partisan support 
in the legislature‖ (2006: 464, 479). Later, this study was challenged by scholars, such as Howell and 
Peavehouse, who argued that Congress plays an important role in the presidential use of force. 
According to this work, presidents are less likely to exercise military force when their opponents 
have control of Congress (2007). In fact, ―as partisan support within Congress increases, presidents 
engage in military initiatives more and more often; but as support within Congress wanes so does 
the frequency with which presidents exercise their authority to use military force abroad‖ (2002: 2).  
In addition to investigating the impact of the US Congress and domestic institutions, scholars of the 
diversionary theory of war have also investigated the effect of international support on, and the role 
of international organizations in, the instrumental use of force by the US presidents. Chapman and 
Reiter, in their study on the ―rally round the flag‖ effect, probed the influence of the support of the 
United Nations Security Council on the rally effect. In this study, they found that when ―proposed 
uses of force attract the support of the United Nations Security Council, the rally in support of the 
American president increases significantly‖ (2004: 886). 
Although the US presidential use of force has dominated diversionary scholarship, recently scholars 
started to test this theory in countries other than the United States. In the diversionary literature, one 
of the most convincing non-US cases has been the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands. 
According to many observers, Argentinean aggression was a result of the domestic economic and 
political crises in Argentina at the time (Hasting and Jenkins, 1983; Lebow, 1985). More subtle 
analyses of the conflict by Vakili and Levy (1992) and later by Oakes (2006) reached similar 
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conclusions about the diversionary motives of Argentinean leaders. Vakili and Levy focused on the 
intra-military conflict whereas Oakes introduced some other variables, including low state extractive 
capacity as an explanation of the diversionary nature of the conflict. Even more interestingly, some 
scholars explained the British reaction to the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands with the 
diversionary theory. Hasting and Jenkings (1983) and Lebow (1985) argued that British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher decided to go to war with Argentina, over an island that had no 
economic or strategic importance to Britain, after considering the domestic benefits for her 
leadership. The diversionary motivations of the British leaders were later studied more extensively by 
scholars, such as Morgan and Anderson and Lai and Reiter. For instance, Morgan and Anderson, in 
their attempt to test the applicability of diversionary theory in the context of the UK, found that the 
level of public support for the British government in the time period of 1950-1992 was associated 
with the probability of Britain displaying or using force abroad (1999). Lai and Reiter later extended 
these findings to cover the time period of 1948 to 2001, and reached a parallel but a more detailed 
conclusion about the ―rally round the flag‖ effect (2005). 
Recently, scholars have also tried to extend the temporal domain of the diversionary use of force 
and apply the theory to more historical cases, such as the foreign policies of states during World War 
I (James, 1987), and the politics of Italian city-states (Sobek, 2007). Other spatial extensions of 
diversionary studies include Ye‘s study of China‘s use of force between 1978 and 1992 (2002), 
Vengrof‘s work on Africa (1980), Pickering and Kissangani‘s research on Rwanda (2005), and 
Mambo and Schoefield‘s study on Tanzania (2005: 2007). Even more recently, scholars have 
increasingly looked into the use of military force in domestic politics for diversionary purposes. For 
example, Tir and Jasinski showed that the embattled leader of a country can elicit domestic support 
by using armed force against an ethnic minority group within its borders. They called this domestic 
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diversion and suggested that it is a less costly and risky method than other forms of externalization 
(2008, 2009). 
Finally, scholars of Middle East studies often refer to the diversionary intention of political leaders 
in order to explain some critical foreign policy decisions of the leaders in this region. Diplomatic 
historians and political observers have especially stressed the political use of force by Arab and 
Israeli leaders in this region. Most of these scholars argued that the conflict-prone nature of the 
region is partly a result of the political use of force by Middle Eastern leaders. When confronted 
with an economic crisis or high levels of social instability, these leaders blame some external entities 
for their failures. Fouad Ajami, in his book on Arab predicament, cites an article by an Arab 
intellectual who points out this characteristic in Arab leaders. Ajami says the following of the Arab 
intellectual‘s observations: 
He noted the tendency among Arab officials, spokesmen, and even some critics to 
lay the blame for defeat elsewhere instead of accepting responsibility. Some were 
quick to explain away the defeat by pointing American and British participation in 
the war. Others went further and accused the USSR of plotting the Arab defeat. 
Finally there were those who declared it was Allah‘s will (1992: 39). 
More recently, experts of Middle Eastern politics have expressed the significance of taking into 
account the diversionary maneuvers of Middle Eastern leaders in order to reach a meaningful peace 
in the region. For example, Martin Indyk and the Richard Haas stressed the importance of resolving 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to prevent the diversionary aggressions of the Middle Eastern 
leaders towards Israel. They argued that the ―failure to resolve the Palestinian issue provides these 
leaders with an excellent excuse for diverting the attention of their people from their own 
shortcomings‖ and scapegoat the State of Israel for their failures (2008: 25).  However, despite this 
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general assumption that the Middle Eastern leaders frequently employ diversionary strategies in 
order to stay in power in these countries, the diversionary theory has not been utilized well in the 
field of Middle Eastern studies. The journalistic accounts and the limited number of case studies 
have been insufficient to constitute cumulative knowledge in the field and to contribute significantly 
to the theoretical advancement of the diversionary theory of war.4 
Theoretical Reformulations 
Before analyzing the relationship between leadership traits and the selection of different diversionary 
strategies, this dissertation aims to revise and refine some basic premises of the classical diversionary 
theory of war. One of the most significant contributions of this research will be its attempt to rescue 
the diversionary theory from war. It will be argued that the diversionary theory can be used to 
explain more than just war and the use of force.  Various presidential dramas, including summits, 
peacemaking ventures, and foreign trips can also be parts of a broader strategy of political leaders to 
                                                          
4 Some of the premises of diversionary theory have been utilized to explain conflicts in the Middle East, 
especially those between Arab states and Israel, though not in a very systematic manner. Among those, 
Dawisha argues that during the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein constantly blamed Persians in order to unify 
his people and overcome religious differences within its borders (2002). In addition, Demir, in his analysis of 
Turkish politics, explores the use of diversionary aggression by the leaders of Turkey during domestic political 
conflicts. In a similar way, Tsakonas, in his study of Turkey‘s foreign policy, projects possible future 
aggression by Turkey against Greece and Cyprus in order to divert attention away from political unrest during 
the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria (2001). Other prominent examples in this field include 
Nasser‘s aggressive policies in 1967 when he was facing a possible coup (James 2005; Mor 1991) and Anwar 
Sadat‘s attack on Israel when the economy of Egypt was experiencing major setbacks (Stein, 1985; 
Rabinovich, 2004; Israeli, 1985). In some instances, Israeli aggression in the region against the Arab states was 
also interpreted as an attempt by Israeli policymakers to divert attention from Israel‘s own economic and 
social problems. For example, Cashman and Robinson argue that ―as early as 1964 the Israeli government 
began purposefully to pursue policies that were designed to antagonize the Arab states in order to induce a 
diversionary war‖ (2007: 179-180).  Later other scholars also investigated this link between Israeli domestic 
politics and foreign policy and claimed the existence of correlations between elections and the use of force 
(Barzilai and Russet, 1990) and between the frequency of Israeli demonstrations and Israeli limited military 
attacks (Sprecher and DeRouen, 2002). These arguments were later refined and revised by scholars including 
Kuperman (2003) and D‘Abramo (2005). D‘Abramo in his study argues that ―although most Israeli responses 
to Palestinian terrorism follow a strategy of tit-for-tat, there have been instances in which Israeli leaders have 
altered their policies prior to an election, using force to increase public support and create diversionary effect‖ 
(2005: 3).  
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divert the attention of their domestic public. Taking into account these less risky and less costly 
foreign policy endeavors will also help us to question an implicit assumption in the literature - US 
exceptionalism. The diversionary theory focuses predominantly on presidential use of force and 
because it focuses on this particular diversionary tactic, which is risky and costly, it assumes that only 
US presidents can afford to use foreign policy to divert the public‘s attention from domestic 
problems. However, the inclusion of some other diversionary mechanisms in the analysis of the 
diversionary theory will demonstrate that the leaders of not-so-great powers also try to divert the 
attention of their publics with their foreign policies. Hence, these revisions will acknowledge the 
diversionary theory as a theory of foreign policy, rather than solely a theory of war.  After making 
these modifications to the theory, I will focus on the role of a leader‘s leadership traits in the 
selection of different diversionary mechanisms, which will provide an individualistic approach to 
diversionary studies and bring the decision-maker back into the diversionary theory.  
This dissertation will also contribute to overcoming some of the theoretical and methodological 
limitations of diversionary studies and expand upon the literature by raising new questions. It will be 
part of the cumulative knowledge on diversionary studies by building on previous empirical findings. 
In order to achieve these goals and in order to generate a new approach toward analyzing 
diversionary behavior of states, different islands of theories are going to be integrated with 
diversionary scholarship in this dissertation. It will focus and revise the mainstream dependent and 
independent variables and also broaden the scope of diversionary studies by taking into account 
states other than the great powers and bringing the decision-makers back in. In the remainder of this 
section, the aforementioned propositions will be discussed at length and in depth.  
Diversionary Theory of Foreign Policy? 
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The diversionary theory of war literature has been known as a theory of war and international 
conflict that links domestic problems and conflicts within a country with international disputes. 
Scholars have for many years investigated diversionary motivations of leaders in times of violent 
external conflicts and wars. However, there have been several drawbacks to this premise. The theory 
in its traditional version considers violent externalization as the only possible tool for a political 
leader to divert the attention of his/her domestic public. This means that a leader can only deflect 
the attention of its population through declaring war or using force against an external foe or enemy. 
Despite the findings elicited in public opinion literature regarding the rally effect of other forms of 
foreign policy actions, most scholars have failed to integrate these different findings with 
diversionary scholarship to form a more comprehensive theory of diversion. The rare studies that 
have aimed to examine the use of more cooperative foreign policy strategies, and those that have 
focused on conflictual foreign policy attitudes short of war, have remained marginal.5  In this study, 
I aim to take into account both cooperative and conflictual uses of foreign policy for domestic 
diversionary purposes.   
Since the inception of systematic scholarship on the diversionary theory, there has been a pseudo-
consensus that external use of force is the dependent variable in studies, even though there have 
been constant debates and discussions about the independent variables. The idea of diverting the 
attention of the domestic public has been almost identified with the external use of force and the 
launching of an international conflict. This consensus in the literature has resulted in the extensive 
use of datasets on wars and violent conflicts, such as the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset, which 
was compiled by the Correlates of War Project developed by Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996). 
                                                          
5 Ann Rivlin‘s doctoral dissertation, ―Diversionary Foreign Policy?‖ (2008), is a recent example of  these 
studies that take into account diversion with cooperative foreign policy gestures.  
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An early assessment of the dependent variable of diversionary studies was made by Joe Hagan in 
1986. Hagan, in his study, argued that the leaders of countries with domestic problems can act 
assertively to divert attention away from domestic issues and enhance the image of their regimes. 
However, these leaders also show some restraint in order to avoid costly military and economic 
reactions by foreign actors, and may prefer diversionary policies other than war. Two years after this 
preliminary suggestion, Levy raised this issue in his seminal review of the literature (1989). After 
criticizing a lack of attention to the nature of the dependent variable, Levy emphasized the need to 
also focus on actions of externalization short of war. For Levy, these ―actions short of war are 
generally more cost-effective in achieving the desired internal effect than an actual war‖ (1989: 281).  
Later, during the 1990s, Morgan and Bickers (1992) also stressed the need to extend the dependent 
variable to include other foreign policy actions. According to them:  
We should not assume…that leaders faced with domestic turmoil will choose to 
initiate war as a diversionary tactic. Lower levels of hostile actions, such as threats to 
use force, shows of force, and uses of force short of war may be adequate to create 
the perception of a foreign threat, are less costly and less risky, and may actually be 
more effective at increasing domestic cohesion…Lower levels of foreign 
aggressiveness may be preferred as a means of rallying domestic support. (1992: 32) 
In this study, they go so far as to highlight the possibility of using more positive foreign policy 
actions, such as entering into peace talks or negotiating over arms limitations agreements (1992: 35). 
This idea was repeated by Richards, Morgan, Wilson, Schwebach and Young (1993) who stated that 
―it may be possible for a leader to accomplish the goals of diversion through other types of actions, 
such as highly visible, cooperative foreign policies‖ (529).  In addition, Heldt, in his review essay 
(1995), once again opens the discussion on dependent variables and points out the reviving of 
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interest ―among researchers in examining whether states become more externally aggressive rather 
than actually turn to the use- rather than just threats- of actual armed force‖ (104).  
In more recent studies, scholars including Ann Rivlin have started to challenge the predominant 
view in diversionary scholarship and argued that, in terms of US foreign policy, the president can 
rally people as the commander-in-chief and also as a peacemaker or a diplomatic giant. Rivlin, in her 
study, states:   
Scholars promoting a diversionary theory of war have argued incorrectly that the 
only role the president has that can sway public opinion is the role of commander in 
chief. Diversionary theory, first discussed by Kinglake during the Crimean War and 
since then examined by such scholars as Levy and DeRouen, takes as its base the 
idea that leaders adopt conflictual foreign policies to divert the attention of the 
public away from domestic problems. In its original articulation, the theory looks 
only at instances of political leaders starting a war. While scholars investigating this 
theory are correct that the president utilizing military troops potentially could result 
in a rallying of the population, they mistakenly ignore other roles the president can 
use to his advantage. In particular, it is possible that the position of the president as 
the chief diplomat and as the voice of the government to the people also can be 
utilized by the president to boost public opinion. Both these roles carry with them 
media attention and symbolic appeal and tend to be associated with non-conflictual 
activities such as speeches, trips, and negotiations. (2008: 8) 
In fact, many scholars have noted that leaders often perceive foreign affairs as an area where they 
have relatively greater autonomy compared to domestic politics (Berthoud and Brady, 2001). 
Scholars like Wildavsky have argued that the leaders of countries have greater room for action in 
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terms of foreign policy for several reasons, including the need for rapid action in foreign policy-
related issues and the presence of an uninformed public. They have further suggested that when 
leaders are constrained in domestic politics, they will turn to foreign policy in order to present 
themselves as active executives (Wildavsky, 1991;  Fishback, 2005). In addition, the relative lack of 
access of the members of the opposition parties to foreign policy decision-making processes 
provides leaders with more independence in the foreign policy realm. The meetings and negotiations 
with foreign leaders and the constant flow of information to the executive branch from the foreign 
policy bureaucracy help the leader and the government to sustain a large information gap with the 
public and the opposition during their term in office. Particularly since the end of the World War II, 
with the advent of increasing diplomatic relations due to technological advancements in 
communication and transportation and changes in the nature of international relations, the role of 
the leader as the main foreign policy decision-maker of a country has become much more obvious 
and autonomous.   
In the context of the US presidency, scholars like Marra, Ostrom, and Simon have explained this 
autonomy with the rights and guarantees that are provided to the president by the US Constitution. 
They state that the branches of the US government have created a ―foreign policy leader role‖ that 
provides the president with more room for maneuvers and unilateral action than do the roles of 
manager of economics and domestic policy initiator (Marra, Ostrom and Simon, 1990: 591-592). 
They argue that, in terms of economic issues, in most instances, the president needs the approval 
and support of Congress, which has the power of the purse and which has jurisdiction over the 
major components of fiscal policy. Moreover, domestic program initiation also demands 
considerable endorsement and approval from Congress. However, presidents have a wider scope of 
authority in foreign policy, including with regard to using military force, travelling to a summit or 
concluding an executive agreement (Marra et. al 1990: 591-592). Marra, Ostrom and Simon also 
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underline several examples of Supreme Court decisions and constitutional guarantees that give the 
US president a great deal of autonomy in foreign policy decision-making and implementation. For 
them, since the FDR administration, the decisions of the Supreme Court and Congress have 
institutionalized a unique role for the president in foreign and military policy. For example:  
The Supreme Court declared the president to be the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations, who could exercise authority which 
did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. Moreover, 
throughout the modern era, the judicial system has been most reluctant to rule 
against presidential exercises of authority in foreign and military affairs… Thus the 
judicial system has been instrumental in establishing and maintaining the president‘s 
ability to act unilaterally in foreign affairs. (Marra, Ostrom, and Simon: 591) 
In addition, Marra et al argue that developments in technology and telecommunication in the 
modern era have provided opportunities for the president to become more international and to 
engage more regularly in foreign affairs. These developments have increased presidents‘ 
opportunities to travel and to dispatch US forces abroad as well as the ability of presidents to convey 
foreign policy-related messages to the domestic public. Moreover, the increasing US involvement in 
world politics and the entry of the US into military and economic alliances since the end of World 
War II have provided more opportunities for presidents to engage in high-level diplomacy. (Marra et 
al., 1990: 592) Hess described this new situation of the presidency as follows: 
The President now devotes a larger part of his time to foreign policy, perhaps as 
much as two-thirds. This is true even if his pre-presidential interests had been mainly 
in the domestic area. He takes trips abroad, attends summit meetings, greets heads of 
state at the White House. Like Kennedy, he believes that "the big difference" 
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between domestic and foreign policy "is that between a bill being defeated and the 
country [being] wiped out." But he also turns to foreign policy because it is the area 
in which he has the most authority to act and, until recently, the least public and 
congressional restraint on his actions. Moreover, history usually rewards the foreign-
policy President, and the longer a President stays in office, the larger in his mind 
looms his "place in history." (1977: 45) 
For many scholars, foreign policy not only provides more freedom to a leader in terms of decision-
making, but also provides a better means of gaining public support than domestic political issues. 
Previous studies on the nexus of public opinion and a president‘s foreign policy have demonstrated 
that an achievement in foreign policy has a more positive impact on the approval rates of the 
presidents than an achievement in domestic politics. For example, in his study on US presidents, 
Lowi gives the example of Reagan‘s presidency to show the effect of foreign policy on approval rate. 
He states:  
Note well that as the economy moving upward at a smooth albeit impressive rate, 
President Reagan‘s approval profile was developing in a more jagged fashion. The six 
point jump in May 1983 can not be laid beside a specific domestic economic 
development, but it can be understood as a fairly immediate response to the violent 
initiation of the United States into the Lebanese conflict…It should be recalled that 
the Lebanon crisis was in an important sense a culmination, perhaps even a 
confirmation, of President Reagan‘s effort to mobilize the American people around 
fear of East-West conflict, an effort begun with the ―evil-empire‖ speech of 
February and carried even further in March with his famous ―star wars‖ address to 
Congress. (Lowi, 1985: 16-17) 
45 | P a g e  
 
In this relatively autonomous foreign policy sphere, a leader usually has more than just one policy 
option to use for domestic purposes. Foreign policy provides the decision-maker a set of alternative 
modes of responses, which he or she can use in different circumstances (Most and Starr, 1989; Starr, 
2000). The leader, depending on his preferences, constraints, and opportunities, can select or 
prioritize one of these policy actions in one instance and another in another instance (Clark and 
Reed, 2005). Most and Starr described this foreign policy substitutability by raising two issues. First 
of all, they argued that ―through time and across space, similar factors could be plausibly be 
expected to trigger different foreign policy acts‖ (1989: 383) and secondly, ―different processes 
could plausibly be expected to lead similar results‖ (ibid). According to them, ―if foreign policies can 
indeed be alternative routes by which decision makers attain their goals, then it would seem plausible 
that decision makers who are confronted with some problem or subjected to some stimulus could, 
under at least certain conditions, substitute one such means for another‖ (1989: 387). In fact, a 
problem that causes a particular foreign policy response in one instance, at a different time may 
result in another distinct behavior. As Bennett and Nordstrom indicated, if the same cause can lead 
to different policy choices, then the mainstream linear approach to testing becomes difficult ―since it 
assumes that a given cause will always lead to a particular single outcome‖ (2000: 33). If a leader of a 
country is motivated to achieve a specific goal, then there may be several different policies that will 
help the leader to attain that goal (Bennett and Nordstrom: 34), and neglecting these other paths 
may limit the options of the leader (Palmer and Bhandari, 2000). Considering this substitutability in 
foreign policy, as de Mesquita argues, it is shortsighted to assume that a leader will externalize in a 
consistently similar fashion in response to domestic problems instead of considering other possible 
policy choices (1985: 130).  
An innovative initial attempt to take into account foreign policy substitutability in the context of a 
leader using foreign policy to divert the domestic public‘s attention from internal economic 
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problems was made by Bennett and Nordstrom (2000). Although they did not directly deal in their 
studies with the different options available to leaders to divert the attention of their populations, 
Bennett and Nordstrom emphasized the availability of multiple foreign policy options in response to 
domestic conditions.  According to them, a state involved in an international conflict may react to 
emerging domestic economic problems by either escalating the conflict in order to divert the 
public‘s attention from the economic problems or seeking to settle the rivalry to free up resources. 
In both instances, a leader can relieve himself from the pressure that he faces in the domestic realm 
(2000). Later, scholars like Clark also underlined the existence of multiple means of diversion for 
political leaders facing domestic problems; however, they did not provide a comprehensive and 
systematic study of this idea. For instance Clark, in his study, states: 
The notion that leaders have incentives to turn to military adventurism in the face of 
domestic adversity fails to recognize other policy tools those leaders can invoke with 
less risk and greater chances of success. Moreover it ignores the extent to which 
domestic political institutions restrain executive entrepreneurialism. (2001: 637) 
In this study, I take into account these arguments by scholars of foreign policy and aim to integrate 
the notion of foreign policy substitutability with the diversionary theory of war. Such integration is 
possible by taking into account policy options other than war or use of force for leaders who aim to 
deflect the attention of the domestic public. In the remainder of this section, I will enumerate some 
other strategies and methods that leaders can use in order to divert the attention of their domestic 
constituencies.  
Empirical studies in the field of foreign policy have revealed that leaders usually make a cost-benefit 
analysis before making a foreign policy decision and usually prefer less costly and less risky foreign 
policy strategies. Due to their high cost and risk, war and other uses of force may not be the first 
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preference of a political leader, particularly in a country facing economic problems and where leader 
needs the approval of the legislature in order to declare war. In such circumstances, it may be 
difficult for a political leader to engage in such an action for the sake of his political survival and 
regardless of the national interest. Furthermore, to launch a military attack or start a war requires 
more time and responsibility than other possible foreign policy options. The tasks that are involved 
in launching a military attack or starting a war include but are not limited to strategic planning by the 
defense department, scheduling the attacks, transporting combat units, and preparing logistical and 
physical support for the troops. Moreover, instead of a short, decisive victory, war may be 
prolonged and become a quagmire for the president. Because of these risks, before using force, the 
leader of a country may be willing to consider other policy options, including threats to use force 
and shows of force, such as military parades and maneuvers. There are numerous examples of these 
types of foreign policy actions that are interpreted as diversionary in nature by international 
observers and analysts, including China‘s massive military exercise in the Taiwan Strait, which was 
interpreted as a way to stoke nationalism to divert attention from China‘s domestic problems, such 
as unemployment (The Strait Times, 2001), the anti-India statements of Pakistani officials and anti-
Pakistani statements of Indian officials before and during elections (The Independent 1999), Ariel 
Sharon‘s constant threats to Lebanon (BBC Monitoring, 2002) and Armenia‘s temporary violations 
of the ceasefire on the Azeri border (BBC Monitoring, 2008).  
In addition to these hostile actions of foreign policy short of war, other forms of aggressive and 
non-military foreign policy actions have also proven to have rallying effects for leaders. For example, 
economic sanctions have been considered important foreign policy tools that can also be used for 
domestic purposes. Scholars such as Baldwin have mentioned economic sanctions as one of the 
three ways of conducting foreign policy, together with diplomacy and war. According to Baldwin, a 
leader can use diplomacy, economic sanctions, or military force to coerce a foreign government to 
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do something (1985). 6  Scholars such as Lindsay (1986), Rivlin (2008) and Ozdemir and Taydas 
(2007) have emphasized that leaders can also employ economic sanctions to deal with some 
domestic problems. Lindsay, in her study on economic sanctions, lists a government‘s attempt to 
increase its domestic support as one of the five reasons for economic sanctions (1986).  According 
to her, in certain instances, political leaders prefer to use economic sanctions instead of military 
force in order to distract the public‘s attention and provide a popularity boost. For instance, ―[t]he 
Eisenhower administration embargoed Cuba two weeks before the presidential election, partly to 
improve Nixon‘s electoral chances (Schreiber, 1973: 393). Similarly, Britain imposed sanctions on 
Italy in 1935 to appease domestic outrage at the invasion of Abyssinia (Baer, 1973: 167-168)‖ 
(Lindsay, 1986; 156). Lindsay also provides different examples of successful domestic use of 
economic sanctions. According to her:  
With the public clamoring for an embargo, British officials led the sanctions drive at 
the League of Nations. The National Government called new elections and, running 
on a pro-sanctions platform, won additional seats in Parliament. As former Prime 
Minister Lloyd George remarked wryly at the time ―Sanctions came too late to save 
Abyssinia but they are just in time to save the Government…  
The oil embargo succeeded spectacularly as a domestic symbol for the Saudi 
monarchy. Saudis applauded the concrete demonstrations of the regime‘s 
commitment to the Palestinians…the embargo infused the Saudi system more 
legitimacy at home than it had ever enjoyed… 
                                                          
6 Drury gives the example of  the development of  crisis between the US and Iraq during the First Gulf  War 
to demonstrate the use of  these different measures, starting from diplomatic negotiations, following 
economic sanctions, and finally ending up with the use of  military force (2001). 
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Sanctions also benefited Jimmy Carter during the Iran crisis. The week the hostages 
were seized, 32 percent approved and 55 percent disapproved of his handling of the 
Presidency. One month later, 61 percent approved and 30 percent disapproved.  
This dramatic reversal partly reflects the tendency of the American public to rally 
behind the President during a crisis, but it also reflects approval of the sanctions. 
(Lindsay, 1986: 167-168) 
Rivlin (2008), in her study, explains political leaders‘ use of the foreign policy tool of economic 
sanctions to confront domestic problems as follows: 
Presidents, inclined to act to increase support among their partisan supporters may 
find restraints on their ability to use force because of public attention to foreign 
policy issues. In these situations, the president is more likely to turn to visible non-
use of force actions. I argue that a president, faced with these possible constraints on 
the use of force, could turn to sanctions, which may be an option for presidents who 
"...seemingly feel compelled to dramatize their opposition to foreign misdeeds..." As 
a result, it is possible that an implementation of sanctions is a likely substitute for a 
use of force—it sends a strong statement that the president is handling the situation, 
but does not risk the costs associated with a use of force, and is thus less offensive to 
a foreign-policy attuned public. (2008: 80) 
 
Rivlin states that President Jimmy Carter frequently used economic sanctions as a substitute for 
military force during his presidency. For her, since Jimmy Carter‘s presidency, economic sanctions 
have proven to be a popular policy tool among presidents and presidents have more frequently 
employed them for domestic purposes (2008: 76). With the end of the Cold War, economic 
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sanctions have been used even more frequently in international relations due to the desire to rely less 
on military force (Drury, 2000: 2001).  Although there is still a need for a systematic study in this 
field to clarify the relationship between sanctions and domestic politics, the writings of these 
scholars from diverse backgrounds strongly suggest that economic sanctions may be used in order to 
boost presidential popularity and to divert attention from domestic problems.  
The aforementioned studies demonstrate the forms of aggressive and conflictual foreign policies 
short of war and armed conflict that can be, and have been, used to rally the domestic public. Other 
studies that focus on the interaction between public opinion and foreign policy reveal that non-
conflictual and cooperative foreign policy actions can also be used as strategies to rally the public 
around the president. Mueller, in his study, provides a classification of possible foreign policy actions 
that created rallying effects between the Truman and Johnson presidencies. According to him, these 
actions include the following categories: 
First there are the four instances of sudden American military intervention: Korea, 
Lebanon, the Bay of Pigs and the Dominican Republic. A second closely related 
category encompasses major military developments in ongoing war; in Korea, the 
Inchon landing, and the Chinese intervention; in Vietnam, the Tonkin Bay episode, 
the beginning of the bombing of North Vietnam, the major extension of this 
bombing, and the Tet offensive. Third are the major diplomatic developments of the 
period: crises over Cuban missiles, the U2 and atomic testing, the enunciation of the 
Truman doctrine with its offer of aid to Greece and Turkey, the beginning of and 
major changes in the peace talks in Korea and Vietnam, and the several crises in 
Berlin. Fourth are the two dramatic technological developments: Sputnik and the 
announcement of the first Soviet atomic test. The fifth category includes the 
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meetings between the president and the head of the Soviet Union at Potsdam in 
1945, Geneva in 1955, Camp David in 1959, Paris in 1960, Vienna in 1961, and 
Glassboro in 1967. (1973: 210)   
Although Mueller stressed the rallying effect of these different foreign policy developments, scholars 
did not pay the same attention to more diplomatic and cooperative actions in the context of 
diversionary theory. However, these different forms of foreign policy actions have been studied 
extensively by scholars who focus on the relationship between public opinion and policy, such as 
Lammers (1982), MacKuen (1983), Simon and Ostrom (1989), Marra, Ostrom and Simon (1990), 
and Brace and Hinckley (1992). These scholars point out that different form of presidential dramas, 
such as presidential trips, foreign policy speeches and peacemaking ventures, can boost approval 
rates of the presidents.  
According to the studies in the field of public opinion, there are several positive and cooperative 
foreign actions that can be employed by political leaders in order to boost their approval ratings or 
to divert the public‘s attention from political and economic problems. Among these, presidential 
dramas constitute one of the most studied forms of foreign policy behaviors with domestic 
purposes. Simon and Ostrom, in their studies on presidential dramas, divide the dramas into three 
groups, which include televised speeches, foreign travels and presidentially relevant events (1989). 
For instance, in terms of the effects of televised speeches on the popularity of the presidents, 
Ostrom and Simon argue:  
The televised speech enables the president to operate in a setting where he is 
unhindered by rival decision makers or aggressive reporters. It thus supplies the 
opportunity to focus public attention, cultivate public support, and use it to acquire 
leverage over competing decision makers. (1989: 61) 
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Other scholars have also pointed out the impact of speeches on presidents‘ approval ratings. 
According to Ann Rivlin, many studies on this topic conclude that declining levels of public 
approval lead a president to give more addresses. Rivlin stated that: 
Ragsdale suggests that changes in public approval lead a president to give more 
major addresses or addresses broadcast on television. Her analysis included the years 
1949 to 1980. Hart concurred with this finding; he argued that presidents respond to 
low popularity with increased speechmaking. Andrade and Young, in their attempt to 
identify the conditions under which a president will turn to foreign policy topics in 
his public addresses, also report that public opinion plays a role in speechmaking 
decisions. Their analysis of addresses from 1953 to 1993 includes presidential 
speeches with exclusively foreign policy content, and concludes that ―new emphasis 
on foreign policy may not reflect any particular increase in foreign policy problems, 
or any particular configuration of international interests, but simply an opportunity 
for a president to cultivate [an] image of power and influence in the wake of a 
declining ability to affect domestic policy.‖ (2005: 8) 
Andrade, in her study also discusses presidential speechmaking and states that: 
Presidential rhetoric and speechmaking can easily be seen as an influential tool of 
governing…Presidents may use their office as a ―bully pulpit‖ and attempt to divert 
attention away from domestic concerns by emphasizing foreign policy. The 
president‘s position as a national and global leader gives him unequaled media 
coverage and unique opportunity to address and attempt to influence public 
opinion…  
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…president may change the topic or focus of any speech, reflecting the need to 
divert public attention. (Andrade, 2003: 57) 
Scholars in the field of public opinion also indicated the significance of the subject of the speeches. 
For scholars like Rivlin, in these speeches, presidents usually concentrate on foreign policy issues. 
According to her: 
….the president may seek to focus attention on foreign policy issues by criticizing 
another state, individual, or action in the international realm in a nationally broadcast 
address…Rather than risking lives, and the start of a conflict that may become 
unpopular if it drags on, the president could create a sense of crisis and rally the 
population by highlighting undesirable actions by another international actor in a 
speech broadcast to the nation. In other words, the president criticizes other actors 
in order to focus the attention of the American voters on the international realm and 
away from other issues that may affect their voting behavior. (Rivlin, 2008: 85) 
A second set of presidential dramas that has been commonly cited in the literature includes 
presidents‘ foreign trips, which involve a high level of diplomatic interaction and capture substantial 
media attention. For many scholars, foreign travels play a significant role in raising the status and 
standing of a president and making him look more like a leader.(Lammers, 1982; Hart, 1987). For 
example, Kernell stressed that ―[m]eetings abroad with other heads of state are especially valuable in 
reminding the electorate of the weighty responsibilities of office and of the president‘s diligence in 
attending to them‖ (1986: 95). MacKuen, in his analysis of presidential dramas (1983), tested this 
hypothesis and concluded that an overseas tour or a summit can raise the popularity of the 
president. Technological improvements in transportation and the increasing ease of travelling 
overseas have caused an increase in leaders‘ use of this foreign policy tool for domestic purposes   
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(Brace and Hinckley, 1992: 53). Technological developments have also enabled timely and live 
coverage of these presidential trips by the media. Today, presidential summits and meetings are 
covered more extensively and promptly than years ago. This increased coverage has increased the 
influence of these meetings on the public‘s perception of presidents.   
In another study conducted on this topic, Brace and Hinckley found that presidents can utilize 
foreign trips to increase their popularity and to carve out their own place in history, in addition to 
using them to strengthen their nation‘s foreign policy According to this study, most of a US 
president‘s foreign travels are strategic and reactive and they are more likely to occur during election 
years and during times of economic problems. The study also revealed that the timing of some of 
these trips is both inversely and significantly related to a president‘s approval rating. Brace and 
Hinckley contended that while these trips may be announced for foreign policy objectives, they are 
timed closely with conditions affecting a president‘s support at home (1993; also see Hansen, 2004). 
For example, Samuel Kernel argued that Eisenhower‘s ―good will‖ tour was organized at a time 
when the presidential approval rating was his main consideration (1986). In addition, many 
characterized Nixon‘s 19-day trip to the Middle East and the Soviet Union in June and July of 1974 
as political theatre (Drew, 1974). While he was in the Middle East, his press secretary, Ron Zeigler, 
conceded to a US information agency official that they hoped to use the press coverage of Nixon‘s 
meeting with leaders as a means to restore stature to the office and increase his approval rating 
(Berthoud and Brady, 2001). President Reagan‘s staffers also admitted that his trip to Europe had 
similar goals. Kernel stated, ―Because the polls were showing a drop in the president‘s popularity, 
which made him vulnerable in Washington, his advisers decided that conferring on location with 
European heads of state would be good for his image as a leader‖ (Kernell, 1986: 96). Clinton‘s 
foreign visits in 1998, his most troubled year in office, also received similar forms of criticism. He 
was the most-traveled president ever, and 1998, the year that he was facing impeachment by 
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Congress, was his most-traveled year. His 11-day trip to Africa with 1300 federal officials and his 10-
day trip to China, which was rescheduled from an earlier time, led many to have suspicions about his 
motivations. Even one Clinton official anonymously conceded to some journalists that ―pictures of 
the President with world leaders are always nice‖ (Berthoud and Brady, 2001). To sum up, as 
scholars like Rivlin contended ―a president seeking re-election and facing a decline in his public 
approval ratings will be more likely to use personal presidential diplomacy as he is gearing up his re-
election campaign‖ (2008: 84). 7 
Peace-making ventures constitute another form of presidential foreign policy that can create a 
diversionary effect. Such ventures include mediating disputes between nations, signing bilateral 
agreements and sending peacekeeping forces to another country. For example, MacKuen (1983) 
observed a sharp but temporary rise in presidents‘ approval ratings after their diplomatic endeavors 
at peacemaking. In his study, he mentioned Carter‘s Camp David peace agreement and Nixon‘s 
announcement of the end of the war in Indochina as examples of these forms of endeavors. 
According to him, both of these actions produced a sudden rise in the presidents‘ approval ratings 
by as much as 15 points (1983: 165) Scholars like Baker also emphasized the rallying nature of these 
diplomatic ventures. For Baker (1999), the American public rallies behind the president during 
international summits and peace conferences, as well as during international conflicts. Baker 
asserted: 
If the conventional wisdom is that the American public will rally behind the 
commander-in-chief during episodes of international conflict and tension, then one 
might assume that same public should be at least equally supportive of the chief 
                                                          
7 She also cited several other scholars, including Andersen and Farrell (1996) and Goldstein (1996), who 
argued that presidents strategically attend summits and make foreign visits for domestic purposes and in an 
effort to present themselves to the voters as peacemakers. 
56 | P a g e  
 
executive in response to more positive, non-crisis rally events- when sources of 
international tension are resolved, when superpower summits are held, when peace 
treaties and arms agreements are announced, unless of course such responses are 
perceived as weakness. (Baker, 1999: 6) 
Hagan also argued that in addition to using force towards another state, leaders may use 
international cooperation. A high-level diplomatic action may demonstrate to an authoritarian 
leader‘s domestic public that he is being dealt with and recognized as an equal by the world‘s leading 
statesmen and thereby result in an equal degree of rallying among the domestic population (Hagan, 
1993: 49). 8 Scholars such as Burbach also discussed peace-promoting events as possible rallying 
events, but with several conditions, including extensive media coverage, presidential involvement 
and popularity among the American people (2003).  
In fact, numerous studies on the interaction between public opinion and foreign policy have pointed 
out the rallying effects of different foreign policy actions. These studies have demonstrated that 
presidents‘ approval ratings can rise with different foreign policy actions, including foreign policy 
speeches, foreign trips, and peace-making ventures as well as the engagement in external conflicts or 
escalating crises. In this study, I aim to build on these studies by integrating them under the 
framework of a diversionary foreign policy. In addition to accounting for the use of conflictual 
diversionary foreign policy actions, this study takes into consideration the use of non-conflictual and 
of cooperative ways of diverting the attention of the domestic audience. It argues that the leader of a 
                                                          
8 In a rare attempt to systematize the study of this sort of positive diversionary initiatives, Cho proposed a 
―diversionary-compliance‖ hypothesis of nuclear renunciation where leaders give up nuclear weapons to stay 
in power. According to Cho, the hypothesis is diversionary in the sense that leaders have an ulterior motive of 
staying in power and keeping their jobs by complying with some international norms. In fact, when domestic 
crisis threatens the leader‘s tenure, he may decide to signal friendly gestures and build alliances to obtain 
support from the international community rather than going war. Cho tests this hypothesis on South Africa 
by process-tracing its nuclear history and reaches the conclusion that when the degrees of domestic crisis and 
foreign pressure were high, its nuclear posture turned dovish (Cho, 2004).   
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country facing domestic problems can achieve the same diversionary ends by pursuing aggressive 
foreign policies short of war, including threatening to use force, as well as by implementing 
cooperative foreign policies, including aligning with another state, or attending a summit to negotiate 
a peace agreement. In fact, in this study, diversionary foreign policy action means any foreign policy 
action taken by leaders in order to divert the public‘s attention from domestic problems and to gain 
domestic popularity.  
Diversion in States other than the United States 
The second limitation of diversionary scholarship that I will address in this dissertation is the 
presence of US exceptionalism. With the exception of a few recent studies that investigate the use of 
diversionary foreign policy by leaders of countries such as Syria (Lawson, 1996; Bronson, 2000), 
Egypt (Lawson, 1992), Turkey (Demir, 2006), Rwanda (Pickering and Kisangani, 2005), Israel 
(Aronson and Horowitz, 1971; Blechman, 1972; Mintz and Russett, 1992; Russett and Barzilai, 
1992), and Tanzania (Mambo and Shoefield, 2005), diversionary scholarship has primarily focused 
on the diversionary use of force by great powers, particularly by the United States. In fact, among 
scholars of the diversionary theory, there has been a tendency to assume that only the leaders of 
great powers are capable of using diversionary tactics when they confront domestic problems 
(Fordham, 2002). For example, according to Fordham, the use of diversionary strategies is not a 
universal way of dealing with domestic problems; it is a particularity of the US presidency (Fordham, 
2005). 
There are several reasons for this overstatement of US exceptionalism in diversionary studies. 
Firstly, since in its conventional form the diversionary action can be achieved only through using 
force against an external actor, there is an assumption that the leader who is trying to divert the 
attention of the domestic public must be able to bear the economic and political costs of a war or 
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military strike without causing more instability in his country. According to scholars like Fordham, it 
is only the US president who has the executive powers to engage in such an international venture 
and the economic resources to commit to the strategies of externalization, such as launching an air 
strike. In addition, diversionary studies have shown that in order to be considered as a successful 
diversionary strategy, in terms of increasing the president‘s approval rating and distracting public 
attention, the diversionary war should be short and decisive and should end with a definite victory. 
The prolongation of the war, the increasing number of casualties, the economic cost and a possible 
defeat may result in a sharp decline in the popularity of the leader. Because of these factors, it is 
assumed that the leader who uses force for domestic purposes should have sufficient economic 
resources and military capabilities to reach his goal militarily.  It is again the great powers, and in 
today‘s world the US, that have the technical and material capabilities to wage a short and victorious 
war or surgical military strikes against another state.  
In addition to the arguments about the importance of material and economic resources to the use of 
diversionary strategies, another major argument in support of the thesis on US exceptionalism has 
been the relationship between the form of government and the need to use diversionary strategies. 
The predominant idea in the field is that since authoritarian leaders have the authority and power to 
suppress any form of opposition in their countries, only leaders of democratic countries would need 
to use diversionary strategies (Gelpi, 1997). 9 According to Clark, Fordham and Nordstrom (2011): 
                                                          
9 Gelpi, in his study on governmental structure and externalization of domestic conflicts, tries to provide a 
framework of this relationship. He asserts that there are different methods that different forms of 
governments use to deal with the opposition in a country. According to him,  
[L]eaders may choose from among at least three solutions when faced with domestic unrest: 
(1) grant the demands of the demonstrators, (2) suppress the demonstrators by force, and 
(3) divert the public‘s attention through the initiation of force externally (1997: 260). 
He argues that usually the first option is unfavorable to both democratic and authoritarian leaders. Instead, 
they choose one of  the remaining two options, divert the public‘s attention or suppress. For Gelpi, domestic 
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Democratic leaders are usually held to have fewer options than their authoritarian 
counterparts for dealing with unhappy citizens since autocrats can often repress, or control 
information in such a way that citizens do not necessarily blame the government for poor 
domestic circumstances. Further, democratic leaders are often presumed to have more 
autonomous control over foreign policy and the military than over domestic policy tools. In 
this light, it is not surprising that Gelpi goes so far as to call diversionary foreign policy ―a 
pathology of democratic systems‖ (1997: 280), suggesting democratic leaders will succumb 
to the temptation of international violence when domestic trouble is brewing. (250) 
 This assumption, together with the aforementioned assumptions on economic capability, has played 
an important role in the limitation of diversionary studies to US presidents‘ use of force and in the 
persistent neglect of the use of diversionary foreign policy by authoritarian leaders.  
In this study, I overcome these limitations of US exceptionalism by focusing on the uses of different 
diversionary strategies by three authoritarian Middle Eastern leaders. As shown above, there is more 
than one way for a leader to divert the attention of his domestic public and a leader may always 
choose a less costly and risky strategy in order to deflect the public‘s attention. The existence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
suppression is more easily achieved by authoritarian regimes, because they face substantially fewer constraints 
to suppress the demonstrators who will be less armed and organized than the forces of  the state. Attacking 
and suppressing rioters or demonstrators will be less costly than initiating an attack against another state.  
Moreover, the population in an authoritarian regime has no institutional means to remove the executive from 
power, so the leader will not be risking his chance to stay in office by suppressing the population. On the 
other hand, democratic governments cannot suppress demonstrators easily and prefer to divert the public‘s 
attention by externalizing the domestic conflict. In fact, according to him, ―the diversionary initiation of  force 
is generally a pathology of  democratic states. Ironically, the protections that democratic systems provide for 
their citizens against domestic repression, combined with the public‘s willingness to rally behind their 
government‘s attacks on external foes, have the unfortunate consequence of  creating incentives for 
democratic leaders to use force against noncitizens.‖ (277) Democratic governments choose this form of  
behavior because they are subject to electoral recall and do not want to upset their electorates. In addition, 
legal or constitutional limitations stop the leaders in democratic countries from acting arbitrarily and 
suppressing opposition. Finally, power is divided in democratic regimes among several institutional centers, 
which makes it harder for the government to use force against its domestic dissidents (Gelpi, 1997). 
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these different alternatives demonstrates that being the leader of a superpower is not a prerequisite 
to using diversionary strategies and that leaders of less resourceful countries may also employ 
diversionary strategies when they believe them to be necessary. Moreover, studies on authoritarian 
regimes have demonstrated that these leaders also pay attention to public opinion and try to pursue 
policies that will not conflict with the demands of their constituencies, though sometimes less than 
their democratic counterparts. Although elections are not usually held in such countries (and even 
when they are held, they are not fair elections), and although there are no public approval polls, 
authoritarian leaders have also certain constituencies whose opinions are critical to the survival of 
their regimes. Such a constituency may be a group of people, such as a politburo, or a state 
institution, such as the military or legislative assembly. In most cases, when enacting a law or 
implementing a domestic or foreign policy, these leaders feel accountable to these constituencies and 
prefer to build coalitions. Scholars, such as Weeks, have emphasized this aspect of authoritarian 
regimes. For Weeks, ―[A]utocratic leaders, while they may exert enormous control over their 
subjects, are not usually immune from domestic threats to their tenure‖ (2008: 61) and ―most 
authoritarian leaders require the support of domestic elites, who act as audiences in much the same 
way as voting publics in democracies‖ (2008: 36). In fact, she argued, some authoritarian leaders are 
more vulnerable and dependent on the support of domestic audiences than is commonly assumed 
(2008; 2009). Hagan, in his study of political opposition, also asserted the presence of various forms 
of pressure on authoritarian leaders. He argued: 
…even where foreign policy making is dominated by a single dominant leader, that 
leader should be seen as coping with pressing international and domestic 
problems…there are often decision making and political constraints, and they are as 
pervasive as those found in the more established political systems…Not only must 
the single predominant leader pay close attention to domestic political opposition 
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outside the regime, but in many regimes there may be a considerable diffusion of 
power across intensely competitive actors in a highly fragmented setting. (1993: 46-
47) 
In addition, although authoritarian leaders frequently resort to using force against opposition 
movements within their countries, they know that using force is not a viable option in the long term. 
According to Gandhi and Przeworski: 
Autocrats may certainly use force to impose cooperation and to eliminate threats of 
rebellion. But the use of force is costly and may not always be effective. Writing of 
military dictatorship in Latin America, Cardoso (1979, p. 48) observes that the ―state 
is sufficiently strong to concentrate its attention and repressive apparatus against so-
called subversive groups, but it is not as efficient when it comes to controlling the 
universities, for example, or even the bureaucracy itself.‖ As a result, the ruler may 
find it useful to rely on other strategies to elicit cooperation and avert rebellion. 
(2007: 1281)  
Scholars like Kneur also argue that although repression and coercion are often the 
predominant methods for authoritarian regimes to cope with domestic opposition, the ruling 
elite have to find some other complementing strategies of legitimation to stay in power. For 
Kneur these authoritarian leaders usually use foreign policy to raise their stature and 
legitimacy and to deflect the attention of the domestic public (2011). In fact, there is a 
growing body of literature in comparative politics which aims to explain that even in the 
absence of democratic institutions, the leaders of authoritarian countries depend on 
domestic support and approval to survive in office (Weeks, 2009; Geddes, 2003; Haber, 
2006). 
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Authoritarian rulers of the Middle East are not exceptions. For instance, Byman, Pollack and 
Waxman showed how Saddam Hussein, in some circumstances, followed the pulse of Iraqi public 
opinion when making his decisions. For them: 
Although Iraqi people are kept under control and the regime rarely canvasses the 
public in formulating policy, popular opinion is not entirely irrelevant to Iraqi 
policymaking. If the Iraqi people were to muster the resources and courage to rise 
up, they could sweep the regime from power. Perhaps surprisingly, Saddam has 
repeatedly demonstrated that he can be responsive to public opinion under certain 
conditions… (Byman, Pollack and Waxman, 1998: 129) 
Hafiz al-Assad of Syria also had similar concerns regarding the power of public opinion. According 
to Seale, from the start of Assad‘s presidency, he paid a particular attention to have a wide popular 
backing for his policies (Seale, 1988: 172).  He argued: 
Assad‘s rule was not based on force alone, nor would it have survived had it been 
so…The factor of public approval was not negligible, Arab regimes such as his, so 
often derided as oriental despotisms, in fact required a measure of popular consent, 
and the importance of public opinion could be gauged by the strenuous efforts made 
to mobilize it, by the repeated exercises in public self-justification, and by the strident 
media campaigns which rival Arab states waged against each other. Both the leaders 
and the led sensed that once popular consent was withdrawn, the substance went out 
of a regime. (Seale, 1988: 178)  
 Finally, scholars of Jordan and biographers of King Hussein have also stressed Hussein‘s need for 
public support. According to Uriel Dann, an important constant in Hussein‘s leadership was the 
need that was felt for constant populist appeals. It was something that distinguished Hussein from 
his predecessors. For Dann: 
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His grandfather and true predecessor, King Abdullah…belonged to another world 
where populism was incomprehensible. That Hussein‘s world should be different is 
of course part of a historic process; however, in part it is also a strain, in Hussein‘s 
personality that was absent from his grandfather‘s—the need to feel in rapport with 
the mass of his subjects. The specific thrusts of these populist appeals or policies 
varied from time to time, depending on the dominant elements in the changing scene 
as well as on Hussein‘s reading of those scenes. (1990) 
 Scholars who study domestic and foreign policy of authoritarian countries have also emphasized the 
relation between domestic and foreign policy in these countries. Shibley Telhami, in his study on 
Arab public opinion during the Gulf Crisis, asserted the influence of the people in Arab countries on 
foreign policy decision making. According to him: 
While it is generally assumed that public opinion matters little in authoritarian 
polities,…on issues of foreign policy, Arab public opinion has a discernible impact 
on the foreign policies of Arab states; moreover in the conduct of Persian Gulf War, 
Arab public opinion was a key element in the strategies of the central parties… 
…Arab leaders act as though Arab public opinion matters. This judgment is 
historically valid, as witnessed by the popular revolution against an entrenched shah 
in Iran; the popular uprising across the Middle East in the 1950s that helped to 
topple several Arab governments; massive food riots in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia, 
all of which were followed by consequential policy shifts; and the apparent increase 
in the political power of social and religious movements. The concern of Arab 
leaders is not irrational. (Telhami, 1993: 183-185) 
 In fact, as noted by Hagan, the predominant leaders in authoritarian countries, despite their political 
power and influence, continue to be preoccupied with issues pertaining to legitimacy problems. And 
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for them, one way of confronting and overcoming these legitimacy-related troubles is finding a 
foreign policy issue to rally people behind their regimes (1983: 56). Numerous leaders of Middle 
Eastern countries have employed the strategy of manipulating a foreign policy-related event in order 
to retain or regain their legitimacy and standing. This frequent use of foreign policy for domestic 
ends in the Middle East is explained by the nature of politics and the relationship between the 
leaders and their societies. According to Dawisha: 
…[G]iven the environment in which Arab politics operate, it is easy to see why there 
is such a strong correlation between foreign policy and domestic legitimacy. Conflict 
in the area is endemic: there is the perennial Arab-Israel struggle; there is the 
constant conflict over territorial issues born out of the colonial legacy and in some 
cases still not satisfactorily resolved; there are immense numbers of sectarian and 
ethnic divisions that cut across state boundaries, causing not only intra-state but also 
inter-state conflict; and finally there is the identification by the citizens of the various 
Arab states with the universalist values of Arabism and Islam. Not only do these two 
ideological forces tend to weaken people‘s identification with their own states, 
Arabism and Islam also are regularly used by Arab leaders to appeal to the loyalty of 
the citizens of other Arab states, thus undermining the legitimacy and stability of 
their regimes. (285)  
Some of these studies on the domestic and foreign policy nexus in authoritarian countries 
emphasized the diversionary behavior of authoritarian leaders but they were primarily conducted in 
the field of area studies and rarely entered into a dialogue with diversionary scholarship. In one of 
these studies, Tessler and Grobschmidt argued that Arab leaders sometimes deliberately involve 
themselves in regional conflicts in an attempt to enhance their legitimacy, deflect the attention of 
their people from domestic grievances, and justify the suppression of political dissent (1995: 144). In 
65 | P a g e  
 
another study, Anderson contended that Arab leaders sometimes consider foreign threats useful for 
their regimes. According to him, these threats provide both legitimacy and influence to these leaders 
when they confront domestic problems. Perthes, in his study on state-building in the Middle East, 
also emphasized the domestic use of foreign policy in countries like Syria. According to him, 
throughout its history, the Middle East has witnessed many cases where political leaders have 
deliberately used war preparation and international conflict to increase the infrastructural power of 
their rule and to force or convince domestic opposition to accept the terms of their incumbent 
regimes due to the ―urgency‖ of the situation for the nation (2000: 159). Finally, Hagan, in his study 
on political opposition, also mentioned the political use of foreign policy by authoritarian leaders of 
Third World countries. He stated that: 
…the political use of foreign policy results in external behavior that is hardly 
restrained or in any way watered down, and not in line with the passive behavior 
often expected from the weak states of the Third World. It necessarily involves a 
strong element of nationalism, quite often in the form of picturing the international 
system as a hostile environment. The resulting hostility is a familiar theme in the 
Third World foreign policy analyses, and…extreme levels of hostility are very well 
documented, especially for relatively radical regimes in China, Iran, Cuba, Indonesia, 
and Syria. (1983: 49) 
 Integrating the results of these area studies and diversionary scholarship will show that public 
opinion is an important concern not only for the leaders of democratic countries but also for the 
leaders of authoritarian regimes. It will also demonstrate that the leaders of small states have the 
ability to use diversionary strategies by adopting less costly and less risky foreign policy initiatives 
than war and armed conflict. In fact, the use of externalization and diversionary strategies is more 
common in world politics than mainstream diversionary scholarship assumes.  
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Leadership Matters 
Richard Nixon, after his resignation from the presidency, began to publish extensively on issues 
related to policy and world politics, in an attempt to restore his image and to share his experiences 
with younger generations. In the opening sentences of one of his most significant books on 
leadership, Nixon stated: 
In the footsteps of great leaders, we hear the rolling thunder of history. Throughout 
the centuries—from the ancient Greeks, through Shakespeare, to the present day—
few subjects have proved more perennially fascinating to dramatists and historians 
alike than the character of great leaders… 
What makes the role of these leaders so compellingly interesting is not just its drama, 
but its importance—its impact. When the final curtain goes down on a play, the 
members of the audience file out of the theater and go home to resume their normal 
lives. When the curtain comes down on a leader‘s career, the very lives of the 
audience have been changed, and the course of history may have been profoundly 
altered. (1982: 1-2) 
At the time that Nixon wrote these words, leadership and the role that leaders play in world politics 
had been for a long time largely ignored in international studies. The dominance of systemic theories 
of international relations during the Cold War years had resulted in the alienation of individual- 
centered approaches. This predominant idea in international studies began to be challenged after the 
end of the Cold War by an increasing number of studies that focused on leaders, leadership styles, 
political leadership, and the relationship of these variables to foreign policy-making. Most of these 
revisionist studies built on some of the findings of earlier studies, including Graham Allison‘s work 
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on conceptual models (1969), Brecher and Wilkenfeld‘s study on  decision making in times of crisis 
(1989), Alexander George‘s study on presidential personality and performance (1998), Morton 
Halperin‘s studies on bureaucratic politics (1972, 1974), Robert Jervis‘s study on perception and 
misperception (1976), and Robert Putnam‘s model of two different levels of decision making (1993).  
In one of the examples of these early studies, Kelman discussed the different roles that individuals 
may play within international relations. In his piece, he stated: 
While agreeing that the nation-state remains the basic unit of analysis in international 
relations, I would stress that individuals constitute the ultimate locus of action. 
Individual decision makers act, set the limits and define the mood within which 
decision makers can operate; and individual actors carry out the official and 
unofficial interactions of which international relations consist. (1970: 3) 
In another study, Kellerman and Rubin, underlined the importance of leadership to understanding 
international conflicts and negotiations. They argued that: 
While the media have always lavished attention on leaders as ―stars‖, scholars have 
been much less interested in the role of the leader in world politics. To be sure, 
leaders have figured prominently when there was not mistaking their pivotal role. In 
particular, Robert. C Tucker drew our attention to the importance of the dictator in 
the foreign policy systems of totalitarian states… 
For the rest, however, academics have tended to underplay (or even ignore) the 
human element, or to refer to it in ways that obscure rather than clarify the national 
leader‘s particular significance. Very little work has been done on how leader-
follower relationships shape leaders‘ perceptions and decisions on foreign policy 
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issues, on how the personality of national leaders impinges on their performances in 
international settings, or on how national leaders view and relate to each other (1988: 
2). 
Byman and Pollack also expressed the need to ―bring the statesman back in‖ in order to be able to 
take into account all of the variances in the foreign affairs of nations. They also questioned the 
accuracy and reliability of an explanation of countries‘ foreign policies in the 20th century without 
taking into account the political leaders: 
How can we explain twentieth-century history without reference to Adolf Hitler, 
Joseph Stalin, Vladimir Lenin, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Mahatma 
Gandhi, or Mao Zedong? Nor would any policymaker in any capital try to explain 
the world today without recourse to the personal goals and beliefs of Bill Clinton, 
Vladimir Putin, Jiang Zemin, and Saddam Hussein, among others. Indeed the 
policymaking community in Washington takes it as an article of faith that who is the 
prime minister of Great Britain, the chancellor of Germany, or the king of Saudi 
Arabia has real repercussions for the United States and the rest of the world. As 
Henry Kissinger remarked, "As a professor, I tended to think of history as run by 
im-personal forces.But when you see it in practice, you see the difference 
personalities make.‖ (2001; 108)   
According to Byman and Pollack, scholars‘ ignorance about the importance of the individual was a 
result of political scientists‘ negligently exclusive attention to systemic factors to explain the vast 
majority of events in international relations. Byman and Pollack stated:  
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It is time to rescue men and women, as individuals, from the oblivion to which 
political scientists have consigned them. This article is not intended as a 
comprehensive account of the importance of individuals- such an effort would 
require the work of many lifetimes- but it is intended to question scholars' current 
assumptions about international politics and show the plausibility of analyzing 
international relations by focusing on the role of individuals. (2001: 109) 
For them, although a country‘s strategic position, domestic politics, culture, and other systematic 
and domestic factors shape a state‘s intentions, individual leaders have the ability to overshadow 
these factors or, in some instances, exercise direct and decisive influences on the behaviors of states. 
In fact, it is the political leader who usually sets the ultimate and secondary intentions of the state 
and shapes its strategies.  
Hermann and Hagan also emphasized the significance of leaders and leadership in foreign policy- 
making.  They contended that for the past several decades, most scholars of world politics had 
discounted leaders and proposed to concentrate on the international constraints that limit what 
leaders can do. However, in reality, when people speak about foreign policy, they focus mostly on 
the decision makers. Hermann and Hagan said:  
When conversations turn to foreign policy and international politics, they often focus 
on particular leaders and evaluations of their leadership. We grade Bill Clinton‘s 
performance abroad; argue about why Benjamin Netanyahu is or is not stalling the 
Middle East peace process; debate Mohammed Khatami‘s intentions regarding 
Iranian relations with the United States; and ponder what will happen in South 
Africa or Russia when Nelson Mandela or Boris Yeltsin leaves office. In each case, 
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our attention is riveted on individuals whose leadership seems to matter beyond the 
borders of the countries they lead. (1998: 124) 
Bruno de Mesquita also raised the issue of leadership. In one of his articles on the relationship 
between domestic politics and international relations, he wrote: 
..I believe it is time to bring the study of citizens, leaders, and leadership back to the 
forefront.  
Leaders, not states, choose actions. Leaders and their subjects enjoy the fruits and 
suffer the ills that follow from their decisions. Alas, leaders seem to be motivated by 
their own well being and not by the welfare of the state. The state‘s immorality 
beyond their own time is secondary to the quest of leaders for personal political 
survival. How else can we explain the long survival in office of such figures as 
Saddam Hussein, Fidel Castro, Mobutu Sese Seko, or Ferdinand Marcos even while 
they impoverished their nations…Without bringing leaders and their domestic 
incentives back to the forefront of our research, I believe that we cannot really hope 
to understand the motivations and constraints that shape international politics and 
economics, the very factors we hope to explain (2002; 4).  
Despite these repeated calls by scholars to focus on the roles of individuals and leaders in foreign 
policy-making, such a focus is still lacking from international relations literature and in diversionary 
scholarship. There is a general consensus in diversionary literature that it is the leader who tries to 
divert the attention of his people from domestic economic, political, and social problems in order to 
stay in office, to rally the population behind his leadership, to get re-elected or to boost his approval 
rating. It is the political leader that makes decisions on diversionary foreign policy and he is the one 
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who implements this decision. In addition, the political leader also is the primary winner if his action 
results in victory. However, diversionary studies have continuously neglected the role of the political 
leader and the difference that a leader can make in the formulation, selection and implementation of 
this policy. The only exception has been Hermann‘s emphasis on the possibility of a relationship 
between leadership traits and different diversionary mechanisms. In one of her studies on the role of 
leadership in negotiation and mediation, Hermann argued that different leaders provide different 
solutions to deal with domestic problems, such as a change in foreign policy. She stated: 
Change is also possible when a leader is in trouble, for example, when a leader faces 
a disruptive domestic situation or risks alienation of an important constituency by 
not solving a problem. Redirecting attention can often be helpful in such situations 
so that the constituents‘ minds are taken off their current problem. Change is used 
here as a scapegoat to get the leadership off the hot seat. If there is domestic turmoil, 
as was the case in Argentina in 1982, the leadership may consider a bold new 
international venture to distract attention. For Argentina it was an invasion of the 
Falkland Islands. For other leaders, it may be a summit or state visit where new 
proposals can be made that take up media time and replace what is happening 
domestically. What leaders under such conditions want to create is a situation that 
will bring support to the regime or, at the least, bring their constituents together to 
deal with a common problem. Changes made under these circumstances are often 
dramatic and reorienting in nature to capture the attention of those causing trouble 
for the leaders. (1995: 64) 10 
                                                          
10 Another exceptions in this field was Smith‘s study on International Crises and Domestic Politics. 
According to him political leaders have two audiences (their domestic constitutents and foreign rivals) and 
72 | P a g e  
 
Hermann, in different instances, also mentioned the necessity of considering multiple diversionary 
strategies and the possible impact that leadership has on the strategy selection. However, despite 
these ―red flags‖ scholars have continued to view the diversionary action as a mechanical deflection 
of domestic problems to the realm of foreign policy. So it has been assumed that regardless of the 
differences in rulers and in their personalities, when they confront domestic problems, they react 
uniformly in the way in which they externalize the domestic conflict to a foreign enemy or a rival. 
This argument not only ignores the role of a political leader during the process of diversionary 
decision making but also neglects how differences in leadership and leadership styles can influence 
the forms of diversionary behavior employed.    
The main goal of this study is to fill in this missing link and to highlight the relationship between 
leadership traits and the diversionary action utilized. This study will demonstrate that leaders are not 
just empty vessels that automatically externalize domestic problems to the foreign policy realm. A 
leader‘s beliefs and politically-relevant psychological traits play an important role in the 
determination of the foreign policy action used for diversionary purposes. In order to achieve this, I 
will utilize the studies and models developed by foreign policy scholars to understand the 
relationship between leadership styles and foreign policy.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
when formulating their foreign policies they take into account the reaction of  both these levels. He 
differentiates competent and incompetent leaders during an international crises and argues:  
The interaction of  domestic and international politics enables leaders to make credible threats… 
Since voters punish leaders who do not carry out their threats, leaders run a risk if  they make threats. 
If  their bluff  is called and a war occurs, then they must decide whether to intervene, and failure to do 
so harms reelection prospects. A leader's competence determines the benefit of  intervening. A highly 
competent leader may actually welcome the opportunity, since it allows her to demonstrate her 
superior abilities to the voters. Less competent leaders, although they want to avoid fighting, are also 
compelled to intervene to avoid being punished electorally. For the least competent leaders, 
intervention is not an option; their poor performance would provide yet more evidence of  their low 
quality, and they will suffer the same electoral fate whatever they decide to do. (1998: 633) 
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Although the leadership traits of different leaders and the influence of these traits to different 
foreign policy actions can be analyzed and discussed, the impact of these traits becomes more 
significant when the leader in question plays a predominant role in foreign policy-making. In fact, as 
Kellerman states: 
The leader‘s impact on foreign policy will vary according to the scope of his power, 
authority, and influence within his own nation state. The more power, authority, and 
influence he has, the greater his impact on foreign policy, and the greater his impact 
on foreign policy, the more his effect on world politics. (1988: 4) 
As Hinnebusch stated, the role and impact of leaders became more significant in the personalized 
authoritarian regimes typical of the Middle East. According to him, the choices and style of these 
authoritarian Middle Eastern leaders becomes decisive, particularly in a crisis or a critical bargaining 
situations, such as the Gulf Crisis (Hinnebusch, 2002: 16).  
Considering the easiness of observing the impact of leadership styles on the decision making process 
when the leader is the predominant actor in foreign policy making, the primary focus of this study 
will be predominant leaders. In the remainder of this section, the conditions under which the 
authoritative decision unit is likely to be a predominant leader will be discussed. 
Predominant Leaders 
Scholars who have examined how governments and ruling parties around the world make foreign 
policy decisions have come up with an extensive array of  different entities that play important roles 
in making and implementing foreign policy decisions. These different entities include individual 
leaders, such as prime ministers, presidents, and party secretaries, groups, such as standing 
committees and cabinets, and institutions, such as bureaucracies, military and legislatures. Foreign 
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policy scholars have tried to classify these different entities in a meaningful way in order to enhance 
the ability to account for governments‘ behaviors in the foreign policy arena. Charles Hermann, Joe 
Hagan and Margaret Hermann have contended that three types of decision units may exist among 
the various political entities listed above: the powerful leader, the single group, and the coalition of 
autonomous actors (Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Hermann and Hagan, 1998; Hermann, 2001; 
Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and Hermann, 2001). Although they recognized the existence of multiple 
domestic and international factors that can and do influence foreign policy behavior, for them, these 
influences are channeled through the political apparatus of a government that identifies, decides, and 
implements foreign policy. In fact, they argued, within any government ―there is an individual or a 
set of individuals with the ability to commit the resources of the society and, when faced with a 
problem, the authority to make a decision that cannot be readily reversed.‖ They called this set of 
decision makers the ―authoritative decision unit‖ and seek to understand how it shapes foreign 
policy decision making across diverse situations and issues as well as different political settings 
(Hermann, 2001a: 48).   
According to them, the decision unit framework has the following components:  
1) it views decision making as involving responding to foreign policy problems and 
occasions for decision; 2) it focuses on three types of authoritative decision unit; 3) it 
defines the key factors that set into motion alternative decision processes; and 4) it 
links these alternative decision processes to particular outcomes. (Hermann, 2001a: 
51-52) 
The model not only categorizes authoritative decision units but provides a framework for 
researching and studying decision making in all types of countries. Most of the previous models on 
decision making were focused almost exclusively on US foreign policy-making and therefore, were 
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not useful for studying nondemocratic, transitional regimes and less developed polities or in 
conducting comparative studies in countries‘ decision making. The decision unit model developed 
by Hermann, Hagan and Hermann is helpful to overcoming these stark limitations in the decision 
making literature and the agency deficiency within diversionary studies. As earlier stated, this model 
includes three types of decision units -- the predominant leader, the single group and the coalition.  
However, I will focus on the predominant leader in this study because the way in which the 
personality traits of the predominant leader influences the foreign policy-making is more observable. 
The predominant leader is defined as an individual leader who ―has the power to make the choice 
concerning how a state is going to respond to a foreign policy problem‖ (Hermann, 2001b: 84). 
When the leader is the predominant one and when everybody knows about his predominance, 
―those with different points of view generally stop public expression of their own alternative 
positions out of respect for the leader or fear of reprisals‖ (ibid).  
There are several conditions that make the decision unit a predominant leader. For example, the 
decision unit is likely to be ―a predominant leader if the regime has one individual in its leadership 
who is vested with the authority—by a constitution, law, or general practice—to commit or 
withhold the resources of the government with regard to the making of foreign policy‖ (ibid).  In 
addition, the decision unit may also be a predominant leader ―if the foreign policy machinery of the 
government is organized hierarchically and one person is located at the top of the hierarchy who is 
accountable for any decisions that are made‖ (Hermann, 2001b: 85).  Moreover, the ownership of 
coercion in the hands of a single individual creates a suitable situation to have a predominant leader 
as a decision unit model. Authoritarian leaders, including dictatorships and one man governments, 
may also be considered within this category. Well-known examples include Fidel Castro in Cuba and 
Kim Il Sung in North Korea. 
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An important issue is the willingness of a predominant leader to use his authority and power in 
issues related to foreign policy. In fact, in some rare instances, although there is a predominant 
leader, that person may not be willing to interfere in or deal with a foreign policy problem. For 
Hermann, the predominant leader ―must exercise authority in dealing with the problem under 
consideration to become the authoritative decision unit. Otherwise, another type of decision unit 
assumes responsibility for making the decision‖ (2001b: 85). According to Hermann, single, 
powerful leaders have been found to act as predominant leaders under the following conditions: 
(1) they have a general, active interest in, as well as involvement with, foreign and 
defense issues; (2) the immediate foreign policy problem is perceived by the regime 
leadership to be critical to the well-being of the regime—it is perceived to be a crisis; 
(3) the current situation involves high level diplomacy or protocol (a state visit, a 
summit meeting, international negotiations); or (4) the issue under consideration is of 
special interest or concern to the leader (ibid). 
Hermann also mentioned the effects of crisis periods on the decision-making process and the 
emergence of a predominant leader during such periods. For her, ―even leaders who generally do 
not have the authority to commit the resources of their governments without consulting with others 
can act like predominant leaders under certain conditions. When such leaders have an intense 
interest in foreign affairs or a particular substantive foreign policy issue or find themselves in the 
midst of an international crisis, they can assume more authority than is ascribed to their positions‖ 
(Hermann 2001b: 86). 11 
                                                          
11 Overall, scholars who studied crisis and foreign policy behavior in these instances contended that three 
major changes take place in terms of the contraction of authority: ―(1) the shifting of authority to higher 
levels in a hierarchical structure; (2) a reduction in the number of persons or units participating in the exercise 
of authority without reference to hierarchy and (3) an increase in the number of occasions for the existence of 
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With the introduction of this new variable of predominant leaders, the critical set of variables for 
explaining a foreign policy decision becomes the leadership traits of the predominant leader. The 
new questions focus on the relationship between leadership traits and the selection of different 
diversionary mechanisms. The new set of questions in this new framework include ―What is the 
relationship between leadership styles of political leaders and the selection of different diversionary 
strategies?‖ and ―Which leadership styles play the most salient roles in the selection of diversionary 
mechanisms?‖. By asking these questions, this dissertation will achieve three different aims. First of 
all, leaders and leadership traits will be taken into account in explaining diversionary foreign policies 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
authority, although the actual number of authority units remain constant.‖(Hermann, 1963: 70)  All these 
instances and conditions bring a smaller decision unit in crisis decision making. In fact, in a domestic crisis 
situation, instead of a coalition of decision makers, usually a predominant leader or in rare instances a loyal 
single group exercises authority in terms of foreign policy action. For this study, I will focus on the 
predominant leaders and their influence on the use and selection of diversionary behaviors.   
Earlier studies in the field demonstrated that it would be extremely difficult for a leader to follow a 
diversionary foreign policy when the authoritative decision unit is not a predominant leader. For instance, it 
has been noted by scholars that coalition decision units are constrained in what they can do in terms of 
foreign policy (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann and Hermann, 2001).  The bargaining and competition that takes 
place between the members of a coalition makes it difficult for the parties to adopt a diversionary strategy. 
Especially the junior partners of a coalition will realize that the primary winner, in this case the prime minister 
or president and his party, takes all the rewards, and the junior partners will have to share the long term 
consequences of a diversionary foreign policy action. When the junior partner of a coalition understands or 
perceives certain foreign policy action as an attempt to divert the attention of domestic public instead of for 
national interest, it most probably blocks this foreign policy action. Alastair Smith explains this problem in 
coalition governments by giving German coalition governments as an example: 
The stylized fact of coalition formation in Germany is that the party with the greatest number of 
seats forms a government with the Free Democrats….The Free Democrats therefore expect to be 
the junior partner in every government that forms. Although the FDP may have preferences over 
which party it prefers to be in government with, the FDP receive similar office-holding benefits 
whichever government forms.  
Since the FDP gains the benefits of office whichever government forms, it cares relatively more 
about national interest than electoral incentives. Just as the Congress limits the ability of the 
President to pursue electorally motivated foreign policies, the FDP veto policies not in the German 
national interest. (Smith, 1996: 148). 
In fact, if one coalition partner expects to increase its votes or at least keep it on the same level, then actions 
cannot be taken against the national interest for electoral reasons. It is also extremely difficult to mobilize 
these more junior members of a coalition to act in accordance with a risky foreign policy, which will benefit 
the senior political party, at least in the short term.  
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of countries. Secondly, the dissertation will integrate the literature on leadership studies with the 
diversionary theory of war literature. A conversation between these two literatures will pave the way 
for the development of alternative perspectives and approaches in both the diversionary theory of 
war and the foreign policy decision-making literatures. Finally, this dissertation will be a first step to 
a much more comprehensive study of the diversionary theory within a new theoretical framework. 
This new framework will allow us to bring agency back in to the literature and focus on decision 
makers.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Case Selection 
During the Gulf War and its immediate aftermath, the foreign policies of Middle Eastern states were 
more prominent on the agenda of foreign policy analysts than probably any other time.12 With 
Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait, we not only witnessed major transformations in the Arab regional order 
but also new alignments and critical foreign policy decisions made by the leaders of Middle Eastern 
states. Predominant leaders of Arab states played important roles in the formulation of these new 
foreign policies and alignments. This characteristic of the Gulf Crisis has frequently been cited by 
                                                          
12 Some examples of  the studies on the First Gulf  War include David M. Malone, The International Struggle 
Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005, Morris M. Motale, The Origins of  the Gulf  Wars, Debra 
Lois Shulman, Regime Strategy and Foreign Policy in Autocracies: Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Gulf  Wars; John 
Bulloch and Harvey Morris, Saddam's War: The Origins of  the Kuwait Conflict and the International Response, 
Thomas B. Allen, F. Clifton Berry, and Norman Polmar, War in the Gulf,  James A. Baker, III, with Thomas M. 
DeFrank, The Politics of  Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992, Alberto Bin, Richard Hill, and Archer 
Jones, Desert Storm: A Forgotten War, Herbert H. Blumberg, The Persian Gulf  War: Views from the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, Lester H. Brune, America and the Iraqi Crisis, 1990-1992: Origins and Aftermath, David 
Campbell, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of  the Gulf  War, Peter Cipkowski, 
Understanding the Crisis in the Persian Gulf, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf  Conflict, 1990-1991: 
Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, Stephen R. Graubard, Mr. Bush's War: Adventures in the Politics of  
Illusion, Roger Hilsman, George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure, Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield 
to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf  War, Thomas Houlahan, Gulf  War: The Complete History, Majid Khadduri and 
Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf  1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and its Implications, Jerry M. Long, Saddam’s 
War of  Words: Politics, Religion, and the Iraqi Invasion of  Kuwait, Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, Saddam Hussein 
and the Crisis in the Gulf, N. C. Menon, Mother of  Battles: Saddam's Folly, Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, 
Iraq and the Second Gulf  War: State Building and Regime Security, Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's 
Quest for Power and the Gulf  Crisis, Dan Tschirgi and Bassam Tibi, Perspectives on the Gulf  Crisis, Bob Woodward, 
The Commanders, Steve A. Yetiv, The Persian Gulf  Crisis, Gazi Ibdewi Abdulghafour, United Nations's Role in the 
Gulf  Crisis, Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane, eds., International Perspectives on the Gulf  Conflict, 1990-91, Ken 
Matthews, The Gulf  Conflict and International Relations, Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds., The Gulf  
War and the New World Order, Ibrahim Ibrahim, ed., The Gulf  Crisis: Background and Consequences, Micah L. Sifry 
and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf  War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, and Adel Akram, Origins of  the 
Gulf  War.   
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scholars, like Jerrold Post who argued that one of the most unusual aspects of the Gulf Crisis was 
―the degree to which the personality and political behavior of the key individual actors played crucial 
roles on the decision to enter the war‖ (Post, 1993: 49). David Winter also emphasized that ―more 
than most dramatic political events, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resulting Gulf War invite 
personalistic attributions of cause‖ (1993: 107).  According to him:  
…the events of 1990-1991 are a case where the two principal leaders‘ personalities 
were important, even decisive….Hussein and Bush occupied strategic locations in 
their national and international political structures. The events and issues at stake 
strongly resonated with the deepest images and themes of their respective 
personalities. Thus the invasion and subsequent Gulf War fit most of the criteria 
offered by Greenstein (1969: 40-61) for identifying instances were leaders‘ 
personalities make a difference (1993: 108). 
However, George H.W. Bush and Saddam Hussein were not the only people who played prominent 
roles in the foreign policies of their respective countries during the crisis. Predominant leaders of the 
Middle East, including King Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad, played equally significant roles during the 
crisis. For almost two years, international attention was focused on these leaders and their decisions 
regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, and the 
Madrid Peace Process which was initiated by the Bush administration as a side payment to Arab 
countries that joined or supported the international coalition.  
During and in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, scholars of Middle Eastern politics wrote 
extensively on the foreign policy-making of individual leaders. Most of these scholars highlighted the 
immense amount of domestic economic hardship, social instability and political trouble that these 
regimes were facing during these years and argued that some of their foreign policy decisions were 
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intended to divert the attention of their people from these problems. Three foreign policy decisions, 
in particular, were widely interpreted as having been made for domestic political purposes. The first 
one was Saddam Hussein‘s verbal and missile attacks against Israel throughout the crisis. Even 
before his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had started to use the discourse of external 
conspiracy for the failure of his economic policies in Iraq and the increasing social unrest in his 
country.  He intensified his verbal attacks throughout 1990s against Israel and even at one point, 
threatened to burn down half of Israel. After his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam attempted to legitimize 
the invasion through ―linkage politics.‖ He agreed to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait if Israeli 
forces withdrew from Palestinian territories. This quid pro quo offer was interpreted by just about 
everyone who commented on it as being diversionary in nature. According to them, Saddam 
Hussein aimed to rally the Arab masses behind his leadership and divert the attention from the 
reality that he was occupying another Arab country and thereby violating international norms and 
Arab regional order. He knew that his strong messages against Israel would strike a chord with the 
Arab masses. His anti-Israeli statements and threats reverberated throughout the streets of Arab 
cities. Major Arab capitals and cities, including the capitals of countries that had been in anti-Saddam 
Hussein coalitions witnessed pro-Saddam demonstrations. Enjoying this popularity, Saddam 
intensified his threats against Israel even more and ultimately attacked against Israel with SCUD 
missiles, which further raised his popularity in the region.  
The second prominent case of diversionary foreign policy-making during this period was the 
alignment of Jordan with Iraq during the Gulf War. Throughout the Gulf Crisis, King Hussein 
preferred not to support the international coalition led by the US and its attacks against Iraq. The 
most significant social reactions and resistances against the international coalition led by the US took 
place in Amman and other Jordanian cities. . The Jordanian people engaged in huge campaigns to 
support the Iraqi people and the Jordanian government tolerated widespread noncompliance with 
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the UN Security Council‘s decision to implement economic sanctions against Iraq.  Studies after the 
end of the war revealed that it was the Jordanian government and especially King Hussein who 
rallied the people in support of Saddam Hussein. During the crisis, Jordan was just recovering from 
an economic crisis that had erupted a year before and Palestinian refugees, which constituted 60% of 
the Jordanian population, had been increasingly raising their voices against King Hussein‘s policies. 
In order to divert the people‘s attention from the domestic problems and unify them around King 
Hussein‘s leadership, King Hussein opted to engage in friendly relations with Saddam Hussein 
despite the pressure and pleas of the United States and other Arab countries. Western governments, 
including the US and Israeli governments, understood the internal dynamics of Jordan and King 
Hussein‘s need for domestic support and therefore, did not punish Jordan after the war and 
included Jordan in the peace process.   
The third prominent example of diversionary foreign policy-making during this period was Syria‘s 
policy towards Israel and the peace process immediately after the Gulf War. The period after the 
Gulf War was a chaotic period for Syria and many other Arab regimes. The short diversion of 
attention from domestic problems to the Gulf Crisis was over and despite economic assistance from 
the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, Syria began to face very serious economic problems after the 
war. People from different social segments and classes, particularly laborers and farmers, started to 
express their grievances against the government. In addition the political changes in Central and 
Eastern Europe began to have impact on the Syrian society as well. Some liberal groups were 
becoming increasingly vocal in their demands for a more democratic political sphere. Faced with 
these hostile circumstances, the al-Assad regime surprised many political pundits by changing its 
inflexible stance towards Israel and initiating a more accommodating policy. However, the change 
was not a total break from its previous foreign policy stance. Within a two year period, observers 
witnessed both accommodative and aggressive foreign policy gestures from the al-Assad regime 
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towards Israel. For scholars like Fred Lawson, both of these foreign policy patterns were followed 
because of domestic political concerns. They were both intended to divert the attention of the public 
from domestic problems to foreign policy issues and with the help of the state-controlled media, the 
al-Assad regime reached its goal of shifting the people‘s focus to the peace process. However, when 
after a brief period of time some segments of the public started to re-raise their voice about their 
demands for a more equitable income distribution, Assad made speeches on the urgency of national 
security matters and began to adopt a more classical form of diversion by threatening Israel (1996). 
The above three foreign policy actions by three Middle Eastern leaders were interpreted as 
diversionary in nature by authoritative sources, including diplomatic historians and area studies 
specialists. Saddam Hussein‘s verbal and missile attacks against Israel were examples of classical 
diversionary strategy, in which leaders use force and threats to use force against an external other in 
order to distract public attention from recurring economic problems. However, King Hussein‘s 
diversionary strategy was to cultivate a more positive and friendlier relationship with a neighbor. 
Finally, Assad‘s diversionary strategy included the use of both of these conflictual and cooperative 
policies.  
In this study instead of trying to find whether the cases were diversionary in nature or not, I intend 
to go behind this question, consider the explanations of these sources valid and ask the role of 
leadership styles on the selection of these diversionary strategies. Thus the goal of this study is not to 
ask the question of ―Do they really try to divert the attention of domestic public? or ―When do they 
prefer to use diversionary strategies?‖. Considering the differences among the diversionary strategies 
in three cases, this study aims to understand the relationship between leadership styles and the 
selection of different diversionary strategies.  
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The three countries in this study, Jordan, Iraq and Syria, are all Arab countries in the Middle East 
that have been members of the Arab League. They have identical historical backgrounds in terms of 
nation and state-building. They were all artificially formed after World War I and the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement between Britain and France. During the last years of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle 
Eastern question (aka ―The Eastern question‖) became an important aspect of the great power 
struggle, especially among Britain, France and Germany. Because of this during the First World War 
(1914-1918), the Middle Eastern territories of the Ottoman Empire were strategic battlegrounds for 
these powers. With the help of Arab rebellions led by Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca and direct 
descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, the British Empire managed to defeat Ottoman forces. 
Although different promises were made by British interlocutors,13 including Lawrence of Arabia, to 
the local people during the war, the region was divided between Britain and France pursuant to a 
secret agreement. This secret agreement -- the Sykes-Picot Agreement -- brought European 
colonialism to the region and was therefore contradictory to the Hussein-McMahon correspondence 
of 1915-1916, which promised the formation of independent Arab states in the region. Under the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement, territories of the Middle East were carved up by the European powers and 
different ―zones of influence‖ were formed. In this new demarcation, the territories of Iraq were 
allotted to Britain. 
In March 1917, British forces successfully invaded the province of Baghdad and made it the center 
of British colonial rule in the territories of Iraq. After the end of the war later in 1921, the newly-
                                                          
13 An example of  this was the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, which was an exchange of  letters 
between Sharif  Hussein of  Mecca, who was the governor of  holy places including Mecca and Medina and 
was recognized as the true descendent of  the Prophet Muhammed, and Sir Henry McMahon, the British 
High Commissioner in Egypt. The letters were about the cooperation between the Arab forces of  Sharif  
Hussein and the British army. McMahon and the British government expected an Arab revolt in the region 
against the Ottoman State, which would result in the allocation of  many Ottoman forces to stop this revolt 
and consequently help defeat the Ottoman state on other fronts by British forces. After the agreement, Sharif  
Hussein organized an army of  tribal warriors and attacked important Ottoman installations and supply routes 
(Thompson, 1999: 85). 
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formed League of Nations granted the mandate of this territory to Britain. The British government 
brought together three provinces of the former Ottoman Empire, namely Baghdad, Basra, and later 
in 1926 Mosul, and delineated the boundaries of the Kingdom of Iraq. Faisal I, the third son of 
Hussein bin Ali, became the King of Iraq. However, the borders of this new state were drawn 
arbitrarily by the colonial officers without considering ethnic, sectarian, and religious lines in Middle 
Eastern societies and the historical backgrounds of these regions (Halliday, 2003: 28). 
In the formative years of Iraq, the people living in the territories of Iraq did not have a common 
identity or loyalty to a higher authority.14 With increasing institutionalization and centralization of 
the state, different groups within Iraq began to struggle to dominate the country‘s political and 
economic resources. Neither the repressive apparatus of King Faisal nor the Iraqi government could 
bring an end to the conflicts among these groups. In a candid confession, King Faisal I described 
Iraqi society in these years as ―unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, 
imbued with religious traditions and absurdities… and prone to anarchy‖ (Batatu, 1978: 25).15 As 
stated by several scholars, the artificial boundaries of the Iraqi state ―together with the absence of a 
stable and centrally organized polity and its religious and ethnic heterogeneity created a situation in 
which a stable state was a virtual impossibility‖ (Hassan, 1999: 72). Because of this, Iraq has been 
considered as the least coherent and governable of all states (Zubaida 1989; Gown 1991). These 
artificial boundaries of the Iraqi state have led to a situation where ―a salient feature of Iraqi politics 
                                                          
14 For a comprehensive overview of  the social structure of  Iraq, see Wardi  , Ali , and Fuad Baali. Understanding 
Iraq: Society, Culture, and Personality. 
15 Aburish, almost 70 years after King Faisal, echoed a similar description of Iraqi society. He stated: 
The turbulent history, harsh environment, and multi-stranded culture of Iraq have produced 
a complex and unique conglomerate which lacks the ingredients for creating a homogenous 
country and a commitment to the idea of a national community. Modern Iraq is a fractured 
society in which numerous clusters, tribes, ethnic, and religious groups pay genuine tribute to 
the idea of a nation state, but one which accords paramaountcy to their particular tribal, 
ethnic or religious background (Aburish, 2001: 3). 
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has remained inherent instability and a marked propensity toward coercion in the settlement of 
political disputes‖ (Kelidar, 1992: 729).  
Britain granted independence to Iraq in 1932 and immediately afterwards, Iraq became a member of 
the League of Nations. However, despite its independence, the state of Iraq had remained under the 
strong influence of Britain. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty allowed Britain to maintain military bases in Iraq 
and to be involved in all matters of Iraqi foreign policy that were relevant to Britain‘s interests. This 
treaty led to the rise of nationalism and anti-British feelings within Iraqi society in the 1930s.   
King Faisal died in 1933 and was replaced by his son King Ghazi, who was known to be ―a sincere 
Arab nationalist and a critic of French rule in Syria, Zionist claims in Palestine, and the British 
colonialists in the Gulf‖ (Derwisha, 1991: 12). However, King Ghazi died in a suspicious car 
accident in 1939, which led to the rise of anti-British sentiment among Iraqis. This event was 
followed by a coup in 1941 that brought anti-British forces in Iraq to power and paved the way for 
the Anglo-Iraqi War of 1941. In this conflict, British forces defeated the Iraqi army and appointed 
pro-British Nuri as-Said as the prime minister. However, this change in power did not bring stability 
to Iraq and the regime was brought down by another coup in 1958 led by Colonel Abd al-Karim 
Qassem. It was another bloody episode of Iraqi politics. Prime Minister Nuri Said was assassinated 
and King Faisal II, along with members of the royal family and Crown Prince Abdul Ilah, were 
executed. These events ―set a precedent for the use of violence, terror and conspiracy as a normal 
instrument of strategy by successive governments which came to power through a series of military 
coups ‖ (Darwish and Alexander, 1991: 20). The constant coups, coup attempts and domestic power 
struggle continued until the Ba‘ath coup, which brought Saddam and Bakr to power.  
The territories of  Jordan witnessed a similar pattern of  developments. These territories also 
remained under the control of  the Ottoman Empire for more than four centuries until World War I. 
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During these years, Jordan became an important passageway for those on pilgrimages from 
Damascus and Anatolia. Although the Ottoman Empire endeavored to exert strict control over this 
route in order to provide for the safety of  the pilgrims, the empire‘s control remained weak outside a 
few populated urban centers. Tribal groups and clans retained much of  the control in these 
territories (Ma‘an 1989: 31). World War I and its aftermath also brought dramatic changes to these 
lands. After the end of  World War I, the British government faced the difficult issue of  fulfilling 
contradictory promises that they had given throughout the war to the people of  the Middle East. 
One of  the most complicated questions was the future of  the Palestinian territories, which later 
became the Palestinian mandate and included the territories of  the East and West Bank of  the 
Jordan River. In order to keep their promises both to the Arabs and Jews, the British government 
divided the territory into two parts. The East Bank became Transjordan and Abdullah, the son of  
Sharif  Hussein, was installed as the ruler; the West Bank of  Jordan was given to Jewish groups. 
At that point, there was no common identity among the inhabitants of  Jordan. The borders of  the 
new principality did not correspond to any particular historic, cultural, or geographical unit (Shlaim, 
2008: 19). The society was a tribal one that had traditionally been far from the centers of  power and 
authority. 16 There were constant rivalries and clashes among the tribes and they did not feel an 
overarching allegiance to a higher authority (Thompson, 1994: 94).  
During its mandate period, Abdullah took important steps to unify the people of  Jordan and to earn 
their loyalty. Abdullah persuaded some tribes to recognize his authority, mostly by giving 
                                                          
16 Saloukh described the creation of  Jordan as ―a short-term arrangement between Amir Abdullah and then 
British secretary of  state for colonies, Winston Churchill, during their deliberations in Jerusalem at the end of  
March 1921. To the British, the creation of  the Emirate of  Transjordan was part of  an effort to appease their 
Sharifian war-time allies, Arab public opinion, and, more importantly, as a precautionary measure against 
possible French design to claim additional mandatory authority over the southern regions of  Greater Syria‖ 
(1994, 25). 
88 | P a g e  
 
concessions to them. 17 However, other more stubborn tribes were forced to accept his rule with 
the help of  the British forces. In 1928, Abdullah made an agreement with the United Kingdom 
regarding the future of  these territories and his rule.  The agreement was reminiscent of  the Anglo-
Iraqi Agreement and ―the articles of  the agreement reflected the British preoccupation with 
Transjordan hitherto, with strategic issues (especially related to military matters) and Britain‘s 
relentless pursuit of  efficient and effective governance (notably in fiscal matters) to the fore‖  
(Robins, 2004: 36).  In the meantime, the Transjordan Frontier Force was established under the 
British command to control the tribes (Abu Nowar, 173-175 cited in Cunningham, 1997). After the 
end of  World War II, Jordan became an independent state, but ―the kingdom remained dependent 
on the British for its annual subsidy. Britain was permitted to station its troops in the kingdom for 
the next 25 years and British officers continued to command the Jordanian army‖ (Robins, 2004: 
57). 
After the independence of  Transjordan, the first conflict in which Abdullah was involved was the 
Arab-Israeli War of  1948. In this war, Abdullah invaded the West Bank of  the Jordan River and the 
Old City of  Jerusalem. Immediately after this invasion, in December 1948, Abdullah declared 
himself  the King of  Palestine. A couple months later, he declared the annexation of  these territories 
and changed the name of  the country to the Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan; Abdullah himself  was 
proclaimed as the King of  Jordan in April 1949. This annexation was not well-received among Arabs 
and Palestinians. There was widespread suspicion that a partition deal between Abdullah and the 
Jews had been signed prior to the annexation. After 1948, with these new territories, Jordan was 
flooded with more than 400,000 Palestinian refugees who escaped from Israeli forces during the war. 
Moreover, with the possession of  these new territories, the West Banker Palestinians became citizens 
                                                          
17 Abdullah considered Transjordan a first step for his greater aim to rule over Greater Syria. See Yehoshua 
Porath. ―Abdullah‘s Greater Syria Program‖.  
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of  the Jordanian state (Cunningham, 1997: 46-48). With these developments, the population of  
Transjordan ballooned from 450,000 to 1,350,000 (Thompson, 1994). 
The new citizens of  Jordan and the Palestinian refugees brought with them new societal and political 
cleavages which made it more difficult for Abdullah to foster unity among the people within 
Jordanian borders. After the influx of  Palestinians, a distinctive and significant ethnic divide emerged 
between the East Bankers, who were natives of  Jordan with Bedouin backgrounds, and West Banker 
Palestinians. Although Abdullah made every attempt to suppress any trace of  Palestinian Arab 
identity, this divide later manifested itself  in the economic and spatial realm and became one of  
most significant cleavages in Jordanian society. Most of  the Bedouin groups continued to live in the 
rural areas of  southern Jordan and engaged in agriculture, whereas Palestinians who began to reside 
in the larger cities of  the north, particularly Amman and Irbid, were employed in the industrial and 
service sectors (Cunningham, 1997: xiv-xv). 18 
In July 1951, a few years after Abdullah formed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, he was 
assassinated by a young Palestinian man at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.19 Discussion about the 
successor to Abdullah began even before his funeral. During his life, Abdullah repeatedly changed 
the crown prince due to his disagreements and dissatisfaction with his sons.20 After lengthy 
discussions between the Jordanian government and the British mandate officers in Transjordan, it 
                                                          
18See Lauri A Brand ―Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of  Identity‖ Journal of  Palestine Studies. Vol.24, 
No:4 (Summer 1995), pp.46-61. Fathi  Jordan- An invented Nation? 
19 For observers of  Arab politics in those days, the assassination was not something unexpected. The 
annexation of  Palestinian territories and more importantly Abdullah‘s secret meetings with Israeli government 
made him extremely unpopular among Palestinians. Even before this event, he had an extremely poor 
reputation among Palestinians due to his friendship and close rapport with the leaders of  Jewish Agency 
(Shlaim, 25). Many Arabs in the region thought that Abdullah had orchestrated the partition of  the territories 
of  Palestine with his Israeli friends long before the war. For the Palestinians and for many Arabs his 
negotiations were a betrayal to the common Arab position against the state of  Israel.   
20 Although during World War II Nayif  was proclaimed as crown prince, in 1947 Abdullah officially declared 
Talal, father of  Hussein, to be his heir. 
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was decided that Talal, the elder son of Abdullah and the father of King Hussein, would become the 
King of Jordan. He succeeded Abdullah in 1951, but his rule did not last long either and his son 
Hussein became the King of Jordan at the age of 18. 
The territories of  Syria in these years also faced similar political and social developments in post-
World War I period. With the end of  Ottoman hegemony in the region, the lands of  Syria became 
another contested territory of  the Middle East. According to the Sykes-Picot agreement, the 
territories of  Syria were allocated to the French government. However, immediately after World War 
I, Sharif  Hussein‘s son Faisal came to Damascus with British forces and declared a pan-Arab state. 
After this incident, the French acted quickly and asked the British government to abide by the 
principles of  the Sykes-Picot agreement. The British government decided to retreat from the Syrian 
territories in order to prevent any confrontation with French forces and left the Arab forces of  
Faisal alone. In the coming years, Syria faced domestic sectarian clashes, as well as conflicts with the 
French government. Only after three years of  clashes and skirmishes between Arab and French 
forces did France gain full control of  the region. Faisal was forced to leave the country and, with the 
help of  the British government, he became the King of  Iraq. 
After France took formal control of  the Syrian territories, the French authorities enforced a new 
administrative division in these territories. In these formative years, Syria suffered from the same 
domestic economic and social problems that other new states had gone through. The most 
observable of  these problems was the absence of  a common identity among the residents of  these 
territories. In the history of  the region, there had been no common territorial identity or 
acknowledgement of  a Syrian nationhood. Observers and travelers who visited the region as late as 
the 1850s emphasized the lack of  a broad, shared bond among the residents of  Syrian territories. 
One of  those observers stated: 
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Patriotism is unknown…there is not a man in the country whether Turk or Arab, 
Mohammedan or Christian who would give a para (penny) to save the Empire from 
ruin. The patriotism of  the Syrian is confined to the four walls of  his own house: 
anything beyond them does not concern him. (Murray, 1858; xlvi. Cited in Ma‘oz, 
1986: 13) 
The sharp contrasts among various groups and communal heterogeneity were also expressed in 
other travel writings and memoirs. In the 1870s, another British observer described communal life in 
Damascus as follows: 
They hate one another. The Sunnites excommunicate the Shiahs and both hate the 
Druzes; all detest the Ansariyyehs [the Alawites]; the Maronites do not love anybody 
but themselves and are duly abhorred by all; the Greek Orthodoxy abominate the 
Greek Catholics and the Latins; all despise the Jews. (Burton, 1875: 105-106 Cited in 
Ma‘oz, 1988: 2) 
After the fall of  the state formed by King Faisal, the French authorities divided the territories of  
Syria into different states, along ethnic and religious lines. In addition, the authorities ―foiled any 
tendencies towards Syrian national unity and increased intercommunal contrasts by encouraging 
polarization in the educational system‖ (Ma‘oz, 1986; 15). This policy led to the absence of  a 
common identity and to sectarian and religious conflicts among the people of  Syria.21 
                                                          
21 In fact, as stated by Ma‘oz, in the formative years of  Syria, the challenge of  national identity was one of  
the most important problems of  the country. According to Ma‘oz: 
….most of  the population in mandatory Syria did not identify itself  as Syrian Arabs. The 
minority communities – both Muslim heterodox and Christian, but with the exception of  the 
Orthodox and Protestant intelligentsia- continued to rely on the French mandatory 
government. The rural and tribal masses and a considerable portion of  the urban lower 
classes continued to live within the limits of  family and regional loyalties. They considered 
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After the defeat of  French forces in World War II, Syria proclaimed its independence in 1941 but 
French forces evacuated the region only in 1946. However, Syria‘s independence did not solve the 
major social and economic problems in this state.  The sectarian divisions and lack of  cohesion 
among the different ethnic and religious groups in Syria particularly continued to be a major obstacle 
for the emergence of  a unified country, even after its independence. According to Ma‘oz:   
When Syria became independent in 1946 she was in many respects a state without 
being a nation-state, a political entity without being a political community. Her 
population was highly heterogeneous; within it there existed gaps and frictions 
among various religious sects, social classes, tribal groups and even between the 
inhabitants of  different towns, such as Damascus and Aleppo. Some of  these groups 
and sects tended to live their own lives in autonomous bodies such as religious 
communities, or nomadic tribes, and would not submit to central authority. Many 
inhabitants lacked a strong sense of  an all-Syrian territorial identity; there was no 
common ideological consensus among the various sections of  the population. (1972: 
389) 
As Kessler stated, ―sharp distinctions among the desert, the village and the city, and differences 
among the peoples and the ideas that come from them, have always worked against the kind of  
cohesion necessary for Syria‘s political integrity and military defense‖ (1987: 16).  The ethnic and 
religious groups, which constituted majorities in certain territorial regions, had historically developed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
themselves Sunni Muslim Arabs- rather than Syrian Arabs.  Even among the more advanced 
urban members of  the national movement, the feeling of  nation-state identity was not as 
strong as it was in neighboring Arab countries. Among these circles, regional tendencies 
and/or a Pan-Arab orientation were still strong, owing to the continuation of  the past…..or 
to the persisting belief  in Arab unity (1996; 16). 
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extensive self-government mechanisms and it was difficult for a central authority to control them 
(Ma‘oz, 1996: 21). There was no Syrian identity and no bond strong enough to integrate the 
heterogeneous demographic structure of  Syria (Ma‘oz and Yaniv, 1986: 28). 
From Syria‘s independence to Hafiz Assad‘s ascendance to power, Syrian politics faced constant 
upheavals and clashes among various factions. Within the first ten years of  the new state, Syria had 
20 different governments and four separate constitutions. While successive governments in Syria 
were trying to stabilize the country, there were foreign policy developments taking place in the 
Middle East, such as the Arab-Israeli War in 1948, which resulted in the overthrow of  the 
government by Colonel Za‘im in 1949. This coup was followed by a series of  coups and coup 
attempts by members of  different factions within the Syrian army. During these years, political 
power was vested mostly in the hands of  the army officers and power was shifted from one general 
to another. This political turmoil went on until the rise of  Hafiz Assad to power.    
In addition to this historical background, there are important similarities in the contemporary 
demographic structures of these three countries. As stated at length above, all of these three states 
are multi-ethnic and multi-religious in nature. For instance, Iraq is composed of Sunni Arabs, Shia 
Arabs, Turkomans, Assyrians, Yazidis and Kurds. Syria is composed of Sunni Arabs, Alawites, 
Christian Arabs, Druzes, Armenians, Kurds, Palestinians and Turkomans. Finally, although the 
majority of Jordan‘s population is Arab, almost 60% is made up of Palestinian refugees who have 
developed a significantly different identity than Jordanian Arabs. In addition, there are Circassians, 
Kurds, and Christian groups in Jordan as well. In this sense, none of these countries were ethnically 
homogenous and stable in the late 1980s. The leaders of these three countries were extremely wary 
about the political attitudes of the ethnic and religious groups within their borders. During the Iran-
Iraq War, Saddam Hussein was extremely concerned about the Shia population in the south of Iraq 
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and about the Kurdish insurgents in the North. Although Assad had just suppressed the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Sunni groups in Syria in the early 1980s, he was still wary of those groups 
and keeping an eye on them. King Hussein was also extremely concerned about the possible 
instability that Palestinians could create in Jordan after the initiation of Intifada in the West Bank. 
Furthermore, all three of these leaders belonged to minority groups in their societies. Assad was 
Alawite in a Sunni-dominated Syria, Saddam Hussein was Sunni in a Shia-dominated Iraq, and King 
Hussein was a Jordanian Arab in a Palestinian-dominated Jordan.  
In addition, all three of these countries were facing important economic and social problems in the 
late 1980s. The bread riots and the Ma‘an uprising in Jordan in the late 1980s were in reaction to the 
economic hardship in the country and market liberalization in Jordan. In Iraq, the eight-year war 
with Iran had exhausted the country‘s economic resources and left it with a huge external debt and 
budget deficit. In addition, the demobilization of soldiers after the end of Iranian War also created a 
huge economic burden, especially in the cities. Syria, which supported Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, 
was also deprived of the income from Iraqi pipelines and cross-border trade. All three countries 
were facing the same structural problems in their economies in those years, including high 
unemployment with high rates of inflation and budget deficits in those years.  
There were signs of possible social unrest in these countries as a result of these economic problems. 
Especially the increasing gap between rich and poor segments of their societies, the shortage of basic 
commodities, the increasing crisis in public sector and unemployment were endangering social 
stability. In addition, all three leaders were facing some urgent political problems, due to the 
influence of political developments in Central and Eastern Europe on Middle Eastern countries. 
Particularly, the overthrow and execution of Ceausescu in Romania caused the rise of dissident 
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voices among the societies of these countries and resulted in anxiety among these authoritarian 
leaders. 
Finally, all three authoritarian leaders were in power at least 20 years when the Gulf War took place 
and consolidated their authorities in their countries. They were also predominant leaders. They had 
the authority and power to commit their countries‘ resources to the particular foreign policy choices 
of their own. They had the final say in foreign and security matters and no other actor or entity had 
authority to revoke their decisions. They were also interested in foreign policy and using their 
authorities by actively engaging in implementation of foreign policy. Among those three leaders Al-
Bakr and Saddam Hussein came to power with a relatively bloodless coup in 1968. Although the July 
Revolution brought the Ba‘ath Party into power, it did not give the Ba‘ath Party enough power to 
make its desired changes and reforms. The operational and organizational skills that Saddam 
Hussein had developed over the years, as well as his ruthlessness, were needed in order to eliminate 
the challengers and to keep the Ba‘ath Party in power. The coup was achieved with the help of non-
Ba‘athists who were against some of the ideological tenets of Ba‘athism. Two weeks after the coup, 
Al-Bakr, with the help of Saddam Hussein, coordinated another coup to remove the non-Ba‘athists 
from the new government. After the removal of the non-Ba‘athist elements from the government, 
Al-Bakr rewarded Saddam with the second highest position in the government, namely the Deputy 
Chairmanship of the Revolutionary Command Council.22  
Once he became the number two official in the country, Saddam Hussein‘s primary goal became to 
secure his position and prevent any form of plot against the government. By then, he had acquired 
                                                          
22 It was an expected and reasonable decision for both Hussein and Al-Bakr. ―Both were relatives and fellow 
Tikritis and both had known each other well for a long time. Bakr had closely followed Hussein‘s personal 
development from a young boy at Khairallah Talfah‘s home to an efficient apparatchik at the party‘s supreme 
organ‖ (Karsh and Rautsi, 35). In fact, for Bakr, Saddam was a person who could be trusted and who could 
get the job done. According to Aburish, the relationship between Saddam and Bakr evolved into a mutual 
dependence and a division of labor. It was reminiscent of the relationship between Stalin and Lenin. 
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substantial experience and expertise in overthrowing governments, organizing coups and 
underground armed groups, and attempting to assassinate political leaders. He was aware of all the 
methods and strategies of anti-government groups and during his rule, he used his experience and 
knowledge to halt any possible coup attempts against his rule. 23 He was extremely successful in his 
campaigns to crack down on the opposition.24 He imprisoned, tortured, and assassinated many 
individuals that could possibly challenge his power. He also cleared the path to become the 
president by accusing possible rivals of plotting against the regime and eliminating them. He did not 
commit these brutal acts in secret. He usually ordered the videotaping of the brutal punishments and 
he distributed them throughout the country to show the consequences of opposition to his rule. 
Al-Bakr and Hussein made significant domestic economic and social achievements during their 
tenure as first and second in command, respectively. The nationalization of the oil industry and 
rising oil prices provided a major impetus for economic modernization and development programs, 
as well as government subsidies in different sectors. In addition to advances in agriculture and 
industry, ―the Ba‘athists oversaw the development of major programs of social welfare, health care, 
education, and a vast array of free services like distribution of radio and television sets‖ 
(Mohamedou, 1998; 180-181). Throughout the 1970s, the government passed a series of laws 
                                                          
23 In an interview, Saddam Hussein stated his intention to create a coup-free Iraq, by saying that ―with our 
party methods, there is no chance for anyone who disagrees with us to jump on a couple of  tanks and 
overthrow the government.‖ In fact, he was saying that he would not let anyone do what he did in July 1968 
(Coughlin, 91). 
24 He had many reasons to feel insecure in his first days in office. He was not a member of  the military. He 
was not well-educated. He did not finish his law degree in Cairo. Furthermore, a coup was not a healthy way 
of  transitioning of  power and in the Iraq context, the coup often yielded temporary results. Moreover, there 
were several coup attempts in the first years of  the Ba‘ath government. A coup attempt against Saddam and 
Bakr was made in January 1970 by several high level military officers. Although it ultimately failed, it was 
evidence of  potent threats to the regime. In fact, Saddam Hussein was realistic about the threats to his life 
and his regime. In an anecdote about his discussion with the leader of  a tribe, Saddam Hussein stated, ―I am 
too important and too well-protected. Should Allah forbid, our regime be overthrown, you will have to wait 
in line to get me. Thousands are ahead of  you in wanting to kill Saddam Hussein‖ (Aburish, 2001: 93). 
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making primary education compulsory and free for all Iraqis (Baram, 1980; Roy, 1993: 167). The 
government also passed several laws that provided gender equality and encouraged women to join 
the education campaign (Balaghi, 2008: 54-55). Hussein also created in Iraq the most modernized 
public health system in the Middle East and tried to give government support to farmers and 
diversify the economy in order to rescue it from the monopoly of the oil industry. He even earned 
an award from UNESCO for his work in the public sector. In July 1979, after an eleven-year 
presidency, Al-Bakr appeared on television and announced his resignation. Immediately after this 
resignation, Saddam was elected as the president of Iraq. 25 During his years as the vice-president 
and president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein was involved in the formulation and implementation of each 
and every important foreign policy decision of the Iraqi government. Especially after becoming the 
president, he made the major foreign policy decisions of Iraq himself, including attacking Iran, 
suspending relations with Syria and later invading Kuwait.   
King Hussein‘s road to consolidate his power also included important foreign and domestic foreign 
policy decisions. When Hussein became King of  Jordan, there were some serious foreign and 
domestic problems on the agenda. The first and most significant problem was the question of  the 
Palestinian refugees. The refugees, most of  whom had been settled along the border with Israel, 
were not only causing political and economic problems for Jordan, but were also straining the 
already fragile relations between Jordan and Israel. The skirmishes between Palestinian groups and 
                                                          
25 According to the majority of scholars, the turnover of power from Al-Bakr to Hussein was a silent coup 
organized by Hussein and it was Hussein who ordered Al-Bakr to go home under guard (Aburish, 2001: 169). 
In 1979, Iraq and Syria were on the verge of a unification agreement that would have marginalized Saddam 
Hussein. Al-Bakr would have been the president of the Republic, and Assad would have been his vice-
president. Saddam Hussein acted decisively before the union agreement was signed and forced President Al-
Bakr to resign.  
In Saddam Hussein‘s semi-official biography, Al-Bakr was mentioned as a sick man who could not run the 
affairs of the government in an era when the Arab world needed a young and energetic leader (Matar, 1981: 
51-53).  
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Israeli forces on the Jordan – Israel border, as well as the hot pursuit of  Israeli soldiers, were 
particularly resulting in severe foreign policy crises for Hussein and endangering the territorial 
integrity of  the country.  Secondly, the overthrow of  the monarchy in Egypt by Nasser and his pan-
Arab politics were major sources of  concern for the future of  the monarchy. The Palestinians, in 
particular, were influenced by Nasser‘s discourse and this factor threatened to trigger a wave of  
instability in Jordan.26  
With the 1956 Suez Crisis, Arab-Israeli relations became the most important item on King Hussein‘s 
foreign policy agenda. This crisis also resulted in the formation of  different alignments in the Arab 
world. During the crisis, Hussein symbolically supported Egypt but chose to remain inactive 
militarily, which further angered Nasser. Relations between Jordan and Egypt became even worse in 
1959, when the security apparatus of  Jordan uncovered a Nasserite plan to overthrow King Hussein. 
Hussein‘s relations with Iraq were also not stable during these years. King of  Iraq Faisal II of  Iraq 
was a cousin and childhood friend of  Hussein, and they had been enthroned on the same day and 
had had very friendly relations. The two countries had even discussed a unification agreement in 
mid-1950s. However, the coup d‘état by Qassem in 1958 ruined their plans. Furthermore, the 
execution of  King Faisal II and his family and the mutilation of  his body traumatized Hussein.27  
                                                          
26 According to Cunningham, ―Many of  the Palestinian refugees were politically sophisticated and 
experienced compared with their East Bank counterparts, and were keenly aware of  the larger nationalist and 
Pan-Arabist tides sweeping the region. Palestinian pressures for political inclusion in their newly adopted state 
fostered the political activism and string nationalist and leftist tides that confronted the King by 1956, a 
challenge that almost ended the Hashemite Monarchy and the King‘s life‖ (1997: 58). 
27 Avi Shlaim underlined the importance of  this event to Hussein‘s life. For Shlaim : 
The grief  he felt at the loss of  his cousin Faisal seared itself  in his mind. Hussein and Faisal had 
been the best of  friends: they were born the same year, and were at Harrow together; their fathers 
were first cousins and best friends; their grandmothers were sisters; and they became kings on the 
same day. Prince Talal once asked his uncle what was the most difficult experience that he had gone 
through in his life. There were so many things Hussein could have said: the assassination of  King 
Abdullah , the June War and the loss of  Jerusalem, the death of  his wife Alia... But Hussein answered 
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In 1967, King Hussein signed a defense agreement with Nasser‘s Egypt, months before the Six Days 
War. The agreement involved many policy concessions to Nasser and put the Jordanian army under 
the command of  an Egyptian general. With the beginning of  the war between Egypt/Syria and 
Israel, King Hussein found himself  in a difficult situation. Israel had constantly warned Hussein not 
to involve Jordan in the dispute. Although he was not willing to make a premature move, he was 
under strong social pressure from both his people and the Arab public in general. Despite his 
reluctance, the Jordanian army under the leadership of  the Egyptian general attacked Israel. It was 
not a well-planned and coordinated attack and the underequipped Jordanian army was defeated by 
the Israeli forces in a very short period of  time. The West Bank and Jerusalem were invaded by 
Israeli forces as a result of  the war. Moreover, around 300,000 Palestinians escaped from the Israeli 
forces, migrated to Jordan and settled in refugee camps. 
The loss of  Palestinian territories and the new wave of  Palestinian refugees generated a new and 
more serious domestic challenge for King Hussein in 1970s. The Palestinian refugees were reluctant 
to integrate into Jordanian society and showed little interest in becoming ―Jordanian.‖ Their priority 
was staying in Jordan until they could go back to their homes in the West Bank (Thompson 1999: 
104). This conflict between the Palestinian groups and King Hussein reached its peak in 1970, when 
militants from the Popular Front for the Liberation of  Palestine (PFLP) made several attempts to 
assassinate King Hussein. After the first assassination attempt in June, King Hussein tried to appease 
these groups and negotiate with them to reconcile differences. However, in September, the PFLP 
tried to assassinate him again by ambushing his car. Hussein barely escaped from the attack and it 
caused him to consider harsher responses toward these groups. When, in the same month, the PFLP 
hijacked several Western airplanes and landed them in Jordan, Hussein made the decision to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that the worst thing was the loss of  his cousin Faisal and the manner in which he and his whole 
family were murdered. This was the thing that grieved him the most in his lifetime‖ (2008: 167). 
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suppress these groups altogether.  In a very bold political move, he ordered a widespread and 
comprehensive operation to eradicate the Palestinian armed groups and militia from Jordan and won 
a decisive victory against these groups.  
In the Yom Kippur War, the Jordanian army only peripherally helped Syrian forces and was not 
involved in any clashes with Israel (Cunningham, 1997; 102). Hussein‘s neutral position and his 
reluctance to join in an armed conflict with Israel were interpreted as a betrayal by Jordan of  the 
Arab cause. Arab countries made Hussein pay for this independent stand at the Rabat Conference in 
1974 by declaring the PLO as the sole representative of  the Palestinians in the occupied territories. 
Through this declaration, King Hussein lost his status as the representative and protector of  
Palestinian people in the occupied territories. This decision not only weakened Jordan‘s status in 
regional politics, but also resulted in legitimacy problems within Jordan, where Palestinian refugees 
constituted the majority of  the population. 
In the 1980s, the Middle East was in the midst of  multiple conflicts. The Arab-Israeli conflict spread 
to Lebanon in the early 1980s and Syria became part of  this conflict. In addition, Jordan‘s eastern 
neighbor Iraq was in conflict with Iran. In the occupied territories, the intifada started in the late 
1980s and its repercussions shook the foundations of  the Hashemite monarchy. In addition, Jordan 
was also experiencing important domestic economic and social problems. The declining oil prices in 
the mid 1980s had an especially damaging impact on the Jordanian economy. Amid all these 
conflicts, Iraq‘s invasion of  Kuwait in 1990 was just another stumbling block for King Hussein, who 
was trying to ensure the stability of  his country and survival of  his regime.  
Al-Assad had also experienced similar forms of  political and social crisis when he was consolidating 
his power in Syria. He started to climb to power with a coup organized by Ba‘athist in 1963. After 
this coup he was appointed as a commander of  the major airfield of  the Syrian air force and in a 
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very short period of  time, he gained total control of  the Syrian Air Force. The pragmatic and astute 
political maneuvers that al-Assad implemented brought him to the center of  power after the coup 
of  February 23, 1966. This coup made al-Assad second in-command in the new Ba‘ath regime with 
the title of  defense minister (Ma‘oz, 1988: 35). 
The 1967 war between Israel and Arab countries was a turning point for al-Assad. After the defeat 
of  the Arab armies, a dispute erupted within the party on how to pursue foreign policy towards 
Israel and Palestinians. The civil war in neighboring Jordan particularly divided the Syrian ruling elite. 
Assad was reluctant to directly intervene in Jordan in support of  the Palestinian fedayeen. When his 
stand was rejected by his colleagues in the Syrian government and the Syrian army entered Jordan, 
al-Assad refused to provide air cover for the military and forced the military to return to Syria 
without interfering in the conflict in Amman. Shortly after this incident, he seized control of  the 
party apparatus by an intra-party coup and in 1971 he became the president of  Syria.  
When he became president, one of  al-Assad‘s most important goals was to regain control of  the 
Golan Heights, which Syria had lost during the 1967 war. He believed that if  he could attack Israel 
with a reliable and powerful ally, he could regain some of  these territories.28  In order to achieve his 
goal, in 1973, al-Assad joined his forces with Egypt in the war against Israel.  Although he failed to 
recover the lost territories, the end of  the war raised al-Assad‘s stature in the international arena. 
Despite this failure, after the war, he continuously increased his military power. He particularly tried 
to increase Syria‘s military strength after the Camp David meetings between Egypt and Israel in 
order to serve as a counterweight to Israel‘s power in the region. 
                                                          
28 For Seale, one other reason for his belligerence against Israel was the influence of  Nasser on him. Al-
Assad became the president in the year that Nasser died and the Arab world was feeling the absence of  a 
charismatic leader, who could carry the flag of  Pan-Arabism in the Middle East. Most Arab leaders, including 
al-Assad, were dreaming to close this gap by filling the position of  Nasser (Seale, 185- 186).   
102 | P a g e  
 
In addition to Israel, Syria also had had cold relations with Iraq because of  the rivalry among the 
different branches of  the Ba‘ath Party. In addition, Syria had had territorial problems with its 
northern neighbor Turkey since the annexation of  Alexandretta by Turkey in 1930s. Furthermore, 
Lebanon was a region that had been carved from the territories of  Syria and its pro-Western 
government represented an ideological threat for al-Assad‘s regime. In order to defend Syria against 
these external threats and to protect the survival of  his regime against domestic opponents, al-Assad 
built one of  the most effective and powerful military institutions in the Middle East. After he 
became president, he allocated the majority of  the state budget to military renovation and rebuilding. 
According to Ma‘oz, at some point, it reached 71 percent of  the budget, a proportion that no 
country in the world had ever reached (Ma‘oz, 1988: 58).  
Al-Assad‘s these policies were also geared toward preparation for another war against Israel in order 
to regain the Golan Heights. However, he knew that to defeat Israel, he needed allies in the Arab 
world. Therefore, al-Assad initiated military alliance talks with Sadat and after long consultations and 
discussions, the two leaders agreed to attack Israel on Yom Kippur. Although the joint Arab attack 
caught Israeli forces by surprise, in a short period of  time, Israeli forces turned the tide and acquired 
more territory than they had during the 1967 war. At an important juncture of  the war, Sadat 
unilaterally declared a ceasefire and left Syria alone against Israel, which caused Syrian forces to lose 
more territories. Although the war was a costly one for Syria, it provided an important source of  
legitimacy for al-Assad domestically. The end of  the war and the negotiations for peace agreements 
were turning points in Middle Eastern history. The Egyptian attempt to strike a separate peace deal 
with Israel despite the opposition of  all of  the other Arab nations, in particular, changed the 
political landscape in the region. Al-Assad, who was a firm believer in Arab unity, thought that this 
act was a betrayal of  the Arab world and pan-Arab principles, as well as of  the Palestinian struggle.  
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After the 1973 war, Egypt lost all hope of  recovering lost territories through armed struggle. 
However, al-Assad was still optimistic about recovering lost territories for Syria through an armed 
confrontation. One aspect of  his strategy was his ―Greater Syria‖ approach. He wanted to extend 
his borders or at least his zone of  influence to historical Syria, which was comprised of  Jordan, 
Lebanon, as well as the occupied territories of  Palestine. The Lebanese venture was the most 
complicated among these regional policies of  his. In the mid 1970s, under the pretext of  stopping 
the civil war in Lebanon, Syria sent its troops to the neighboring land. Initially, this was intended as a 
limited military operation of  peace-building with the authorization of  the Arab League. However, in 
a short period of  time, Syria became a party to the war and consolidated its position within 
Lebanon.  
In the early 1980s, the major domestic problem that al-Assad faced was the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Islamic opposition to his regime. The assassinations and violent reaction against al-Assad 
regime‘s repressive policies within Syria reached its peak during these years. Al-Assad reacted to the 
resistance of  this organization with disproportional use of  force.  The casualty numbers were never 
released but estimates changed between 10,000 and 30,000. Although this attack ended the strength 
of  the Brotherhood in Syria, it led to the isolation of  al-Assad both domestically and regionally. Al-
Assad tried to regain the influence that he used to have in Middle Eastern politics through using 
unconventional methods, including providing logistical and material support to guerilla organization. 
Although the international community condemned many of  the acts perpetrated by Syrian 
government, al-Assad continued to increase its effect in the Middle East through these mechanisms. 
 Research Design 
This dissertation will contribute to the methodological advancement of diversionary literature by 
using a structured, focused comparative study (George, 1979; George and Bennett, 2005), which has 
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thus far not been present throughout most of the literature. 29 The literature has an ample number 
of individual case studies and large-n quantitative studies, but other than a few recently-written 
dissertations on the presidential use of force in the US, scholars have not employed comparative 
studies (Williams, 2000; Bronson, 1997). As a result, the complexities of the decision making process 
and the possible differences among diversionary decisions in different countries, and within the 
same country among different time periods, have not been significantly explored. A comparative 
case study will help us to see the applicability of the research design and theory of diversionary 
studies to countries other than the US.  
The structured, focused comparison that will be employed in this research will improve the 
methodology of diversionary studies by responding to the shortcomings of individual case studies 
and large-n quantitative researches. Firstly, individual case studies in foreign policy studies have 
often been criticized for being non-cumulative (Rosenau, 1969; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). 
Scholars agree that these case studies have provided important insights and information about 
individual cases and made important contributions to the current knowledge; but again, the lack of 
systematic comparisons in these studies make them less cumulative (George and Bennett, 2005; 
Rosenau, 1969), and more descriptive and monographic (Macridis and Brown, 1955). The literature 
is full of these individual case studies that examine particular international conflicts through process 
tracing. These studies provide important information about the causes of conflict and decision 
making mechanisms within governments. However, they mostly aim to either test the diversion 
                                                          
29 According George and Bennett, ―The method and logic of  structured, focused comparison is simple and 
straightforward. The method is structured in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the 
research objective and that these questions are asked of  each case under study to guide and standardize data 
collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of  the findings of  the cases possible. The 
method is focused in that it deals only with certain aspects of  the historical cases examined. The requirements 
for structure and focus apply equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional cases‖ 
(2005: 67). 
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theory or to demonstrate the explanatory power of the theory through a single case. Structured, 
focused comparison helps us to yield a more generalizable set of data and to develop a theoretical 
framework for the subject matter.  
However, while responding to the limitations of the employment of individual case studies and 
large-n quantitative research in the field, the structured, focused comparison also borrows some 
important insights from them. Firstly, just like individual case studies, the structured focused 
comparison enables the researcher to get in-depth knowledge about cases and provide information 
about the intricacies of decision making.  However the structured, focused comparisons is different 
from single case studies in the sense that  it takes into account a number of specific, comparable 
cases, which will in the long run pave the way for the development of theory in this field. Secondly, 
the structured, focused comparison ―borrows the device of asking a set of standardized, general 
questions of each case‖ from the statistical models (George and Bennett, 2005: 69). However, it 
describes the explanatory variables in greater detail than a summary of statistical information could 
provide (Williams, 2000).  
The method of structured, focused comparison is going to be utilized in order to conduct an 
examination of three diversionary foreign policy decisions made by three leaders (Hafiz al-Assad, 
Saddam Hussein and King Hussein) from three different countries (Syria, Iraq and Jordan) during 
the Gulf War and its immediate aftermath. The questions set forth below will be asked in each and 
every case in order to assess the relationship between leadership traits and selection of diversionary 
actions. Before proceeding to the questions, the dependent and independent variables of the study 
will be discussed.  
Questions 
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As mentioned above, this dissertation employs Alexander George‘s structured, focused comparison. 
To conduct this research and study, and to ensure that the case studies were indeed comparable, I 
needed a list of standardized questions. These questions were brought together by taking into 
account the theoretical focus of this research. Some of them are intended to provide background 
information about the case and the decision context.   
1-) What are the domestic circumstances that made the leader to use one of the diversionary 
strategies? 
2-) What was the authoritative decision unit in this case? 
3-) What were the leadership styles of the political leader? 
4-) How does the leader divert the attention of the domestic public? 
 Did he use one of the conflictual strategies? 
 Did he use one of the cooperative strategies? 
 Did he use both of these strategies at the same time?  
5- ) What is the relationship between the leadership styles and the selection of different 
forms of diversionary foreign policy? 
1. What is the relationship between challenging/respecting constraint and the 
diversionary behavior? 
2. What is the relationship between openness/closeness to information and the 
diversionary behavior? 
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3. What is the relationship between the task motivation of the leader and the 
diversionary behavior? 
4. What is the relationship between the motivations of the political leader 
towards the world and the diversionary behavior? 
Dependent Variable 
For many years, the dependent variable of mainstream diversionary studies has been either war or 
another form of external use of force. In this study, I extend the scope of the dependent variable to 
integrate theories from the literature on domestic politics and international conflict interaction and 
literature on the public opinion and foreign policy nexus into diversionary scholarship.  The 
dependent variables of this study will be the following different diversionary strategies -- ―use of 
conflictual diversionary strategy‖, ―use of cooperative diversionary strategy‖ and ―use of multiple 
strategies including both conflictual and cooperative diversionary strategies.‖  
In order to solve the problem of categorizing various different foreign policy actions as cooperative 
or conflictual, I used the Conflict and Peace Databank’s coding of international events. (Azar, 1980) 
This dataset categorizes events along a continuum from the ―most hostile‖ to ―the friendliest.‖ The 
continuum has fifteen different points. This fifteen-point scale may be divided into two general 
categories of ―conflict‖ and ―cooperation‖: 
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Conflict Cooperation 
a.       Extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation 
or high strategic costs, including: full-scale air, naval, 
and land battles; invasion; and bombing of military 
installations.  
b.      Limited acts of war including:  intermittent 
shelling or clashes; and sporadic bombing of military 
or industrial areas.  
c.       Small-scale military acts, including:  limited air, 
sea, and border skirmishes; and material support of 
subversive activities against the target country. 
d.      Political-military hostile actions, including:  
inciting riots; encouraging guerilla activities; breaking 
diplomatic relations; and expelling military advisors. 
e.       Diplomatic-economic hostile actions, 
including:  increasing troop mobilization; staging 
boycotts; imposing economic sanctions; embargoing 
goods; and refusing to support foreign military allies. 
f.       Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in 
the interaction, including: threatening retaliation for 
acts; making threatening demands and accusations; 
and condemning specific actions.  
g.      Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in 
the interaction: Low key objection to policies; 
unofficial and official, including diplomatic notes of 
protest. 
a.       Minor official exchanges/talks and mild verbal 
support of policy, including: meetings with high-level 
officials; conferring on problems of mutual interest; 
issuing joint communiqués; proposing talks; and 
requesting support for policy. 
b.      Official verbal support of goals, values, or 
regime, including:  officially supporting policy; 
reaffirming friendship; asking for help against a third 
party; and resuming broken relations.  
c.       Cultural or scientific agreement or support 
(non-strategic), including:  initiating diplomatic 
relations; proposing or offering economic or military 
aid; and visits by head of state.  
d.      Non-military economic, technological or 
industrial agreement, including: making economic 
loans and grants; economic pacts; and giving 
industrial or cultural assistance.  
e.       Military economic or strategic support: 
providing air, naval, or land facilities for bases; giving 
technical military assistance; intervening with military 
support; concluding military agreements; training 
military personnel.  
f.       Major strategic alliances (regional or 
international), including: fighting a war jointly; 
establishing a joint military command or alliance; and 
joining international alliances.  
g.      Voluntary unification into one nation, 
including:  merging voluntarily into one nation-state; 
and forming one nation with one legally binding 
government.  
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Independent Variables 
The independent variables of this study will be similar to the independent variables used previously 
by scholars in the field of diversionary theory war. Since the inception of more systemic studies on 
the diversionary theory of war, most of the scholars used domestic problems that leaders face in 
their countries as the independent variables of their study. Following this pattern, in this study, 
independent variables will be various sorts of domestic problems that leaders face in their countries, 
including domestic social problems, such as riots, rebellions and ethnic, religious and sectarian 
conflicts, domestic economic problems, such as rising inflation and unemployment, high foreign 
debt and budget deficits and domestic political problems, such as legitimacy crisis, political scandals, 
emergence of a strong opposition and problems in terms of controlling the military.  
Intervening Variables 
The intervening variables of this study will be the leadership styles of the three Middle Eastern 
leaders. Although all three Middle Eastern leaders in this study were predominant leaders, significant 
differences existed in their leadership styles. This study argues that the differences among the 
leadership styles of these leaders can account to differences in the use of diversionary strategies. In 
order to reveal the effects of leadership styles on the selection of diversionary strategies, first the 
leadership styles of these three individual leaders will be analyzed through content analysis of their 
interview responses. After this, the relationship between these leadership styles and the selection of 
different diversionary strategies will be assessed.  
Leadership style is defined as ―the ways in which leaders relate to those around them- whether 
constituents, advisers, or other leaders- and how they structure interactions and the norm, rules, and 
principles they use to guide such interactions‖ (Hermann, 2005a: 181).  Previous research in the field 
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of leadership studies demonstrate that leadership style usually affects the manner in which a political 
leader deals with political problems and crises, and also the nature of the decision making process 
that the leader adopts. Hermann, in her three-decade long research on political leadership and 
leadership traits found a set of leadership traits that guides how leaders interact with those they lead 
and with whom they share power. According to her, leadership styles are built around the answers to 
three main questions, which are ―1-) How do leaders react to political constraints in their 
environment―do they respect or challenge such constraints? 2-) How open are leaders to incoming 
information―do they selectively use information or are they open to information directing their 
response? 3-) What motivates leaders to take action―are they driven by an internal focus of 
attention or by responses from salient constituents?‖ (Hermann, 2001: 90). For Hermann, the 
answers to these three questions provide information regarding the sensitivity of the leader to the 
political context and the degree to which he or she will want to control what happens or be an agent 
for the viewpoints of others. Knowledge about how leaders react to constraints, process 
information, and are motivated to deal with their political environments are usually discovered by 
analyzing seven different traits of their political personalities. These are:  
(1)the belief that one can influence or control what happens, (2) the need for power 
and influence, (3) conceptual complexity (the ability to differentiate things and 
people in one‘s environment), (4) self confidence, (5) the tendency to focus on 
problem solving and accomplishing something versus maintenance of the group and 
dealing with others‘ ideas and sensitivities, (6) general distrust and suspiciousness of 
others, and (7) the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (Hermann, 
2003: 184).  
Leadership Styles 
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Challenging the Constraints 
The attitude of  a leader towards constraints plays a definitive role in his political behavior. The 
constraints can include public opinion, power-sharing arrangements, such as checks and balances, 
and opposition groups, such as social movements and political parties (Keller, 2005: 837). Previous 
research on challenging constraints demonstrates that leaders who challenge constraints usually see 
these constraints as obstacles that need to be overcome in order to achieve their policy goals. These 
leaders usually prefer to meet a situation head-on and achieve a quick resolution. On the other hand, 
leaders who respect constraints are more empathetic to their environments and seek the support of  
the people around them. They are usually more open to trade-offs and bargaining (Hermann, 2001; 
Kaarbo and Hermann 1998; Hermann 2005a). To understand whether a leader challenges or 
respects constraints, scholars have analyzed the relationship between two leadership traits, namely 
the degree of  the leader‘s belief  in controlling events and the extent of  the leader‘s need for power.  
The need for power involves ―a concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring one‘s power; in 
other words, it is the desire to control, influence, or have an impact on other persons or groups‖ 
(Hermann, 2005b: 190). Leader with high drives and great needs for power usually try to have 
influence on foreign policy decisions. They may use various strategies, including manipulating the 
environment, sizing up opportunities, and working behind the scenes. They are flexible about the 
rules. Their rules may change if  their interests change. They are willing to circumvent their 
constraints in the pursuit of  their own objectives (Shannon and Keller, 2007: 85). In fact, these 
leaders ―will test the limits before adhering to a course of  action, bartering and bargaining up until 
the last moment in order to see what is possible and what the consequences will be of  pushing 
further toward their goals‖ (Hermann, 2005b: 190). When the score for the ―need for power‖ is low 
for a certain leader, he is usually willing to delegate to others and to give credit to others for the 
112 | P a g e  
 
government‘s achievements. Such a leader considers his subordinates his equals and tries to foster a 
group spirit. Shared responsibility and shared accountability are particularly important to such a 
leader. According to scholars, a strong need for power is linked to autocratic decision making 
methods and suppression of  dissent (Preston, 2001; Shannon and Keller, 2007: 85). 
The second leadership trait, namely, the belief  in the ability to control events is ―a view of  the world 
in which individuals and governments can exercise some degree of  control over the situation in 
which they find themselves‖ (Shannon and Keller: 85) Leaders who registers high scores in ―belief  
in the ability to control events‖ are very interested in foreign policy making processes and are 
actively involved in the orientation and implementation of  their countries‘ foreign policies. Such 
leaders want to be in total control of  all steps of  the foreign policy making in their country. Instead 
of  delegating authority, they choose to be in charge of  every policy move. In addition ―because such 
leaders are so sure that they can have an impact on the world, they are less prone to compromise or 
work out a deal with others. Once they decide, they exude confidence in their decision-they know 
what should be done‖ (Hermann, 2005b: 189). On the other hand, leaders who register low scores 
in ―belief  in the ability to control events‖ are more reactive and less proactive in the foreign policy 
realm. They only want to participate in the foreign policy decision making process when there is at 
least a 50% chance of  success (Hermann, 2001). They prefer others to take responsibility and prefer 
to delegate authority. Because of  this, in the case of  policy failures, they can easily push the blame 
on others and scapegoat the people who took charge in making and implementing the foreign policy 
decisions. 
Leaders who score high both in ―the need for power‖ and ―belief  in the ability to control events‖ 
challenge the constraints around them. They also push the limits of  what is possible and available to 
them. Leaders who score low in both of  these traits respect constraints and try to act within the 
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parameters of  constraints. Leaders who score moderately in both of  these traits may choose to 
challenge or respect the constraint depending on the situation and context. When the leader‘s belief  
in his ability to control events is high and his need for power is low to moderate, the leader will take 
charge and challenge constraints but he will be too direct in his challenge and open to use force if  
needed. In these circumstances the leader will not do well in setting behind the scenes maneuvers 
and manipulating others. On the other hand, when a leader‘s need for power is high and his belief  in 
his ability to control events is low, he will be more skillful in challenging constraints indirectly. For 
Hermann, such leaders are more comfortable challenging constraints from behind the scenes. They 
are usually the people who are ―behind the throne‖ pulling the strings and not being accountable for 
the results (Hermann, 2005b: 188).  
Openness to Information 
Openness to information plays an important part in shaping leaders‘ foreign policy orientation. 
Leaders who are open to information are usually open to contextual cues and advice from experts 
and advisors. They also take into account the arguments of  the important opinion leaders in their 
society. They want to know the different alternatives and viewpoints and they welcome different 
suggestions, even if  the suggestions are contrary to their own opinions. They are usually cue-takers, 
who make their final decisions after hearing and considering different policy options.  
On the other hand, leaders who are close to the information usually take office with certain strong 
and rigid political opinions. They are usually advocates and they look for information that supports 
and strengthens their arguments and policy positions. They most often ignore and prefer not to pay 
attention to views that are contradictory to their strongly held beliefs (Hermann, 2001; Hermann 
and Kaarbo, 1998; Stewart, Hermann and Hermann, 1989 ; Hermann 2005a). Scholars have noted 
the influence of  openness to contextual information on a leader‘s foreign policy decision 
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making. For example, Hermann stated, ―How leaders‘ sensitivity to the political context and 
information about what is happening politically can influence when contextual factors are likely to 
shape how they engage in decision making‖ (Hermann, 1994: 367). Leaders‘ openness to contextual 
information is determined by the relationship of  two leadership traits, namely the level of  self-
confidence and the conceptual complexity. 
Self-confidence is ―one‘s sense of  self  importance, an individual‘s image of  his or her ability to cope 
adequately with objects and persons in the environment‖ (Hermann, 2005b: 194). Leaders with high 
self-confidence are immune to incoming information from their environments, including from their 
advisors and from journalists. They think that they have sufficient knowledge about situations and 
they trust their understanding of  the world and their solutions to particular problems. Even when 
they get new information, they perceive the information according to their own beliefs and thoughts. 
Leaders who have low self-confidence, on the other hand, are open to information and advice from 
the outside. Such leaders ―tend to continually seek out information from the environment in order 
to know what to do and how to conform to the demands of  the circumstances which they find 
themselves‖ (Hermann, 2001: 22). They sometimes behave inconsistently due to the existence of  
various difference viewpoints on particular subjects. 
Conceptual complexity is ―the degree of  differentiation that an individual shows in describing or 
discussing other people, places, policies, ideas, or things‖ (Hermann, 2005b: 195). It is one of  the 
most frequently studied attributes of  political leadership.30 According to scholars, low conceptual 
complexity is indicative of  situations in which leaders see the world as black and white. Such leaders 
                                                          
30 . For examples of  the works that focus on conceptual complexity, see Dille Brian and Michael D. Young. 
2000. ―The Conceptual Complexity of  Presidents Carter and Clinton: An Automated Content Analysis of  
Temporal Stability and Source Bias‖; Thies, Cameron G. 2009. ―The Conceptual Complexity of  Central 
Bankers and the Asian Financial Crisis‖; Guitteri, Karen, Michael D Wallace and Peter Suedfield. 1995. ―The 
Integrative Complexity of  American Decision Makers in the Cuban Missile Crisis‖.    
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prefer to reach quick decisions and spend relatively little time on deliberation. Usually, they prefer 
action to thinking and deliberations. For them, it is relatively easier to decide on a solution to a 
foreign policy problem. They are also more likely to use forceful policy instruments than other 
leaders (Hermann, 1984; Preston, 2001).  For leaders who possess higher conceptual complexity, the 
world is more ambiguous; there are more gray areas than black or white situations. Such a leader 
―can see varying reasons for a particular position, is willing to entertain the possibility that there is 
ambiguity in the environment, and is flexible in reacting to objects or ideas‖ (Hermann, 2001: 22). 
These leaders also prefer to listen to a wide array of  viewpoints and engage with different people on 
particular subjects, and only after doing those things, make a decision. 
 Leaders whose ―conceptual complexity‖ scores are higher than their ―self-confidence‖ scores are 
more open to information and more pragmatic with regard to contextual cues. They are more open 
and accessible for their advisers, and they also listen to people with different opinions (Hermann, 
2005: 193). When faced with a foreign policy problem, such leaders prefer to follow signals from 
society, the opposition, and their advisory groups. The reactions of  these groups to an issue are 
significant to the leader. 
Leaders whose ―self-confidence‖ scores are higher than their ―conceptual complexity‖ scores are 
generally more closed to information. They are motivated mostly by causes and ideologies, instead 
of  by situational clues. They are self-confident about their ideologies and believe that their courses 
of  action are the best. They are more likely to use coercive measures in order to force others to 
conform to their views. Information that reaches such leaders is mostly ignored or selected by the 
leaders in accordance with their views and ideologies. They organize their decision making in 
manners that put them at the top of  the hierarchy and provide them with full control of  the 
decision making environments (Hermann, 2001).  
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If  both the leaders‘ ―self-confidence‖ and ―conceptual complexity‖ scores are high, they are usually 
more open and strategic and they try to figure out the best possible options for particular points of  
time. On the other hand, low scores in both traits reflect more closed attitudes to contextual 
information. Such leaders are also inclined to easily lock into particular positions that seem likely to 
be successful (Hermann, 2005).  
Motivation for Seeking Office 
The trait of  task motivation is related to the leader‘s reason for seeking office. This trait focuses on 
the significance that a leader gives to a particular problem or goal and to the solution of  the problem 
versus the significance that a leader gives to his constituents, their needs, and their loyalties. In other 
words, a leader may be driven ―either by an internal focus―a particular problem or cause, an 
ideology, a specific set of  interests―or by the desire for a certain kind of  feedback from those in 
their environment―acceptance approval, power, support, status, acclaim‖ (Hermann, 2005a: 184).  A 
leader with a relatively high problem orientation concentrates on a particular goal and tries to 
mobilize his people in order to achieve that particular goal. People, politics, and coercive methods 
are all instruments for such a leader to accomplish his aim. The most important thing in the world 
for such a leader is the mission that he chooses, and he prefers people who follow his lead in 
pursuing his goals. On the other hand, a leader with relationship orientation is sensitive to his 
relationship with his people. He wants to maintain his constituents‘ loyalty and support. Although 
such a leader also has certain goals, he prefers to pursue his goals without losing the consent and 
support of  his people. For him, leadership is all about fostering collegiality, mobilizing people, and 
fostering the participation of  the people. According to Hermann, a leader who is in the middle of  
this spectrum is usually a charismatic leader. He takes into account both the problem and the 
relationships depending on the context (Hermann, 2005a). 
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Motivation towards the World 
In Leadership Trait Analysis, the motivation of  a leader in the world is measured by his scores on 
―in-group bias‖ and ―distrust of  others.‖ These scores indicate to the researcher ―whether the leader 
is driven by threats or problems he or she perceives in the world or by opportunities to form 
cooperative relationships‖ (Hermann, 2005b‖ 199). In fact, they give a researcher an idea about the 
leader‘s foreign policy - whether the leader is going to be confrontational or is going prefer to build 
friendly relations. 
In-group bias is a view of  the world in which ―one‘s group holds center stage. There are strong 
emotional attachments to this in group, and it is perceived as the best‖ (Hermann, 2005b: 201). 
Leaders who possess such bias are often nationalistic leaders with exclusionary tendencies. Scholars 
have observed that leaders with high in-group bias and leaders with low in-group bias engage in 
particular foreign policy behaviors. Leaders with high in-group bias usually see the world as a 
conflict- prone environment with clear-cut boundaries between those ―with us‖ and ―against us‖. 
Such leaders want the members of  their groups to feel absolute loyalty to their causes. Unity among 
the members of  their groups is sacrosanct for achieving their causes. They do not tolerate any form 
of  opposition or hindrance to the achievement of  their causes and believe that any such opposition 
or hindrance must be eliminated. Such leaders also do not accept any form of  weakness within their 
regimes or errors in the implementation of  their policies.  
Leaders with low in-group bias do still have patriotic feelings. They still have loyalty and devotion to 
their own groups, but see the world less in terms of  black and white. They are ―more willing to 
categorize people as we and them based on the nature of  the situation or problem at hand so that 
such categories remain fluid and ever changing depending on what is happening in the world at the 
moment‖ (Hermann, 2005a: 190).  
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Distrust of  others involves feelings of  doubt, suspicion, and skepticism about others and their 
actions. Leaders with high distrust towards others are suspicious of  the actions and motives of  
others, especially those who are in positions to challenge their authority and regimes. In its extreme 
forms, distrust of  others turns into paranoia and distrust of  everyone. Leaders with high distrust of  
others prefer to hire loyalists to their administrations and they usually try to handle the critical jobs 
themselves.  They also ―shuffle their advisers around, making sure that none of  them is acquiring a 
large enough power base to challenge the leader‘s authority.....‖ and ―..tend to be hypersensitive to 
criticism- often seeing criticism where others would not- and they are vigilant, always on the lookout 
for challenge to their authority or self ‖ (Hermann, 2005b: 2003). Leaders with low distrust try to 
evaluate situations and people according to the contexts and their past experiences with them. Such 
leaders tend to trust or distrust people when there are some actual signs of  betrayal or of  attempts 
to overthrow. They tend to not subscribe to conspiracy theories. 
Leaders with high in-group bias and high distrust of  others tend to see the world in Hobbesian 
terms -- as conflict-prone and full of  dangers. They believe that they are surrounded by adversaries 
who aim to extend their own powers or ideologies and destroy the leaders‘ regimes. Therefore, the 
main focus of  leaders with high in-group bias and high distrust of  others is to eliminate potential 
problems. On the other hand, leaders with low in-group bias and low distrust of  others tend not to 
see the world as a threatening place. They believe that cooperation is both possible and feasible in 
the international system. Between these two extremes are leaders with high in-group bias and low 
distrust of  others and they tend to see politics as a zero-sum game. However, this game is 
constrained by some international norms. The focuses of  such leaders are confronting threats, 
solving problems, and increasing the capabilities of  their countries. On the other hand, leaders with 
low ingroup bias and high distrust of  others focus on taking advantage of  opportunities and 
building relationships while remaining vigilant of  threats (Hermann, 2001). 
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The Determination of Leadership Styles 
There is a substantial body of literature on the impact of political leaders‘ personal characteristics on 
countries‘ foreign policy-making. For instance, Rosenau, in his seminal article on pre-theories and 
theories of foreign policy making, delineated a leader‘s personal characteristics as one of the five 
important variables that determine a nation‘s foreign policy (1966). In addition, other scholars, 
including Hermann (1963) and Holsti (1967), also underlined political leaders‘ leadership traits as a 
variable to explain the foreign policy behaviors of states. 31 In the late 1970s and 1980s, the study of 
political leaders‘ personality characteristics and their relationship to policy behavior became more 
systematic and ―scientific‖ due to the advancement of different methodologies. 32 Two major 
streams of personality and leadership studies were developed in these years. Firstly, scholars began 
during these years to write psychobiographies of political leaders, in which they associated political 
leaders‘ policy preferences and leadership styles with their psychological development. The scholars 
in writing these pscyhobiographies were primarily influenced by George‘s psychobiography of 
Wilson (1956). 33 Their studies used psychological theory and research in order to explain political 
leaders‘ motivations. Most of these studies focused on the political leaders‘ entire lives and inferred 
certain psychological patterns and traits from their lives, such as Gartner‘s psychological biography 
                                                          
31 For some of  the earlier examples of  studies on the relation between personal characteristics of  political 
leaders and foreign policy, see Driver, M. J. 1977 "Individual differences as determinants of  aggression in the 
Inter- nation Simulation," ; Hermann, M. G 1974 "Leader personality and foreign policy behavior"; Hermann, 
M. G. (1977) "Some personal characteristics related to foreign aid voting of  congressmen"; Hermann, M. G. 
1980 ―Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of  Political Leaders.‖. 
32 For a review of  this literature, see Winter, David G. 2005. Assessing Leaders‘ Personalities: A Historical 
Survey of  Academic Research Studies; Winter, David G. 1992. Personality and Foreign Policy: Historical 
Overview.  
33 For a review and criticism to George‘s study see, Friedman, William. 1994. ―Woodrow Wilson and Colonel 
House and Political Psychobiography.‖ 
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of Clinton (2008)34, whereas others only focused on certain psychological traits of a political leader 
and tried to analyze those traits within the life stories of the leaders they profiled, such as Renshon‘s 
assessment of the Clinton presidency (1994 and 2000).35 One of the prominent representatives of 
this genre in recent years has been Jerrold Post and his analysis of leadership psychologies and their 
impact on leaders‘ policies. Post, while analyzing the biographies of individual leaders, focused on 
certain constitutive moments and aspects of the leaders‘ lives, including his mentors, his education 
and childhood, and his life cycle. 36   
Another school of research on political leadership uses a different methodology, one involving 
analysis of to ascertain their personality traits and the impacts of those traits on their policies. The 
development of this form of analysis was mostly due to the difficulty of obtaining direct access to 
political leaders and of extracting honest answers from them, especially on politically sensitive issues. 
In fact, as stated by Hermann (2005): 
                                                          
34 For more examples, see Muslin, H. L. and Jobe, T. H. (1991). Lyndon Johnson: The Tragic Self: A 
Psychohistorical Portrait.; Weinstein, E. A. 1981. Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography. 
35 For more information on this methodology, see Mazlish, Bruce. 1994. ―Some Observations on the 
Psychology of Political Leadership‖; Stanley A. Renshon, 1996. The Psychological Assessment of Presidential 
Candidates; Stanley A. Renshon, 1992. High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition ; James David 
Barber, Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House; Stanley A. Renshon, ―Analyzing the 
Psychology and Performance of Presidential Candidates at a Distance: Bob Dole and the 1996 Presidential 
Campaign‖; Bruce Mazlish, In Search of Nixon: A Psychohistory Inquiry; Birt, Raymond. 1993. ―Personality and 
Foreign Policy: The Case of Stalin‖.  
 
36 For examples of this form of at a distance assessments of political leadership traits, see Post, Jerrold M. 
1991. Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile.; Post, Jerrold. M. 1983. ―Woodrow Wilson Re-
Examined: The Mind-Body Controversy Redux and Other Disputations‖; Post, Jerrold. M. 1993. ―The 
Defining Moment of Saddam‘s Life: A Political Psychology Perspective on the Leadership and Decision 
Making of Saddam Hussein During the Gulf Crisis‖; Robbins, Robert S. and Jerrold M. Post. 1987. ―The 
Paranoid Political Actor‖; Post, Jerrold M. and  Amatzia Baram.2002. "Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam"; Post, 
Jerrold M. 1993.; Post, J. (1991b). "Saddam Hussein of Iraq: Afterword.";  Post, Jerrold M. 2008. ―Kim Jon-Il 
of North Korea: In the Shadow of His Father‖; Kille, Kent J. and Roger M. Scully. 2003. ―Executive Heads 
and the Role of Intergovernmental organizations: Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and the 
European Union. Dyson, Stephen Benedict and Thomas Preston. 2006. ―Individual Characteristics of 
Political Leaders and the Use of Analogy in Foreign Policy Decision Making.‖ 
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It is hard to conceive of giving people like Tony Blair, Saddam Hussein or Boris 
Yeltsin a battery of psychological tests or having them submit a series of clinical 
interviews. Not only would they not have time for, or tolerate, such procedures, they 
would be wary that the results, if made public, might prove politically damaging to 
them (178). 
Although there are some types of documents that can give the analysts information about the 
backgrounds and personal characteristics of leaders, such as biographies and autobiographies, they 
do have their own problems in terms of genuineness. Some biographies were written with strong 
biases against the leader, such as biographies of late president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein which were 
extremely popular in 1990s. Other biographies have problems with accuracy of information. 
Furthermore, autobiographies always have problems of self-promotion and self-defense, and most 
often they do not say many things about the personal weaknesses and failures of the writer. 
Considering these difficulties, scholars have tried to find other methods of analyzing political 
leaders‘ personal characteristics from a distance and without a requirement of direct interaction. One 
way that they have discovered has been to look at the words that a leader uses.  
Presidents and political leaders leave behind more words than anyone else in the world. Their 
speeches, interviews, press conferences, and even cabinet discussions are recorded and archived. 
These words have constituted the basis of different methods of assessing their personal 
characteristics, including the operational code analysis developed by George (1969), Holsti (1970) 
and Walker (1983, 1990 and 2000; Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1999; Walker, and Falkowski, 1984; 
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Walker, Schafer and Young. 1998.), and the leadership trait analysis developed by Hermann (1980, 
1987, 2001, 2005; Hermann and Preston. 1994). 37 
This study will use the leadership trait analysis developed by Hermann (1980, 1987, 2001, 2005). 
This method is based on analyzing the content of what political leaders say. In this method, political 
leaders‘ spontaneous interview responses are examined to assess their personality traits and 
leadership styles. Spontaneous materials are preferred by researchers because they minimize the 
effects of ghost writing and planned communication. According to Hermann, ―materials, such as 
speeches and letters are often written for the head of government by others and are generally 
designed to convey a specific image to a certain audience. As a consequence, the researcher content 
analyzing these materials will learn what the ghost writer is like or what the image is which the 
political leader would like to reflect. In the press conference settings, the head of government is 
usually the author of his responses and often has little time in which to plan his response‖ (1980: 15) 
In addition, Hermann argued, ―in the interview, political leaders are less in control of what they say 
and even though still in a public setting , more likely to evidence what they, themselves are like than 
is often possible when giving a speech‖ (2005a; 179). 38 The earlier studies on content analysis, such 
as Le Vine (1966), also revealed that the relationship between personal characteristics and 
                                                          
37 For examples of  at-a- distance assessments, see Winter, David G., Margaret G Hermann, Walter 
Weintraub, and Stephen Walker. 1991. ―The Personalities of  Bush and Gorbachev at a Distance: Follow-up 
on Predictions.‖; Kaarbo, Juliet. 1997. ―Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision making: 
A Framework for research‖; Steinberg, Blema S. 2005. ―Indira Gandhi: The Relationship between Personality 
Profile and Leadership Style‖; Kimhi, Shaul. 2001. ―Benjamin Netanyahu: A Psychological Profile Using 
Behavior Analysis‖; Sigelman, Lee. 2002. ―Two Reagans? Genre Imperatives, Ghostwriters, and Presidential 
Personality Profiling‖; Dyson, Stephen Benedict. 2005. ―Personality and Foreign policy: Tony Blair‘s Iraq 
Decisions‖; Stewart, Phillip D., Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann. 1989. ―Modeling the 1973 
Soviet Decision to Support Egypt‖;  Preston, Thomas and Paul‘t Hart. 1999. ―Understanding and Evaluating 
Bureaucratic Politics: The Nexus Between Political Leaders and Advisory Systems‖; Carter, Neal. 2008. 
―Investigating Stephan Harper: Personality as a Distance Profile‖. 
38 For the analysis and comparison of  the prepared and spontaneous remarks of  the political leaders, see 
Dille, Brian. 2000. ―The Prepared and Spontaneous Remarks of  Presidents Reagan and Bush : A Validity 
comparison for at-a-distance Measurements‖.  
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spontaneous material is stronger than the link between personal characteristics and prepared 
material.  
The interview responses of political leaders are used as the units of analysis for the leadership trait 
analysis in this study.39 The interviews were collected from a single source -- the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service Daily Report. All of the interviews were conducted during the Gulf Crisis or 
immediately after the Gulf War. In previous studies conducted by Hermann (2001), she has found 
that it is possible to develop an adequate assessment of leadership style based on fifty interview 
responses of one hundred words or more in length, which is accepted as a baseline for this research.  
This technique also involves comparisons of these scores with a broader population of leaders. 
When the mean score of a particular trait for a leader is one standard deviation or more above the 
score of the norming group for that trait, the leader is characterized as ‗high‘ on that trait. When the 
leader‘s score for a particular trait is one standard deviation below the population‘s mean score or 
less for that trait, the leader is characterized as low on that trait. Finally when the leader‘s score is 
within one standard deviation of the population‘s mean score, the leader is characterized as 
moderate for that particular trait. In this study, the norming group for three leaders is Arab and 
Islamic leaders, which include scores for 44 Arab and Islamic leaders, in order to control cultural 
and some background characteristics. 
 
 
                                                          
39 In this study domestic interviews of the leaders were taken into account. However these interviews 
were later compared with the interviews of these leaders with foreign correspondents which were 
intended to target foreign audience. The results show no significant difference between the scores of the 
domestic and international interviews. Especially there was no significant change in the leadership styles 
of these leaders when they talked to Iraqi or foreign journalists.  
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Leadership 
Traits 
Number of 
Leaders 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Belief in 
Controlling 
Events 
 
44 
 
0.24 
 
0.45 
 
0.32 
 
0.04 
Task 
Orientation 
 
44 
 
0.43 
 
0.76 
 
0.59 
 
0.06 
Distrust of 
Others 
 
44 
 
0.06 
 
0.31 
 
0.18 
 
0.06 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
 
44 
 
0.50 
 
0.65 
 
0.58 
 
0.03 
In-Group Bias  
44 
 
0.09 
 
0.20 
 
0.13 
 
 
0.02 
Self-
Confidence 
 
44 
 
0.08 
 
0.63 
 
0.36 
 
0.10 
Need for 
Power 
 
44 
 
0.20 
 
0.33 
 
0.25 
 
0.03 
Table 1: Norming Score for Arab and Islamic Leaders 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
SADDAM HUSSEIN OF IRAQ AND HIS DIVERSIONARY STRATEGIES 
 
 
Saddam Hussein, former president of Iraq, was one of the most controversial figures of Middle 
Eastern and world politics in the last decades of the twentieth century.  In his tumultuous life, he 
was the vice president of the Republic for 11 years and then became the president of Iraq and ruled 
the country for 24 years. During his tenure as the president, the state of Iraq engaged in armed 
conflicts with two of its neighbors (its eastern neighbor Iran and its southern neighbor Kuwait) and 
was in constant conflict with its western neighbor Syria. The war with Iran lasted eight years (1980-
1988) and was one of the longest and bloodiest conventional armed conflicts of the twentieth 
century. In 1990, two years after the cessation of conflicts with Iran, Saddam Hussein invaded his 
southern neighbor, Kuwait, which led to the First Gulf War. The war ended with the defeat of Iraqi 
forces by an international coalition, led by the United States.  The rebellions of the Kurdish groups 
in Northern Iraq and Shi‘a groups in the South after the defeat were suppressed by the internal 
security apparatus of Saddam Hussein‘s regime.  After the Gulf War, Iraq faced one of the longest 
and harshest economic sanctions in the twentieth century. Despite the UN‘s oil-for-food program, 
the people of Iraq suffered grave humanitarian losses during these years.  
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Between 1991 and 2003, Saddam Hussein and Iraq were under constant surveillance by the 
international community and particularly by the United States. Iraq was hit several times militarily 
during this time period, including the 1993 attack by US forces and 1998‘s Operation Desert Fox by 
the United States and the United Kingdom. During this period, Iraq was also accused of not 
complying with the IAEA and developing weapons of mass destruction. The suspicions regarding 
Saddam Hussein‘s intentions led to the Second Gulf War in the post-9/11 environment. In a very 
short period of time, the US and its allies invaded Iraq and toppled the regime in Baghdad. Saddam 
Hussein was captured in December 2003 by US forces in Operation Red Dawn in the town of ad-
Dawr near Tikrit. He was sentenced to death and executed in December 2006. 
Saddam Hussein has been one of the most studied and written about political actors in Middle 
Eastern politics. His life, domestic struggles, and wars have been the subjects of numerous books 
and publications around the world. During his lifetime, especially after the First Gulf War, numerous 
biographies were written on his life and they were widely read and circulated among Western 
readers.40  In addition, almost every Western broadcasting network has produced a documentary 
about Saddam Hussein‘s life. These documentaries have included but have not been limited to House 
of Saddam (2008) by BBC and HBO, Saddam Hussein-Defying the World by ITN, Why Can’t They Kill 
Saddam? (2008), Saddam’s Secret Tunnels (2007) and Saddam’s Bombmaker: Escape to Freedom (2006) by the 
History Channel.  Even after his death, interest in Saddam Hussein‘s life and politics did not vanish. 
Recently, new books and reports have been published regarding his personal and political life, 
including a book by his American army-nurse during his detention (Ellis, 2009) and another by a 
                                                          
40.Some of the example of Saddam‘s biographies include Aburish, Said K. 2001. Saddam Hussein The Politics of 
Revenge. Balaghi, Shiva. 2008. Saddam Hussein: A Biography. ; Cockburn, Andrew, and Patrick Cockburn. 2000. 
Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein.; Coughlin, Con. 2005. Saddam His Rise and Fall.; Karsh, 
Efraim, and Inari Rautsi. 2002. Saddam Hussein A Political Biography ; MacKey, Sandra. The Reckoning Iraq and the  
Legacy of Saddam Hussein.; Myerson, Daniel. Blood and Splendor the Lives of Five Tyrants, from Nero to Saddam  
Hussein.; Post, Jerrold M. The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill 
Clinton.  
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Special Operations flight surgeon (Green, 2009). In addition, the FBI recently released the 
transcripts of Saddam‘s interrogation (2009).  
This chapter will focus on the leadership traits of Saddam Hussein and the impact of these traits on 
his use of diversionary strategies. Scapegoating and diverting the attention of the domestic public 
through foreign policy were important pillars of Saddam Hussein‘s strategies of survival during his 
rule of Iraq. From the first days of the Ba‘ath rule, Saddam Hussein constantly blamed an external 
other for domestic economic and social problems. Through these strategies, he tried to distract the 
attention of Iraqi people from recurring domestic problems and unify the people of Iraq, who were 
divided by ethnic, religious, tribal, and sectarian lines, around his leadership. One of the most 
discernible uses of this strategy took place before and during the First Gulf Crisis. Before the 
invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein began to accuse Kuwait and other Gulf states of being the 
puppets of imperialist forces. After the invasion, he pursued ―linkage politics‖ to deflect the 
attention of Arab public opinion. Finally, after the launching of Operation Desert Storm, Saddam 
attacked Israel with its SCUD missiles, to gain more popular backing in the Arab world. 
Although many scholars and biographers have pointed out Saddam‘s constant use of scapegoating 
strategies for political survival, this leadership strategy of Saddam has never been studied 
systematically.41 This chapter aims to analyze the relationship between his leadership traits and his 
selection of diversionary mechanisms. The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part 
provides some background information on the domestic context of Iraq. The second part focuses 
on the authoritative decision unit in Iraq during the Gulf Crisis and an assessment of Saddam 
Hussein‘s leadership styles. The final part is a discussion of the use of diversionary foreign policy 
                                                          
41 See. Piscatori, James. "Religion and Realpolitik: Islamic Responses to the Gulf  War."; and Karsh, Efraim, 
and Inari Rautsi. Saddam Hussein A Political Biography. 
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before and during this crisis and the relation between his leadership styles and his use of 
diversionary mechanisms.  
THE DECISION CONTEXT 
In 1990, the Iraqi economy was undergoing a huge crisis, and the society was heading toward 
turmoil. The Iran – Iraq War, which lasted for eight years, had socially and economically devastated 
both countries. Saddam Hussein‘s attempt to repair the economy had failed, which led to the rise of 
social resentment against the regime in Baghdad. Finally, the end of the Cold War and the fall of  
communist totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe countries, which 
had been the natural allies of the Iraqi regime for decades, had brought anxiety to ―the strong man 
of Baghdad.‖ 
The Iran-Iraq War was the bloodiest and longest war of the twentieth century.42 Almost one million 
people died and the war did not bring any substantial gain for either party. It was also one of the 
costliest conflicts of the twentieth century in terms of the impact that it had on the economies of the 
parties (Alnasrawi, 1986: 869). Cities in both Iraq and Iran were destroyed and social services in both 
countries were disrupted. In Iraq, Basra and in particular the oilfields around the city were destroyed. 
In addition, the industrial plants and infrastructures of Khur al-Zubair and Fao were seriously 
damaged (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 21). According to Alnasrawi, after the war, Iraq 
experienced one of the worst economic crises of its history. Alnasrawi stated, ―Its oil exporting 
capacity from the southern fields was destroyed, its infrastructure was seriously damaged, a major 
                                                          
42 The relationship between Iran and Iraq had never been stable. Saddam Hussein had always considered 
Iran to be Iraq‘s most dangerous neighbor. In 1979, the revolution took place in Iran and Ayatollah 
Khomeini became its leader. Saddam Hussein was already worried by the rise of Shi‘a ideology and he tried to 
prevent the spread of revolutionary ideologies among Iraqi Shi‘a groups. He believed that with a sudden 
attack he could win a quick victory which would garner him immense political capital within Iraq and the 
Arab world.   
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segment of the its labor force had been drafted into military service and a large number of foreign 
workers had to be imported, its development plans were disorganized and lacking in investment 
funds, its foreign debt was high and its service was a major drain on a declining level of oil income, 
progress along the path of industrialization and diversification was blunted, its reliance on food 
imports increased, and inflation was rampant‖ (Alnasrawi, 1992: 336). During the war and in its 
aftermath, Saddam Hussein unsuccessfully tried to repair this devastated economy by implementing 
economic reforms, including liberalization of the economic sector and privatization.43  
One of the most acute problems in the Iraqi economy in the early 1990s was the foreign debt. 
Before the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was debt-free with the accumulation of 35 billion dollars in foreign 
reserves. However, most of these reserves were exhausted in the first years of the war (Sanford, 
2003: 14). With the prolongation of the war, Iraq began to borrow huge sums of money from 
Western and Arab countries, most of which were spent on purchasing arms and military equipment. 
44 After the eight-year war with Iran, Iraq had the third largest debt of any country in the world 
(Musallam, 1996: 85). Iraq‘s estimated foreign debt in 1990 was 80 billion dollars and Western 
estimates put the cost of reconstruction at 230 billion dollars (Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 39). 
According to estimates, even if all oil revenues had been directed to the reconstruction effort, it 
would have taken almost twenty years to repair the damage. Meanwhile, the interest on the debts 
was also mounting and foreign companies and governments were reluctant to extend any more 
                                                          
43 For the economic consequences of  the Iran- Iraq War, see Alnasrawi 1986, Alnasrawi 1992, Gause, 2002, 
Lawson, 1992, Chaudhry, 1991. 
44 Iraq‘s estimated arm purchases during the war were between 52 and 102 billion dollars (Sanford, 2003: 14).  
The estimated overall cost of  the war for Iraq was 452 billion dollars (Alnasrawi, 1992; Mofid 1990: 53).  
According to Mofid, this number does not include ―inflationary costs, the loss of  services and earnings by the 
many hundred thousands of  people killed, the depletion of  natural resources, the postponement of  crucial 
development projects or the cost of  the delayed training and education of  the young people. Finally, the 
figure does not include the cost of  the welfare payments to the hundreds of  thousands injured in the war, 
who are not able to contribute fully to the creation of  wealth for the national economy‖ (1990: 53). 
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credit to Iraq (Karsh and Rautsi, 2002: 202). In addition, the reflection of the deteriorating economic 
conditions in the GDP was staggering. The GDP per capita, which had been 4.083 dollars in 1980, 
plummeted to 1.537 dollars in 1988 (Alnasrawi 2002: 233 Cited in Sanford, 2003: 11) and inflation 
reached a record high of 400% in 1989 (Sanford, 2003: 17). 
As stated above, in order to solve these problems, Hussein adopted some market reforms, which 
included policies ―designed to encourage the growth of private enterprise and market based relations 
of production in the country‘s economic affairs‖ (Lawson, 1992: 157). After the first wave of 
privatization in 1985-86, the regime embarked on another series of economic reforms in 1987, 
which included selling state lands, farms and factories to the private sector, and encouraging private 
enterprise and deregulating of the labor market (Alnasrawi, 1992: 338).  However, despite the new 
measures in 1990, the overall state of the economy was more worrisome to Saddam Hussein than it 
had been in 1988.  Contrary to the expectations of Saddam Hussein‘s regime, the increasing 
privatization and market reforms brought ―high levels of inflation, unemployment, and shortages in 
basic goods, growing and highly visible economic inequality, and the emergence of a brisk black 
market in foreign currencies‖ (Chaudhry, 1991: 17). In fact, the social consequences of these 
reforms, such as increasing unemployment and declining living standards, which were not well-
calculated in advance, began to cause important social troubles for the regime.  
Among the economic problems in Iraq in 1990, the most distressing was the increasing 
unemployment.  The privatization of the state-owned enterprises brought a huge wave of 
unemployment in Iraq. In the absence of any employment regulation in privatization, the first act of 
the entrepreneurs who bought state-owned businesses was to restructure employment. According to 
estimates, the owners of industries and agricultural businesses dismissed between 40 and 80 percent 
of their work forces (ibid). In addition, the labor unions were dissolved during the privatization 
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program and the minimum wage was abolished (Chaudhry, 1994: 9). Most of the newly unemployed 
found themselves in an already competitive job market and without any social guarantees.  
Another major source of unemployment was the demobilization of Iraqi soldiers. Under the Ba‘ath 
government, the size of Iraq‘s army had increased by an incredible scale. It increased from six 
divisions in the mid 1960s to forty-four divisions during the eight-year war with Iran (al-Khafaji, 
2000: 267).  By 1988, the size of the armed forces in Iraq had reached 1 million, which constituted 
22% of the labor force in the country (Alnasrawi, 1992: 337).  In order to compensate for the 
civilian workforce‘s loss of Iraqis to the military, Iraq admitted large numbers of workers from other 
countries, particularly Egypt.  In addition, ―under the laws of the Arab Cooperative Council, 
founded in 1988, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan were permitted to export labor freely to Iraq‖ 
(Chaudhry, 1994: 9). After the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein‘s regime began to 
demobilize its soldiers because of the high cost of feeding one million soldiers and the possible 
danger of an armed insurrection by these ―free soldiers.‖  Demobilized soldiers began to return to 
their hometowns in the first months of 1989. As a first step to deal with the demobilization-related 
unemployment, the Iraqi government squeezed 2 million migrant workers and slashed the 
remittances they were allowed to send home (Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 39). However, this was 
not enough to secure jobs for the demobilized soldiers. The discharged men of Iraq desperate for 
jobs began to participate in street fights against Egyptian workers, which spread to various big cities 
in Iraq (Aburish, 2001: 261). The government‘s attempt to suppress these fights resulted in 
increasing reaction to the security forces and attacks on public buildings.  
The demobilization program halted after the release of 200.000 soldiers. The soldiers who remained 
in their barracks were a major source of concern for Saddam Hussein. As Musallam (1996) stated, 
the Iraqi army had become ―a monster of the decision maker‘s own creation. The need to feed it, 
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and to keep it occupied, was a constant source of anxiety‖ (85). In fact, according to scholars like 
Hassan, this issue alone was enough of a reason for Saddam Hussein to search for a diversionary 
strategy. According to him: 
On the eve of the invasion, Iraq had one million men under arms, a huge military 
structure for a country with the size and the strategic needs of Iraq. This state of 
affairs, in its turn, pressured the regime from within and, ultimately, compelled it to 
divert attention away from home (Hassan, 1999: 77). 
Al-Khafaji also supported this claim in his study on the war-prone nature of the Ba‘athist regime. 
For him: 
The mood of despondence and disillusion among the youth had far-reaching 
repercussions for the regime. Throughout the war, and especially during its last three 
years, Iraqis were exposed to high levels of paranoid indoctrination, told that because 
of their superior qualities and traits they had been subject to all sorts of external 
conspiracies intended to hinder their progress and their opportunity to assume their 
natural role in leading the Arab-nation. Now that the war was over, there was no 
foreign enemy to blame for local difficulties. What sense of national pride and unity 
the war had fostered among Iraqi youth could disrupt into unpredictable violence 
once the demobilized fighters, who had been through all the atrocities of the war, 
discovered that the rewards of the war went into pockets of others, especially the 
nouveaux riches who had benefited from the privatization campaign and war 
contract (2000: 275). 
In addition to increasing unemployment, the privatization also brought higher inflation and the 
black market to Baghdad. The Iraqi population, which was accustomed to ―stability in consumer 
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goods…. to relatively equitable income distribution‖ (Chaudhry, 2001: 17), began to experience food 
shortages in big cities like Baghdad in 1989. In fact, ―[f]or the first time under Saddam‘s rule, feeding 
the people became a serious problem‖ for the government (Abd al-Jabbar, 1992: 4). Furthermore, 
the privatization created a new wealthy class, which was endangering the stability of the regime: 1) 
by replacing the Ba‘ath bureaucracy, which had been the privileged class since the Ba‘ath revolution 
of 1968, as the new powerful group in the society (Lawson, 1992) and 2) by becoming a source of 
aggravation for the losers of the privatization program. 
Apart from these economic and social problems, the regime was also worried about possible ethnic 
or religious upheaval in the country after the end of Iran-Iraq war. Iraq was a torn country along 
different ethnic, religious, political and tribal lines. Its Kurdish minority in the north and its Shi‘a 
majority in the south were especially major sources of concern for the regime in Baghdad. During 
Saddam Hussein‘s vice-presidency and presidency, he tried to suppress these groups‘ anti-regime 
demonstrations and rebellions by using excessive force.45  He also initiated an Iraqi patriotism 
policy and tried to spread patriotic ideas among the non-Arab Kurds and non-Sunni Arabs. This 
policy was mostly successful among the Shi‘a groups who joined the Iraqi army against their co-
religionists. Suppressing the Shi‘a groups was particularly important to Saddam because 60% of the 
Iraqi population was Shi‘a and more importantly because with increasing internal migration, 
members of the Shi‘a groups began to constitute the majority of the populations in big cities, such as 
                                                          
45 During his vice-presidency, Saddam Hussein was assigned to the mission of  removing divisive elements 
and solving separatist problems. There was increasing political activity among the Shi‘a groups in the south, 
especially around Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was the founder of  the Islamic Dawa Party of  Iraq. Al-Sadr 
tried to form a strong Islamist movement within Iraq together with Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim. In later 
years, Sadr was executed and Hakim fled to Iran to continue his political activities. For more information on 
al-Sadr and the Dawa Party, see Aziz, T. M. "The Role of  Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism 
in Iraq from 1958 to 1980"; Shanahan, Rodger. "The Islamic Da'wa Party: Past Development and Future 
Prospects.";  Batatu, Hanna. "Iraq's Underground Shī'a Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects"; 
Mallat, Chibli. "Religious Militancy in Contemporary Iraq: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr and the Sunni-Shia 
Paradigm.. 
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Baghdad (Baram, 2003). The Kurdish minority in the north was also a major source of concern for 
the regime.46 Although the Kurds constituted a minority, they were organized and militarily well-
equipped compared to Shi‘a groups (Musallam, 1996: 53). Saddam Hussein and the Ba‘ath Party 
implemented different strategies of oppression, including mass deportation of Iraqi Kurds from the 
northern Iraq, burning of villages, and political persecution of any political group or individual who 
supported Kurdish autonomy. The persecution continued during the Iraq – Iran War, particularly 
because of the support of some Kurdish groups on the Iraq-Iran border, including the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan of Jalal Talabani to Iranian war efforts (al-Khafaji, 1988: 35; Olson, 1992: 477). 
After the ceasefire agreement with Iran, Saddam Hussein initiated a punishment campaign in 1988, 
which was also known as the Anfal Campaign. The campaign included the use of chemical weapons 
to systematically exterminate Kurdish villages and was implemented under the direction of Ali 
Hasan al-Majid. However, despite these drastic measures, the regime in Baghdad was still worried 
about these groups and the possibility of their resurgence. 
In addition to being concerned about these domestic problems, Saddam Hussein was concerned 
about developments in international politics. He was especially worried about the collapse of 
communist and totalitarian regimes and the emergence of the popular resurgence in Central and 
Eastern European countries. The fall of these regimes was not only depriving Iraq of its traditional 
allies, but also endangering Saddam Hussein‘s authoritarian regime. The fall of the Ceausescu regime 
and the execution of Ceausescu were particularly traumatic incidents for Saddam Hussein. He knew 
the consequences of the fall of regimes in authoritarian countries and he had witnessed the fate of 
                                                          
46 The Kurds around Mustafa Barzani, the legendary Kurdish leader, maintained their struggle for autonomy 
during the Ba‘ath government. The external support for these Kurdish groups, particularly from Iran and the 
Soviet Union, made it extremely difficult for Baghdad to cope with this problem. For more information on 
the Iraqi Kurdish problem, see Bārzānī, Masʻūd. Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish liberation movement (1931-1961); 
Yildiz, Kerim. The Kurds in Iraq - Second Edition The Past, Present and Future. 
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the fallen rulers of Iraq. According to reports, he watched Ceausescu‘s execution many times and 
ordered the heads of security services to study the videotapes of his overthrow (Freedman and 
Karsh, 1993; 31). His obsession with these incidents became more obvious during his interviews 
with foreign journalists. In numerous instances, he referred to the fall of Ceausescu and indicated 
that he will not be overthrown like him.47  
In sum, by 1990, Saddam Hussein was in the midst of one of the worst crises of his rule in Iraq. 
According to Chaudhry, the situation in 1990 was so grave that ―not even the experienced repressive 
apparatus of the Ba‘ath Party could guarantee domestic political stability‖ (1991: 14). The economic 
crisis had started to endanger political stability.  The Iraqi people had been unified and mobilized for 
eight years by their government and after the end of the war, they were expecting the fruits of the 
victory. However, it was a Pyrrhic victory and the government had no economic rewards to 
distribute to the Iraqi masses. There was no sign of reconstruction efforts on the infrastructure of 
the country and no indication of normalization in the life of Iraqis. Furthermore, new dividing lines 
emerged after the failure of the privatization program. Unemployment was providing a fertile 
ground for violence and conflict in the cities. The shortages were causing frustration within the 
society. More importantly, there were three assassination attempts on Saddam Hussein between the 
end of the war and the Gulf Crisis. The first one of these attempts took place in November 1988. It 
was a plot to kill Hussein by attacking his plane when he was returning from a state visit to Egypt. 
The second one was more worrisome for Hussein, since the planners of the assassination included 
some of his own officers from the Republican Guard. The third assassination attempt took place in 
January 1990 when he was riding his car around Baghdad. In addition to these assassination 
                                                          
47 See Diane Sawyer interview, ABC News 1991. 
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attempts, there was a coup attempt by army officers that failed in September 1989 (Freedman and 
Karsh, 1993: 29-30). 
SADDAM HUSSEIN: THE PRESIDENT/ THE PREDOMINANT LEADER 
During his years as vice-president, Saddam Hussein made important achievements for the stability 
of Iraq, survival of the regime, and the development of the Iraqi economy. He consolidated the 
power of the Ba‘ath party and spread its ideology within the society. The ethnic and religious 
resurgences were suppressed and opposition groups and organizations were neutralized. Through 
intelligence and security agencies and a network of spies and informants, he was able to create an 
Orwellian society. In eleven years, Saddam Hussein prepared the country for a smooth transition of 
power and after eleven years of being ―the strong man of Baghdad,‖ he became ―the only man of 
Baghdad.‖ When he was sworn in as the president, he was the sole decision maker of Iraqi politics.   
From his first day in office as the president, Saddam Hussein endeavored to solidify his rule and 
consolidate his power. ―The Great Purge‖ which started five days after Saddam Hussein took 
power, was just the beginning of Hussein‘s repression of dissent (and of even possible dissent).48  
According to Karsh and Rautsi (2002), this purge marked the beginning of a new era of Iraqi 
politics. Iraq was transformed from a political-military dictatorship into a totalitarian state.  ―The 
Great Purge‖ was a starting point for the ―Saddamization‖ of the Ba‘ath Party and later of the whole 
Iraqi society. (117) In addition to eliminating people with multiple loyalties, Hussein eradicated the 
infrastructure for possible opposition in the future. Trade unions, political organizations, and media 
came under the total control of Saddam Hussein and his state apparatus.  Multiple intelligence 
                                                          
48 ―The Great Purge‖ was intended to uncover a ―plot‖ allegedly aimed to overthrow Saddam. According to 
―confessions,‖ the plot was allegedly crafted by five of  the twenty-one members of  the Revolutionary 
Command Council. Karsh and Rautsi indicated that most of  the people who were purged in this campaign 
were outspoken critics of  Saddam Hussein and possible challengers of  Hussein‘s rule.  
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agencies were scrutinizing these organizations and preventing the emergence of any ―harmful‖ 
elements for the Ba‘ath Party. Hussein himself dubbed this new era as the ―Stalinist era of Iraq‖ and 
stated, ―We shall strike with an iron fist against the slightest deviation or backsliding beginning with 
the Ba‘athist themselves‖ (Karsh and Rautsi, 2002: 117).  
Saddam Hussein, during his presidency, followed multiple strategies to keep the Iraqi society and 
government under his control. Firstly, the Stalinist police state that Hussein created monitored and 
watched the people of Iraq in order to prevent the rise of oppositional movements. The usual 
suspects of the Iraqi state, such as ethnic and religious groups and leftist organizations, were 
particularly targeted by the coercive state apparatus. Shi‘a leaders and clergy were persecuted and 
Shi‘a groups with any form of Iranian connection were prohibited. Membership in these groups was 
made punishable by death. In addition, the political elites of the Kurdish groups were either 
assassinated or exiled. The relationship of the Kurdish groups with other countries, including the 
Soviet Union and Iran, were strictly monitored.  
The cruelty of the regime was not only directed towards ethnic and religious groups. Sunni Arabs 
also suffered under Saddam Hussein‘s rule. Their political activities and daily lives were also kept 
under surveillance. The domestic intelligence agencies of Iraq tried to recruit as many Iraqis as 
possible to be informants. Even students were asked to report their parents‘ ―political misbehavior‖ 
to their teachers. As stated by Hassan,  
With the emergence of a highly militarized regime ruled by a presidential monarch 
and party seeking total domination of all walks of life in the state, the Iraqi 
government turned the whole of the people into state employees. Societal 
institutions and the middle classes were overwhelmed by a draconian process of 
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Leninist-type political mobilization of the rural population into the Ba‘athist state 
organizations (1999: 86). 
However, a Stalinist police state apparatus was not enough to keep 14 million people under control. 
In addition to using coercive mechanisms, Saddam Hussein and his government cultivated a new 
―Saddam Hussein‖ image in order to brand him as the leader and bolster his legitimacy. The first 
step was the construction of an image of Saddam Hussein‘s paternalism above and beyond politics. 
Such an image would bolster his legitimacy because in a traditional society like Iraq, paternalism was 
considered as one of the most important sources of authority.  In fact, according to this new image, 
Iraq was a family and Saddam‘s Hussein‘s role was depicted as being the father of the society and 
head of the family. The second step of this strategy was the presentation of Saddam Hussein as the 
hero of the Arabs. He promoted himself to field marshal and began to be pictured more frequently 
as a military leader. In addition, although he was a staunch secularist, considering the significance of 
religion in Iraqi society, he was portrayed as a religious Muslim and although he was Sunni, he 
claimed that his mother was Shi‘a (Sciolino, 1991: 64).  He also invented an elaborate family tree that 
traced his origin to Prophet Mohammed‘s daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali and their son Hussein 
-- the spiritual patrons of Shi‘a sect (ibid).  
Saddam Hussein tried to promote these images of himself by providing historical analogies to his 
rule and his policies. For instance, he imitated the most widespread depiction of Saladin – Saladin on 
a white horse – by posing on a white horse himself. In another instance, Hussein tried to associate 
himself with Sa‘d ibn abi-Waqqass, the commander of the Muslim army that defeated the Persians in 
the Battle of Qadisiyyah (Abdi, 2008: 24). He exploited textbooks, museums, as well as stamps to 
foster this image of him as a Muslim warrior. However, despite Hussein‘s Islamic references, for 
some of his biographers, his heart really belonged to the Mesopotamian kings. He constantly 
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reiterated his fascination with Nebuchednezzar and attempted to put himself in the same league with 
the Babylonian King. Saddam‘s ―image juxtaposed with that of Nebuchednezzar became a popular 
theme, appearing in many contexts, including the commemorative emblem of the Babylonian 
Festival, depicting the bust of the two with a pseudo-cuneiform inscription‖ (Abdi, 2008: 26). 49 
In addition to his absolute control of Iraqi society, Saddam Hussein also dominated the foreign 
policy-making apparatus in Baghdad.  He had full control of the executive branch and was in charge 
of military and security affairs. He was the predominant leader of foreign policy decision making in 
Iraq (Hermann, Hermann and Hagan, 1987; Hermann and Hermann, 1989; Hermann and Hagan, 
1998; and Hermann, Preston, Korany, and Shaw, 2001). He had the final say in each and every 
foreign and security matter and exerted and commanded a unique kind of political power ―that had 
evolved an institution into itself‖ (Hassan, 1999: 100).  The Revolutionary Command Council, the 
Cabinet, the Army, and the Ba‘ath Party constituted his political apparatus. Iraq‘s constitution also 
vested him with the authority to commit or withhold the resources with regard to the making of 
foreign policy. He was located at the top of the state hierarchy. He was ―the President of the 
Republic, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, 
chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, General Secretary of the Regional Command of 
the ABSP, Chairman of the Supreme Planning Council, Chairman of the Committee on 
                                                          
49 In fact, Nebuchednezzar represented everything that Saddam Hussein ―aspired to: glory, conquests, 
regional hegemony from Gulf to Egypt and above all the embodiment of distinct Iraqi patriotism and Arab 
nationalism‖ (Karsh and Rautsi, 152). Saddam Hussein, in his semi-official biography, reiterated his 
fascination with the following words: 
By God, I do indeed dream and wish for [assuming Nebuchednezzar‘s role]. It is an honor 
for any human being to dream of such a role…  And what is most important for me about 
Nebuchednezzar is the link between the Arabs‘ ability and the liberation of Palestine. 
Nebuchednezzar was after all an Arab from Iraq, albeit ancient Iraq. Nebuchednezzar was 
the one who brought the bound Jewish slaves from Palestine. That is why whenever I 
remember Nebuchednezzar I like to remind the Arabs, Iraqis in particular of their historical 
responsibilities (Matar, 1981; 235-266). 
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Agreements, …among other things‖ (Al-Khalil, 1998: 110).  He also had control over the various 
forms of coercion mechanisms, including the Intelligence Agency, and the police forces.  
Observers of Iraqi politics, for years during Saddam‘s long rule, had believed that the Iraqi military 
would be the only institution that could challenge or end Saddam‘s rule in Iraq either by means of a 
successful assassination attempt or by a coup d‘etat (Hashim, 2003: 9). However, Saddam managed 
to control the military and prevented a coup for thirty years by implementing all possible coup-
proofing strategies (Quinlivan, 1999). First of all, he created multiple security agencies and armed 
groups in order to defeat a possible coup attempt of one agency with the help of another. 50 These 
armed groups and parallel armies consisted of extreme loyalists to his regime, and their main 
functions were to be the last line of defense against a coup attempt.51 The most prominent of these 
armies was the Revolutionary Guard. In addition, Saddam also created parallel intelligence agencies 
to protect his regime. Three separate secret police organizations- the Amn (internal security), the 
Estikhbarat (military intelligence), and the Mukhabarat (Ba‘athist Party intelligence) kept track of the 
activities of each other as well as possible opposition groups within Iraqi society (Murray and Scales, 
2003; 27). He also appointed his first degree relatives and most trusted loyalists from his tribe to lead 
these agencies and armies. Especially Tikritis were leading all the key security agencies. Adnan 
Khairallah, Saddam‘s brother-in-law and his uncle Khairallah‘s son, was the Chief of Staff and 
Minister of Defense for a long time and Saddam‘s half brother Barzan was the head of the 
Mukhabarat, intelligence agency. The National Security Office was run by his cousin Sa‘adoun 
                                                          
50 See Quinlivan (1999), Ahmet Hashim (2003), Andrew Parasilti and Sinan Anton (2000), Andrew Parasiliti 
(2001). 
51 One of  the first internal security agencies created by Saddam Hussein was the Ba‘ath Popular Army, which 
he founded to be a counterweight to the regular armed forces. As the Iraqi army grew in size and influence 
during the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein transformed the Popular Army into the Republican Guard, which 
had a similar mission and had members who were better trained and better equipped than the members of  
the Popular Army. Most of  the members of  the Guard were selected among the Sunni Arab tribes, 
particularly among the Tikritis (Hashim, 2003; 23-24). 
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Shaker. His uncle Khairallah was the mayor of Baghdad. His other half-brother Watban became the 
governor of the province of Tikrit. The Popular Army was under the command of the ultimate 
Saddam loyalist, Izzat Douri (Aburish, 2001: 161). In addition, Saddam Hussein‘s son-in-law 
Hussain Kamil Majid became the Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization and his brother 
Saddam Kamil married another one of his daughters and became a colonel (Farouk-Sluglett and 
Sluglett, 1987: 21-22). 
Furthermore, the members of the officer corps were provided with a high standard of living, in 
comparison to other government employees. During the Iraq-Iran war, Hussein provided even more 
financial incentives to the army in order to prevent a possible rebellion. In this period, ―[t]he already 
high standard of living of the officer corps was further improved and members of the armed forces 
were given priority for car and house purchases. Bereaved families, for their part, were granted a free 
car, a free plot of land, and an interest free loan to build a house‖ (Karsh and Rautsi, 1991: 154). 
Hussein also tried to satisfy the military‘s demands for modern equipment and arms. In short, 
Hussein devoted a considerable amount of resources to the armed forces (Hashim, 2003: 25). 
According to Baram, ―[t]he families of his internal security units (the Republican and Special 
Republican Guards; the Special Security and the Palaces Guard, who are in charge of his immediate 
safety; and various other units) are provided with more economic benefits than any other group in 
Iraq‖ (Baram, 1998). 
According to Hermann, when there is a predominant leader in the political system and his position 
is known, ―those with different points of view generally stop public expression of their own 
alternative positions out of respect for the leader or fear of reprisals. If these others are allowed to 
continue discussing additional options, their opinions are no longer relevant to the political outcome 
of the moment‖ (2001: 84). During Saddam Hussein‘s presidency, nobody in his administration was 
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able to express an alternative viewpoint when he was present. The political system that Hussein 
created did not allow anyone in government or in Iraqi society in general to criticize his viewpoints 
and ideas. In fact, when his advisors and ministers determined that his mind was made up on an 
issue, they chose not to antagonize him by expressing their views or criticizing him (Baram, 1998). 
52  
Hermann, et al., argue that ―[e]ven though a political regime has a single, powerful individual who 
would qualify under the above definition as a predominant leader, that person must exercise 
authority in dealing with the problem under consideration to become the authoritative decision unit‖ 
(2001a; 85).  In fact, the leader needs to have a general interest, as well as involvement, in the foreign 
and security policy of the country (Hermann, 1984, 1988a, 1995). Saddam Hussein had a deep 
interest in the foreign and security matters of Iraq. He not only formulated the defense and foreign 
policy matters in Iraq, but was also actively involved in implementing these decisions. Even during 
his vice-presidency, he was the person behind significant foreign policy issues, such as the 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the Algiers Agreement with Iran. After he became the 
president, he continued to formulate the foreign policy of Iraq himself. He unilaterally made the 
decision to attack Iran and he was the one to make the decision about the ceasefire agreement. 
                                                          
52 Books such as Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq written by Kanan Nakiya presented various 
anecdotes of Saddam Hussein‘s intolerance of those who challenged his ideas or put forward alternative 
viewpoints. Nobody was immune from his viciousness, including ministers and close advisors. The fate of 
Riyadh Ibrahim Hussein, who was the Minister of Health in Saddam‘s cabinet, is a vivid illustration of this 
intolerance. During the first years of the Iran-Iraq war, Ayatollah Khomeini stated that he would never 
negotiate with Saddam Hussein on a ceasefire agreement. After Khomeini‘s statements, Saddam suggested in 
a cabinet meeting that he resign temporarily in order to start ceasefire negotiations with Iran. He requested 
the candid opinions of his ministers on his suggestion. Initially, none of them accepted this suggestion. 
However, after his insistence, Ibrahim, reportedly suggested that Hussein step down temporarily in favor of 
Bakr and that after the negotiations, he become  president again. Hussein asked Ibrahim to meet with 
Hussein privately in his office where he shot Ibrahim. After the shooting, he asked the ministers their 
opinions again and there was a unanimous rejection of Hussein‘s resignation (Karsh and Rautsi, 2002; 166).  
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Later, he himself made the decision to invade Kuwait. After the invasion, he managed all aspects of 
the negotiations with the Western countries and the United Nations.  
SADDAM HUSSEIN’S LEADERSHIP STYLE 
The analysis of Saddam Hussein‘s leadership style is based on content analysis of his interview 
responses. 53  These interviews were conducted during the Gulf War (in 1990 and 1991) and thus, 
they are context- specific. Authoritarian leaders like Saddam Hussein do not usually give interviews 
to the journalists of their country. Instead, they prefer to make speeches and address their nations 
through national and government-controlled channels. Although Saddam Hussein gave numerous 
interviews to foreign correspondents during the Gulf Crisis, he only granted a few interviews to 
Iraqi journalists. In the absence of freedom of the press and in the presence of strict control and 
censorship by the government, it was almost impossible for Iraqi journalists to ask impromptu 
questions of their leaders. However, according to Hermann, the few interviews that he gave to Iraqi 
journalists are still useful in assessing Hussein‘s leadership traits than any other prepared materials. 
The second set of interviews used in this analysis is the interviews of Hussein by foreign 
correspondents, which were translated into Arabic and broadcasted or published in the Iraqi press.   
As stated in Chapter Two, Hussein‘s words are examined in this analysis for seven traits that have 
implications on how leaders conduct their foreign policies, including the kind of actions they are 
likely to urge on their governments and the way they structure and interact with their advisory 
                                                          
53 David Winter asserted the reluctance of  Saddam Hussein to conduct interviews. According to him,  
Hussein was ― somewhat of  a ‗fugitive‘ subject for interviewers. The readily available material from books, 
magazines, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report consisted of  only eleven English 
language texts of  interviews….ranging over the period April 1974- January 1991‖  (Winter, 2005: 371). 
Hussein was even stricter about press conferences. Over the 15 years between 1974 and 1991, he only 
attended one press conference. He gave his first comprehensive interviews during the first years of  the Iran-
Iraq War. The second set of  interviews was conducted during the First Gulf  War.  Saddam met with foreign 
journalists from different countries, but most importantly from the United States.  
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systems (Hermann, 2005a). The scores in these traits are compared with the regional norming group, 
namely Middle Eastern and Islamic political leaders. The scores on these traits and their 
comparisons with cultural subsets ―provide information that is relevant to assessing how political 
leaders respond to the constraints in their environment, how they process information, and what 
motivates them to action‖ (ibid). The goal is to explore the relationship between these seven traits 
and the diversionary preferences of Saddam Hussein. The analysis also reveals which traits are 
particularly potent predictors of these preferences.  
 
Saddam Hussein 
 
Domestic 
Interview 
 
 
Norming Group 
Mean Score 
 
Standard Deviation 
 
Compared to 
norming group 
 
Belief in 
Controlling Events 
 
 
0.38 
 
0.32 
 
0.04 
 
High 
 
Need for Power 
 
 
 
0.22 
 
0.25 
 
0.03 
 
Low 
 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
 
 
0.59 
 
0.58 
 
0.03 
 
Moderate 
 
Self-Confidence 
 
 
 
0.35 
 
0.36 
 
0.10 
 
Moderate 
 
Task Orientation 
 
 
 
0.48 
 
0.59 
 
 
0.06 
 
Low 
 
Distrust of Others 
 
 
 
0.25 
 
0.18 
 
0.06 
 
High 
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In Group Bias 
 
 
 
0.10 
 
0.13 
 
0.02 
 
Low 
Table 2: Saddam Hussein’s Leadership Style 
 
Challenging Constraints 
According to the leadership trait analysis, Saddam Hussein‘s score on ―need for power‖ is low 
compared to that of other Middle Eastern and Islamic leaders; whereas his score on ―belief in 
controlling events‖ is high. These scores demonstrate that Saddam Hussein was a constraint 
challenger during the Gulf War. His low score in need for power and high belief in controlling 
events also shows that his challenges to constraints are direct and open.     
This leadership trait analysis of Saddam Hussein is not surprising when we look at his behavior 
pattern during the Gulf War. During this period, he challenged domestic and external constraints 
directly and openly. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces was a challenge to international norms 
of state sovereignty, as well as to the charters of the United Nations and the Arab League. 
Immediately after the invasion, international organizations, including the UN, the European 
Community and the Arab League condemned Iraq‘s action and demanded an immediate withdrawal. 
However, Hussein challenged these resolutions by not abiding by them and insisting on his claims 
over the territories of Kuwait. In addition, the invasion of an Arab country by another Arab country 
was a moral challenge for a leader whose country and whose party had pursued pan-Arab policies 
for decades. The reaction of Arab people to such an invasion was important to Saddam Hussein‘s 
legitimacy in the Arab regional order. During his presidency, he had always tried to utilize this 
external source of legitimacy. Initially, after the exclusion of Egypt from the Arab League following 
the Camp David Accords in 1979, Hussein attempted to fill the vacuum of Egypt and become the 
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―New Nasser‖ of the Arab world. Hussein later represented his eight-year long war with Iran as a 
fight between Arabs and Iranians and described Iraq as a bulwark country that protects other Arab 
countries from the threat of expansion of the Iranian revolution. Furthermore, after eight years of 
war with Iran and the substantial diminishment of economic resources as a result, another foreign 
venture was not a popular idea among Iraqis. His own military, in particular, was a major source of 
concern for him. According to Abd al-Jabbar: 
The socio-political time bomb was the army. At least, three perhaps four generations 
were recruited, driven to the battlefields, kept there almost a decade. They had 
suffered the horrors and agonies of a long and draining war., were deprived of the 
best years of youthful, active life, and became hungry for literally everything (1992; 
35). 
The sudden decision to invade Iraq was another challenge to the demands of the Iraqi people and 
the expectations of the military as well.  
Openness to Information 
According to the leadership trait analysis, Saddam Hussein‘s score on ―conceptual complexity‖ is 
moderate in comparison to other Middle Eastern and Islamic leaders. His score in ―self confidence‖ 
is also moderate compared to his norming group. According to these scores, Saddam Hussein was 
open to information and contextual cues during the Gulf War on a case by case basis. Although this 
result contradicts earlier analyses and arguments of experts on Saddam Hussein, it demonstrates that 
leaders can behave differently depending on the context (Hermann, 2005; Karsh and Rautsi, 1991). 
Almost all of the biographers and experts on Saddam Hussein have depicted him as a man who was 
mostly indifferent and apathetic to information from outside. According to scholars and biographers 
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such as Karsh and Rautsi (1991), Winter (1993), Hermann (2005), and Post (2005, 2003), Saddam 
Hussein made important policy decisions himself, without consultations with others. After several 
instances in which Hussein harshly treated those who tried to express alternative viewpoints, his 
ministers and so-called advisors opted not to interfere with the decision making process at all. 
Nobody in his inner circle was courageous enough to challenge his viewpoint or present an 
alternative solution to a problem. Most of his advisors were there just to approve or confirm his 
opinions and reassure him about the accuracy of his viewpoints. In a leadership trait analysis of 
Hussein, Hermann stated that Hussein was likely to take most actions on his own and for him, 
political advisors were only the implementers of actions previously decided by him, not participants 
in the decision making process (Hermann, 2005a; 378).  In another leadership analysis, Winter 
reported that the sycophants around Saddam Hussein led him to make disastrous miscalculations in 
foreign policy because of their fear of correcting mistakes that they saw in his policies (Winter, 1993; 
110).  
Throughout his presidency, Hussein‘s resistance to listening to the advice of others caused him to 
detach from the realities of the world and in some instances, resulted in huge policy failures. 
According to Baram, one of these failures was his decision to attack Iran. For him, 
[t]his decision was made without any consultation. When Saddam‘s advisors realized 
that his mind was made up, they dared not to antagonize him. Only a year earlier he 
had executed fifty-five senior party officials and army officers for voicing opposition 
to an important decision he had made (Baram, 1998).  
According to Myerson, self-proclaimed Marshal Saddam Hussein‘s ignorance of the advice of his 
generals led to Iraq‘s defeat during important parts of the Iran-Iraq War (Myerson, 1992; 234). 
Moreover, his scant experience with the Western world (Post, 1993; 49) made him extremely 
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vulnerable to conspiracy theories and led him to make erroneous foreign policy decisions. (Stein, 
1992; 178) In fact, for scholars like Hassan, the most difficult aspect of dealing with the Iraqi 
leadership was the absence of Saddam Hussein‘s political advisors. According to him: 
There were no persons or key contacts to discreetly influence, and there were no 
channels through which to convey messages or suggestions for solving and finding a 
way out of the conflict. No public figures, no single individual in the Revolutionary 
Command Council- which is the highest official political institution in Iraq- no 
ministers, no Ba‘ath Party member, not even the army had any real authority or 
power at all...(1999: 102) 
The outcome of the leadership trait analysis in some way contradicts with these earlier findings and 
demonstrates that Hussein might also be open to information in some instances during the Gulf 
Crisis. It shows that some leadership traits may be context-specific and leaders may change their 
attitudes toward incoming information and contextual cues when they are in crisis situations. A 
closer analysis of Saddam Hussein‘s openness to information during this crisis suggests that Hussein 
became more open to information as the crisis became more international. 
It is possible to track some changes in Saddam Hussein‘s behavior during the Gulf Crisis from the 
studies that focused on the decision making process in Baghdad. For example, Amatzia Baram 
(1998) stated that Hussein made decisions during the crisis in consultation with several people, 
including:  Husayn Kamil, his young and docile cousin and son-in-law; General Iyad Khalifa al-Rawi, 
Commander of the Republican Guard; and Ali Hasan al-Majid, a professional soldier and his cousin. 
Moreover, after the invasion of Kuwait, some generals, including Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army 
Nizar-al Khazraji were given the opportunity to express to Saddam Hussein their concerns about a 
possible clash between the Iraqi and American armies. Khazraji submitted a report to Hussein 
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explaining that in the case of a war with the United States, Iraq would be the loser. He later reported 
to journalists: 
I explained the potential dangers for Iraq. I also explained the status of the balance 
of powers, saying that Iraq would lose the war. A meeting was held at the general 
command on 18 September to discuss my two reports in Saddam Hussein‘s 
presence…. The commander in chief expressed his anger and ended the meeting 
before I finished my report (Quoted in Ashton, 2008: 269). 
Although Khazraji was dismissed from his post after this unwelcomed report, the fact that he was 
able to express his opinions to Saddam Hussein, without being physically harmed demonstrated 
some signs of change in Hussein‘s attitude toward information.  
As the crisis became more international with the passage of UN resolutions and the formation of an 
international coalition, Saddam Hussein began to occupy a central position in world politics. This 
was the first time in his political career that he became a focal point in world politics. He didn‘t have 
sufficient knowledge and experience on how to approach Western public opinion, Western states, or 
international organizations. Although Hussein had begun to construct friendly relations with 
Western countries and gained their support during the Iran-Iraq war, he had never played in the 
league of Western diplomacy and had never lived in a Western country. Even the number of his 
trips to Western capitals, as vice-president and president, was insubstantial compared to his visits to 
Arab capitals (Musallam, 1996). In addition, he possessed little knowledge about the political systems 
in Western countries.  
Because of Saddam Hussein‘s deficient knowledge of and experience with Western countries, he 
started during the Gulf Crisis to be more open to information. Although he continued to be 
selective about his sources, who included King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat, he 
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demonstrated a relative readiness to acquire contextual information. An anecdote of one of his 
meetings with Yasser Arafat demonstrates Saddam Hussein‘s willingness to understand the Western 
mindset about the Gulf Crisis and the intentions of the Western governments as well as his 
realization of the inability and reluctance of his advisors to inform him about the developments in 
Western countries. During the meeting with Arafat, he asked Arafat whether Western threats to 
attack him are real. 
Arafat… wouldn‘t give a clear answer and referred Saddam to his special adviser 
Bassam Abu Sharif. The latter said that the West would indeed attack, and to support 
his position, he cited cover stories on Saddam in Time and Newsweek magazines. At 
this point Saddam turned to his own advisors and asked them why no one had told 
him that he had been the subject of these stories (Aburish, 2001: 299) 
This anecdote shows that Saddam Hussein became more open to information as the crisis 
transformed into an international problem. Moreover, during the crisis and between his invasion of 
Kuwait and the launch of Operation Desert Storm, he was able to meet with numerous foreign 
dignitaries, diplomats, intellectuals, political leaders and journalists. He had never experienced this 
level of interaction with foreigners in his life and his openness to information was partly due to the 
conversations and exchanges that took place during these meetings. 
Motivation by Problem or Relationship    
The leadership trait analysis shows that Saddam Hussein‘s score on ―the motivation for seeking 
office‖ was low compared to Middle Eastern and Islamic leaders. Hussein‘s score indicates that he 
focused more on relationships than on tasks. This score may sound odd at first, considering the fact 
that dictators and authoritarian leaders do not usually need to deal with the public or worry about 
forming relationships. Hussein‘s score provides an important insight into his leadership and 
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priorities. Hussein‘s main aims under difficult economic, political, and social circumstances became 
group maintenance, maintaining the loyalty of his constituents, and increasing the morale of the 
Iraqi army and society. Although his rule was authoritarian, he still needed the support and backing 
of his people and fostering collegiality and camaraderie was an important part of his leadership 
during the Gulf Crisis.  
Saddam Hussein‘s interpersonal emphasis brings to light a neglected dimension of the relationship 
of authoritarian leaders to their publics, which was described at length above in Chapter Two. 
Although there were no democratic elections, independent media, or autonomous polling agencies 
in Iraq during the Gulf Crisis, Saddam Hussein was still extremely vigilant about the public‘s 
reaction to his policies and he made speeches to rally people in Iraq and the Arab world around his 
leadership. He also constantly tried to ensure the loyalty of his people to prevent a popular 
movement in the country. According to Byman, Pollack and Waxman (1998): 
Although Iraqi people are kept under control and the regime rarely canvasses the 
public in formulating policy, popular opinion is not entirely irrelevant to Iraqi 
policymaking. If the Iraqi people were to muster the resources and courage to rise 
up, they could sweep the regime from power. Perhaps surprisingly, Saddam has 
repeatedly demonstrated that he can be responsive to public opinion under certain 
conditions… (129).    
His biographers, Karsh and Rautsi, also emphasized that he learned from his days on the streets of 
Baghdad that repressing public opinion, demonstrations, and popular grievances does not always 
help an authoritarian leader to stay in power, especially in unstable countries like Iraq, which has a 
long history of popular uprising. They argued that:   
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[i]t had been evident to him, from early on, that even the least democratic form of 
government required substantial popular support… He knew that a regime ruling at 
the points of bayonets was condemned to a precarious existence, and bound to come 
to an abrupt end. (Karsh and Rautsi, 2002; 89).  
At the start of the Gulf War, Hussein was already aware that when there is opposition in a country, 
repression may not always be the best option for an authoritarian leader. Saddam Hussein, as a 
leader with a relationship focus, preferred strategies that would strengthen the relationship of him 
with his people and those that would keep the morale and spirit of the group high against the 
external others.  
Motivation towards the World 
According to the leadership trait analysis, Saddam Hussein‘s score on ―distrust of others‖ is high 
compared to other Middle Eastern and Islamic leaders. His score on ―in-group bias,‖ on the other 
hand, is low compared to his norming group. These scores reveal that Saddam Hussein believed that 
the world was a conflict-prone place with good and evil, but that he also believed that other 
countries have constraints on what they can do. Therefore, he was more flexible in his outlook than 
those who saw the world in strictly Hobbesian terms. He considered the possibility of opportunities, 
while at the same time remaining vigilant.  
Again, this outcome is somewhat contradictory to the findings of scholars and observers of Iraqi 
politics. Previous research on Saddam Hussein argued that he perceived the world in Hobbesian 
terms. According to these studies, for Saddam Hussein, the world was full of threats directed against 
Iraq. There was good and evil in world politics and the evil forces included the state of Israel, 
Western powers and Persia. These evil forces were constantly trying to threaten the development 
and unity of Iraq. According to previous research, Hussein believed that these ―evil forces‖ were 
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intent on spreading their ideologies and powers at the expense of Iraq and the Arab world. The 
research indicated that amid all these attacks, Hussein made it the mission of the Iraqi people to 
confront these evildoers (Post, 2005). In fact, there were ―us‖ and ―them‖ in Hussein‘s political 
thinking and a constant struggle between Iraqi people and these external others (Hermann, 2005b).  
The discrepancy between previous scholarship and the leadership trait analysis during the Gulf Crisis 
can also be partly attributed to Hussein‘s openness to information and increasing interaction with 
foreigners during the Gulf Crisis. Another important reason of his low in-group bias during the Gulf 
War was his attempt to reach out to the Arab masses, Islamic world and Western public opinion, as 
well as his constant emphasis on the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflicts. In fact, although 
he continued to express his enmity against the ―external others‖ throughout the crisis, he also 
constantly mentioned the possibility of resolution of the crisis without the use of force. For instance, 
while criticizing the policies of the US administration, he was also asking to meet with George H.W. 
Bush face-to- face and to solve problems in a collegial manner.  
THE USE OF DIVERSIONARY MECHANISMS 
Amid the above-mentioned difficulties, constraints, and increasing opposition, Saddam Hussein had 
two options. The first option was to suppress the dissent and increase his grip on power through 
autocratic measures.  He had applied this method numerous times throughout his political career 
and bloodily suppressed every possible opposition group that endangered the survival of his regime.  
However, he was experienced enough to understand the side effects of the constant use of this 
strategy and the possible consequences of public outburst. Saddam Hussein knew that he could not 
use the policy of oppression forever and that without a decent amount of public support and the 
loyalty of Iraq‘s citizens, it was impossible for his regime to stay in power.   
154 | P a g e  
 
The second option was to deflect the attention of the public from these domestic problems through 
the use of a foreign policy event. It was a strategy of challenging these constraints temporarily 
without losing the public‘s support. Saddam Hussein believed that he could rescue himself from 
these domestic pressures by shifting the attention of his people to a foreign policy problem. This 
new foreign policy issue could distract the public and make them delay/forget their ―less existential‖ 
demands and objections. He could even ask for further sacrifice and generosity from his people. 
Furthermore, using foreign policy could help him to rally the people around his flag and unify them 
under his leadership.  
Throughout Saddam Hussein‘s long political career, in addition to his policy of suppressing the 
dissent he also constantly used diversionary strategies in order to deal with domestic opposition, 
economic and social problems, and possible contenders to his rule. Starting from his first days in 
power, he employed diversionary strategies to mobilize the Iraqi people around a common ideal and 
to prevent coup attempts against his regime.  For Bengio: 
The Ba‘ath regime has known many external enemies, and the most intense hostility 
has usually been reserved for the ―imperialist-Zionist-Iranian‖ triangle. All three 
components were considered excellent mass propaganda targets by the Ba‘ath….. 
The trinity was meant to demonstrate the constant plotting and collusion against 
Iraq, to deflect frustration and anger away from home towards external enemies, and 
to underpin the Ba‘athi policy of violent action (Bengio, 1998: 14). 
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During the 1970s, while trying to consolidate his regime, he used a foreign policy event- most often 
the Palestinian problem after his purge campaigns ―as a trump card both in rallying the masses 
behind the regime and providing an outlet for popular frustration‖ (Karsh and Rautsi, 2002: 57). 54 
Saddam once again employed this strategy with the Gulf War. He threatened Iraq‘s southern 
neighbor Kuwait and accused Kuwait of waging an economic war against Iraq. Long interpreted 
Hussein‘s policy toward Kuwait as an attempt to shift the focus of the Iraqi people‘s attention away 
from the staggering economic and social problems. According to Long: 
Some exterior crisis, Saddam realized, was needed to focus the potentially self-
destructive energies of the disparate groups. For eight years, war with Iran served 
just that. But peace, alas, was finally brokered and something else was needed (2004: 
9)… 
These various internal needs thus generated another need for Iraq, that of 
discovering an external crisis to divert attention away from home. The external crisis 
could also justify the continued active military service of 5-6 percent of its 
population (almost ten percent when the Popular Army is included). Totalitarian 
regimes have generally used the threat of enemies to justify the most abusive of 
domestic policies as well as continued calls for national sacrifice. Of course there 
                                                          
54 According to Telhami, using the Palestinian question for domestic purposes had been a common trait of 
the authoritarian leaders of the Arab world.  
To be sure, Arab states abused this question for their own ends, with the Palestinians always 
paying the price. It is also true that the Palestinian issue is not high on the daily agenda of 
most Arabs. Still, for historical reasons, the Palestinian issue remains at the very core of 
every major Arab, Islamic, and anti-Western political movement, providing lens through 
which Arabs view the world…. Palestine remains the subconscious cue that the Arab public 
opinion employs in evaluating the behavior of the outside world towards the Middle East: a 
friend is he who supports the Palestinians and an enemy if he who opposes them. Whenever 
the legitimacy of an Arab government comes into question, it will rush to wrap itself in the 
Palestinian flag (1993: 186). 
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were the usual external suspects to be rounded up: the other wealthy Gulf States, 
Zionism, and imperialism. (Long, 2004: 13) 
Karsh and Rautsi also proffered a similar viewpoint about Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of Kuwait. 
In the summer of 1988 Iran was debilitated; Iraq‘s military power was greater than 
ever, having steadily expanded during the war. In Tehran an agonizing reckoning was 
already under way; in Baghdad millions were dancing on the streets.  
Yet not even such euphoric circumstances would lure a professional survivor like 
Hussein into a false sense of security. He had no illusions, whatsoever, realizing that 
the celebrations would give way to a hangover; that a bill for the dislocations of the 
war would be presented in one form or another. He knew that even in the most 
repressive police state there are limits to what people are willing to endure or the 
sacrifices they are prepared to make. The removal of the Iranian threat, the main 
factor cementing Iraqi society during the war years, generated an urgent need for 
new means of rallying public support and enthusiasm behind Saddam (2002: 194). 
At the same time Saddam Hussein also linked the crisis with Kuwait to an external plot to 
overthrow his government and destroy Iraq.  Saddam Hussein claimed that problems in the Iraqi 
economy, which were seemingly domestic problems, were related to some external forces. (Ruysdael, 
2003: xviii). As Long stated: 
As it happened, the Iraqis simply exchanged devils. Imperialists and Zionists, 
although not new enemies, took the place of those theretofore demonized, who in 
turn became the sought-after ally…..Particularly significant is that the frequency and 
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stridency of verbal attacks on Israel markedly increased after a period of relative 
quiescence… 
In February, Saddam had promised, ―The banners of justice shall fly over holy 
Jerusalem.‖ Later in the next months, Saddam assured his listeners in a speech that 
Jerusalem could be liberated if Arabs were determined and exercised faith in God. 
Iraq he declared, which never tired of war, would lead in the effort. In April, of 
course, Saddam delivered his famous fire speech, threatening Israel. (2004: 85-86) 
Although Kuwait was accused of waging an economic war against Iraq, in the discourse of Saddam 
Hussein, it was again the imperialist forces and particularly the state of Israel that was behind this 
conspiracy.  According to Hussein, Kuwait was just a tool of these enemy forces to destroy Iraq. In 
fact, Hussein‘s diversion policy mostly relied on scapegoating external forces for Iraq‘s domestic 
problems and trying to rally people around his flag and against them.  
An early indication of Saddam Hussein‘s intention to use this strategy was his speech at the opening 
of the fourth summit of the Arab Cooperation Council in Amman in February 1990. Hussein spent 
half of this lengthy speech underlining the increasing threat of Israel and Zionism in the region. He 
called for unity in the Arab world against this threat and suggested preparedness for an attack from 
Israel (Hussein 1990a). According to scholars like Barnett in this speech, ―Saddam Hussein 
attempted to rally Arab states around him by stating that Arab power would promote (his version 
of) regional peace and by issuing thinly veiled threats against Israel‖ (Barnett, 1998: 215). 
Throughout 1990, Hussein intensified his discourse against Israel. In another speech in April 1990, 
he threatened Israel by stating that ―by God, we will make fire eat up half of Israel if it tried anything 
against Iraq‖ (Saddam, 1990). His words were widely publicized among the Arab people in the 
Middle East and provided high esteem and support for Saddam Hussein.  
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While threatening to destroy Israel, Hussein was at the same time trying to maintain friendly 
relations with Western countries. He tried to reassure the decision makers in Israel and in the United 
States about the domestic nature of these speeches (Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 32-33). Henderson, 
in his book on the Gulf War, highlighted the differences in the discourse of Saddam Hussein.  
There was no hint of deviation from the standard hard line position, that Israel was a 
false usurper, an illegal entity, a cancerous tumor that should be excised from 
Palestine – but then Saddam was speaking to the Iraqi news agency, not in a 
conversation with visiting Americans. (1991: 99) 
An important demonstration of this attitude took place in his meeting with Prince Bandar after his 
April speech against Israel. According to Woodward, Hussein explained the nature of the speech 
with following words: 
…[Y]ou must understand the context in which it had been made.. it had been 
delivered to members of the armed forces at a public forum where emotions were 
running high , with people clapping and screaming. As we both know, it never hurts 
in the Arab world to threaten Israel, so I had done it. (Woodward, 1991: 210) 
He also assured Prince Bandar that he would not attack Israel. 
 ―I want to assure President Bush and His Majesty King Fahd that I will not attack 
Israel‖ Saddam stressed…. 
―Do you want us to mention this to Bush as our observation?‖ Bandar asked, ―Or is 
it a message from you to President Bush?‖ 
―It‘s a message from me to President Bush‖ Saddam replied. (Woodward, 1991: 202). 
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In the same conversation, after a pause, he once again turned back to Bandar‘s question about his 
speech in April. 
Saddam then turned to justifying his verbal assaults on Israel, though he continued 
giving assurances that he would not attack the Jewish state. Israel was the natural 
lightning rod for creating a crisis atmosphere, he said. It had been two years since the 
Iran-Iraq cease-fire, and the Iraqi people were getting relaxed. ―I must whip them 
into a sort of frenzy or emotional mobilization so they will be ready for whatever 
may happen‖ (ibid.). 
Despite assurances that he made to Arab and Western policy makers, Saddam Hussein continued to 
escalate his tone against Israel in his speeches. In his televised speeches, he blamed Zionism and 
Israel for the economic problems that Iraq was encountering. In a speech delivered on July 1990, the 
22nd anniversary of the Ba‘ath Revolution, Saddam Hussein stated following:  
In their recent campaign, the imperialist and Zionist forces have not used weapons 
to kill the sons of the nation, nor have they threatened to use their fleets and air 
bases in this region and elsewhere in the world, as is often done by the usurpers of 
the land and the violators of Arab dignity and sovereignty….Rather they started to 
weaken and kill the capability that protects Arab dignity and sovereignty by tools and 
methods suited to them. They followed a method, which produces results that are 
more dangerous than those produced by the old direct methods. This new 
method…seeks to cut off livelihood while the old method..sought to cut off necks. 
When livelihood is cut off, the roots dry up and the shoots and branches wilt and 
become timber due to the loss of basic source of life. Imperialism and Zionism hope 
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that they will succeed by this method after they have failed by traditional methods. 
(Saddam, 1990) 
Meanwhile, the Gulf Crisis was also reaching its peak. The confrontation between Iraq and Kuwait 
was reaching its tipping point. Hussein was aware of the value of his pan-Arabist image and was not 
willing to lose it. However, to attack or threaten to attack a neighboring Arab country would be an 
anathema according to Arabist principles. It would also be against the convention of the Arab 
League. He therefore linked the Gulf states to Israel. In a speech, he stated that: 
They (Imperialists and Zionists) hope to achieve their aim by this new method and 
through the Arabs themselves, both individuals even states, in this region. I mean by 
that the new oil policy which certain rulers of the Gulf states have been pursuing 
intentionally for some time to reduce oil prices without any economic justification 
and against the wish of the majority of OPEC producers, and also against the 
interest of the Arab nation… 
...True patriotism and pan-Arabism will be judged according to the kind of oil 
policies we pursue and where we stand on Arab-Zionist conflict and the struggle for 
the liberation of Palestine. Only by this yardstick can we separate the sheep from the 
goats. Only by this standard can we tell the dissemblers from the upright and the 
honest. (Saddam 1990) 
In fact, as stated by Hassan, in most of the speeches and government statements, the main target of 
the conflict, Kuwait, was invisible.  
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There were a very few scattered references to it in the Iraqi presidents‘ political 
speeches during the Gulf Crisis and in the main they described Kuwait as being 
active within the American and Zionism‘s grand scheme against Iraq. (1999: 161) 
In these speeches, Hussein focused on Israel and the situation of Palestinians and were crafted to 
attract the constellations of civil society in other Arab states behind his leadership. (1999: 160) 
On the 1st of August, 1990, Saddam Hussein‘s forces invaded Kuwait. The invasion became public 
with Baghdad Radio‘s following broadcast:  
God has helped the free and honest men of Kuwait to depose the traitor regime in 
Kuwait, which is involved in Zionist and foreign plots.(Saddam quoted in Bengio, 
2001) 
According to Coughlin, although Hussein was not expecting any plaudits for his move, he was also 
not expecting such a huge-scale international reaction to his invasion of Kuwait. British Premier 
Margaret Thatcher, who was with George H.W. Bush, immediately drew an analogy between 
Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of Kuwait and Hitler‘s invasion of Sudetenland. After a few days, the US 
government and Soviet Union issued a joint declaration of condemnation of the invasion. Within 
hours of the invasion, the United Nations Security Council convened and passed Resolution 660, 
which condemned the invasion and demanded an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops. After this 
resolution, the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council passed their own resolutions.  
The most troubling development for Saddam was the resolution of the Arab League and the 
dispatch of Arab troops as part of the multinational force. The Arab League summit revealed the 
increasing isolation of Hussein‘s regime in the Arab regional order. The only hope for Hussein was 
to mobilize the Arab masses against their governments‘ support for the anti-Iraq coalition. To 
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achieve this, Hussein one more time adopted diversionary strategy and targeted Israel to divert the 
attention from his invasion of Kuwait. In fact, as stated by Karsh and Rautsi: 
With the summit revealing an unbridgeable gap with other Arab regimes, Saddam 
sought to undermine them by rallying masses behind his cause by Zionizing the 
crisis. By linking his Kuwaiti venture to the Palestinian problem, he hoped to portray 
himself as the champion of the Pan-Arab cause, thereby eradicating any conceivable 
opposition to his move in the Arab world. If the ‗restoration of Kuwait to the 
motherland‘ was the first step towards ‗the liberation of Jerusalem‘, how could any 
Arab leader be opposed to it?  The aggressor would be transformed into a liberator 
and a hero. (2002: 100) 
Saddam Hussein decided to shift the issue to the Palestinian cause not because he was willing to 
attack Israel and liberate Palestine. Under the economic and social circumstances, he knew that it 
would be unwise to start another costly war with Israel. It was only part of Saddam Hussein‘s 
scapegoating strategy. A few days after the summit, Saddam Hussein alleged that Israeli pilots had 
been deployed in Saudi Arabia, disguised as Americans. Although the coalition forces and Saudi 
officials denied this accusation, Saddam Hussein continued his allegations about the Israeli 
contribution to the war efforts (Karsh and Rautsi, 2002: 101).  
On August 12th, Saddam initiated a new diversionary maneuver by proposing a plan for withdrawal 
from Kuwait. It was a three-point peace initiative, which mostly aimed to link the invasion of 
Kuwait to other conflicts in the region, and most importantly to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
territories. His proposal started with a verbal attack on the United States, as well as Israel, and 
continued by proposing to ―solve‖ all problems of invasion together.  
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So, as to contribute to creating an atmosphere of real peace in the region: and in 
order to facilitate the achievement of stability in the area; and to expose the lies of 
America and its ugly ally Israel….I propose that all issues of occupation in the 
region, and that which had been misrepresented as occupation, be solved in 
accordance with the same standard, principles, and premises laid down by the UN 
Security Council…..First, to make ready withdrawal arrangements according to the 
same principles for the immediate unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the 
occupied Arab territories in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, and for the Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon, and for the withdrawal of troops on the Iraq-Iran front, 
and to make arrangements for the status of Kuwait. (Saddam 1990)   
While the proposal was promptly rejected by the White House, the reaction among Arabs was 
ambivalent. It was definitely welcomed by the Palestinians and Jordanians and it made sense to many 
others in the Arab world (Khalidi, 1991: 171). Demonstrations took place in support of Saddam 
Hussein and his peace proposal in Arab capitals. According to Joel Brinkley of the New York Times, 
―by positioning himself as the strongest advocate of the Palestinian cause, Saddam Hussein 
automatically becomes Israel‘s bête noire and, as a result, a leader of great appeal to Arabs.‖ 
(Binkley, cited in Hiro, 1992: 274).  After making this proposal, he started and ended most of his 
speeches during this period by glorifying Palestine and cursing Israel. He also watched the 
developments in the occupied territories carefully and utilized them for his own purposes. For 
example, after the death of 20 Palestinians in Jerusalem in September 1990, Hussein made a 
televised speech and stated: 
After the Zionists thought that the American occupation of the sanctities in Najd 
and Hijaz and the desecration of Mecca and the tomb of the Prophet, may God‘s 
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peace and blessing be upon him provide them with a golden opportunity to entrench 
their occupation of Jerusalem..they attempted to destroy the al-Aksa mosque after 
they failed to burn it and to destroy it through excavations (Saddam, 1990 cited in 
Freedman and Karsh, 2002: 169). 
He also declared three days of national mourning in Iraq in this speech (Hiro, 1992: 211). 
Saddam Hussein‘s linkage policy to divert attention from his invasion of Kuwait and to unify Iraqi 
people domestically and Arabs regionally was partially successful in mobilizing the masses in the 
Middle East. However, it was not strong enough to create a wave of revolutions that would topple 
Arab regimes. Three months after the invasion, in November 1990, the UN Security Council passed 
another resolution, Resolution 678, which gave Iraq a withdrawal deadline (15 January, 1991) and 
authorized all necessary means to implement Resolution 660. After the withdrawal deadline of 
January 15th  passed and Iraq had still not withdrawn, a coalition air attack was launched against Iraqi 
targets.  
Saddam Hussein intensified his threats toward Israel after these resolutions. In his famous speech, 
―Mother of All Battles‖, he mentioned the following: 
… Then the skies in the Arab homeland will appear in a new color and a sun of hope 
will shine over them and over our nation and on all the good men whose bright 
lights will not be overcome by the darkness in the hearts of infidels, the Zionists, and 
the treacherous.. 
Then the door will be wide open for the liberation of beloved Palestine, Lebanon, 
and the Golan. The Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock will be released from the 
bondage. (Saddam, 1991) 
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Immediately after this speech, Saddam Hussein began to attack Israel with SCUD missiles. He knew 
that striking Israel with SCUD missiles would not bring any strategic military advantage to Iraq; but 
it would definitely be welcomed enthusiastically by Arab masses as well as by the people in Iraq. 
Although the material damage done by the SCUD missiles was lower than Hussein expected, the 
psychological damage was immense. For the first time since the establishment of the Israeli state its 
main population centers were under a military attack by an Arab army, life was stopped in city 
centers, thousands fled to Jerusalem to be safe from bombing, causalities happened mostly because 
of the heart attack and problems about the masks (Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 169). On the other 
hand, the Arab world‘s reaction to the SCUD attacks was ecstatic. People in various Arab capitals 
celebrated the end of Israel‘s immunity from attacks by dancing in the streets and organizing mass 
demonstrations in support of Saddam Hussein. Even in Syria, despite the draconian rule of Assad, 
people expressed their happiness and joy on the streets (Hiro, 1992: 325).  
Several scholars stated Hussein‘s diversionary motivations in its relations and threats against Israel 
during this period. For instance, Jerrold Post, a highly acclaimed expert on Saddam Hussein, 
evaluated Hussein‘s policies during the Gulf War as follows: 
What began as an act of naked aggression toward Kuwait was transformed into the 
defining drama of his life. Although he had previously showed little concern for 
Palestinian people, the shrewdly manipulative Saddam had wrapped himself and his 
invasion of Kuwait in the Palestinian Flag. (Post, 1993: 57)    
Karsh and Rautsi  also asserted the diversionary nature of Hussein‘s attacks on Israel. 
…Saddam showed a staunch, principled face to Iraq‘s other neighbors, seeking to 
―Zionize‖ the Gulf crisis from the outset. By linking his Kuwaiti venture to the 
Palestinian problem, he hoped to portray himself as the champion of the pan-Arab 
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cause, thereby eradicating any conceivable opposition to his move in the Arab 
World. (Karsh and Rautsi, 2002: 227) 
James Piscatori also interpreted Saddam Hussein‘s policy in the same way. According to him:  
When Saddam Hussein launched his initiative of 12 August, explicitly linking his withdrawal from 
Kuwait with Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, he was exploiting the profound 
sentiment which had become the Arab- and the Muslim- consensus. It was on one level, an obvious 
political ploy, a cost free way of attempting to divert attention. He appeared to strike a blow for 
Palestinian liberation without doing a great deal to accomplish it. But by explicitly shifting focus to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and restoring the question of Palestine to pride of place, he was on another 
level, tapping into deep springs of Muslim concern (Piscatori, 1991: 22).  
Although there is a general consensus that Saddam Hussein‘s escalation of conflict with Israel and 
his SCUD attacks were intended to divert the attention of the Arab public and rally them around his 
leadership, there are also some alternative explanations for Saddam‘s actions. One of the most 
popular explanations is about Saddam‘s intentions to destroy Israel because of his willingness to 
become the new Salahuddin of the Arab world by saving the Occupied Territories from the hands 
of Israel (Parson, 1991). According to the proponents of this view to become the Salahuddin had 
been the dream of every political leader in the Arab world and it was this dream that pushed the 
Arab leaders, including Nasser of Egypt and al-Assad of Syria, to pursue a more belligerent foreign 
policy against Israel after the end of the World War II. Saddam‘s attacks against Israel were also 
genuinely intended to rescue the occupied territories from the hands of Israel. However, this 
explanation neglected an important part of Saddam‘s strategic and military calculations. Although 
Saddam, as each and every Arab leader, dreamt about being Salahuddin, he had no intention at that 
moment to engage in an armed conflict with the state of Israel. It was almost certain that an armed 
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conflict with Israel would be a long and challenging war and after eight year long war with Iran it 
would be disastrous for his rule to commit the resources of his country for such a venture.  In 
addition, although Saddam strategically utilized from the Arab-Israeli conflict, he didn‘t have a 
significant interest in the Palestinian issue. During the 1973 War, the state of Iraq under the 
leadership of Bakir and Saddam peripherally involved in the armed conflict and just send a symbolic 
number of troops to Syria – Israeli border.  This reluctance to engage in an armed conflict with 
Israel was a starting point for a serious rift between al-Assad‘s Syria and Saddam‘s Iraq. When the 
Iran and Iraq war started, al-Assad this time refused to support Iraq and aligned with Iran. 
According to Assad, Saddam, with this war, was serving not for the interest of the Arab world and 
Palestinian cause but only for its petty interest. For Assad, a war with Iran, whose government was 
following an anti-Israeli discourse, was not only damaging the anti- Israeli block in the Middle East 
but also diverting the Arab resources away from its more imminent threat, Israel. Moreover Saddam 
had never been in good terms with Palestinian Liberation Organization and its leaders. In the ―Black 
September‖ of 1970 he stood firmly against an intervention to Jordan to help the Palestinian 
refugees. During the oil boom years, he excluded Palestinians from coming to work in Iraq (Karsh, 
2002). During most of 1980s, against the PLO‘s leadership he had supported Abu Nidal, who 
allegedly assassinated important leaders of PLO, such as Abu Iyad (Mattar, 1993). Just ―prior to the 
Gulf War, he worked to win Israeli acquiescence in the laying of an Iraqi oil pipeline to the 
Jordanian port town of Aqaba, collaborated with Israel against Syrian interests in Lebanon (to 
punish Assad for his support of Iran) and even attempted to acquire sophisticated Israeli military 
equipment.‖ In 1984, Saddam went so far as to voice his public support for peace negotiations with 
the Jewish state, emphasizing that ―no Arab leader looks forward to the destruction of Israel‖ and 
that any solution to the conflict would require ―the existence of a secure state for the Israelis.‖ 
(Karsh, 2002: 60) Although Arafat and Saddam met several times during the crisis and although 
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there had been a general view that Arafat took a pro-Saddam position during the war, the PLO 
official statements during the crisis denied these allegations. It was widely asserted by scholars, such 
as Post (1993), Long (2002) and Karsh and Rautsi (2002) that, Arafat and the Palestinian cause were 
instrumental for the Saddam regime to mobilize people, however these causes were never 
considered a priority for Saddam.  
LEADERSHIP STYLE AND THE SELECTION OF DIVERSIONARY STRATEGIES 
As discussed above, Saddam Hussein‘s use of diversionary strategies during the Gulf Crisis provides 
important insights into the politics of the Middle East, the diversionary theory of war and the 
relationship between leadership traits and the selection of diversionary strategies. Some of the 
outcomes of this case study are summarized below.  
First of all, Saddam Hussein‘s use of diversionary strategies demonstrates that leaders of states, other 
than the US and great powers, are also able to employ these strategies in order to deflect the 
attention of their people from domestic problems. Although as classical diversionary theorists have 
contended, the existence of a powerful army and sufficient economic resources may provide a 
comparative advantage to leaders of great powers in using diversionary war and military strikes when 
they face domestic problems, the availability of  less costly and less risky diversionary options makes 
leaders of other states also able to employ these strategies to attain the same goals. As stated above, 
after the eight-year war with Iran, Iraq had many domestic problems, including an ailing economy 
and an increasingly volatile society. As stated by observers of Iraqi politics, it was not possible for 
Saddam Hussein‘s regime to fix these issues within a very short period of time.  In light of this 
factor, Saddam Hussein attempted to divert the attention of the Iraqi people and of Arab public 
opinion by threatening Israel in the first months of the crisis. Threatening to use force against Israel 
was a less costly and less risky strategy on the part of Iraq than actually using force against Israel.  
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Hussein did not consider actually using force against Israel, for despite the constant mobilization of 
Iraqi society, there was no way for Iraq to wage a long and costly war against Israel with the 
economic conditions as they were and without the endorsement of one of its Arab neighbors and 
none of Israel‘s neighbors would be willing to engage in an armed conflict with Israel at that 
particular moment of time. In addition, despite his threats against Israel, Saddam Hussein managed 
to ensure Western governments that he did not intend to attack Israel. Although he sent missiles to 
Israel after the initiation of the armed conflict, the missiles didn‘t carry any dirty bombs or chemical 
weapons. The attacks were more symbolic than militarily strategic and intended to make an impact 
on Arab audiences. The relative success of this strategy and increasing support for Saddam Hussein 
shows that the threat to use force can also have a rallying effect on a society.  
Saddam Hussein‘s use of diversionary strategies also demonstrates that leaders of authoritarian 
countries may use these strategies in order to deflect the attention and pressure of public opinion. 
The Iraqi case shows that the use of diversionary mechanisms is not particular to the leaders of 
democratic countries. Although Saddam Hussein was a dictator and had total control of all coercive 
mechanisms of the state of Iraq to suppress or punish oppositional movements, he still believed that 
it was vital to ensure the support of people on the streets in order to remain in power. Therefore, 
unlike previous studies which claim a direct relationship between democratic regimes and the use of 
diversionary strategies, this study suggests that diversionary strategies may be used by the leaders of 
any country, regardless of the form of government.  
The final finding of this case study concerns the relationship between Saddam Hussein‘s leadership 
traits and his use of diversionary strategy. The leadership traits of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf 
Crisis reveal certain characteristics that account for the use of more conflictual diversionary 
strategies. The case of Saddam Hussein shows that using diversionary mechanisms is actually a form 
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of challenging constraints for political leaders. Leaders who are confronted with certain constraint, 
whether a legislative constraint of a democratic regime or popular opposition, try to cope with the 
constraint by either respecting it  and accepting the demands of the constraint-making groups or 
challenging the constraints by finding ways to refuse the groups‘ demands. When leaders choose to 
challenge constraints, they have several alternatives that they can adopt. One alternative is to 
suppress the groups or parties creating the constraints by using force or other coercive measures. 
Leaders with enough authority to use force against domestic opposition, in particular, choose to 
suppress these groups if they think that their demands are unacceptable. The second most 
widespread strategy is to deflect the attention of the domestic groups from recurring domestic 
problems and shift their focuses to external problems. When a leader sees that suppression is not a 
viable strategy, due to either the size or the strength of the opposition or the possible political cost 
of a huge-scale strike hard campaign, the leader prefers to find a way to divert the attention of the 
domestic public by shifting the debate to a foreign policy issue. This strategy not only creates a 
temporary distraction of public attention from domestic issues to foreign policy, but it also unifies 
the people around the flag of the leader. Under these circumstances, the groups that were raising 
their voices against the political leader either join the rally around the leader or strategically mute 
their criticisms, recognizing the unpopularity of challenging the leader of a country in the time of an 
international crisis. Although most of the time this distraction is temporary in nature, it gives the 
leader time at a critical juncture to contemplate solutions to the domestic problems.  
From earlier studies on leadership trait analysis (Hermann 2003, 2005), we already know that leaders 
challenge constraints in different ways. Some follow a direct way of challenging constraints whereas 
others skillfully use behind-the- scenes maneuvers. The study of the Iraqi case demonstrates that 
Saddam Hussein was a leader who made decisions on how to challenge constraints depending on 
circumstances. These kinds of leaders can be too direct in their threats to others and ready to use 
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force and in some other instances they can be indirect in their challenges. They give their decisions 
on a case by case basis.   
From the analysis of Saddam Hussein‘s leadership above, we can also see that a leader with 
relationship focus is more likely to use diversionary mechanisms than other leaders. The leadership 
studies suggest that leaders with higher relationship focus are usually more sensitive to the reaction 
of their people and their popularity. For these leaders, domestic popularity and recognition and 
endorsement by their own people constitute an important part of their leadership agendas. The 
literature on diversionary theory of war demonstrates that leaders resort to diversionary mechanisms 
not only to divert the attention of their domestic publics from economic or social problems but also 
to rally their people around their flags and gain domestic popularity and higher approval ratings.  
In fact, although in authoritarian systems, leaders may not feel accountable to the people as they are 
in democratic regimes, both leaders of authoritarian and democratic regimes want to stay in office 
and be recognized and endorsed by the people of their countries. Therefore, even leaders of 
authoritarian regimes may become anxious about popular protest and opposition and therefore may 
put special emphasis on building and maintaining relationships with their constituents. For example, 
Saddam Hussein knew the consequences of losing power in an authoritarian regime and observed 
the horrid fate of fallen leaders and their families. Because of that he was extremely eager to 
maintain good relations with his people, to build solidarity with his clan members, to ensure the 
loyalty of the minorities in his country and to guarantee the faithfulness of his soldiers. The use of 
foreign policy to rally the people of Iraq around his leadership and solidify their loyalty to him was 
an important part of his leadership strategy.   
According to the leadership style assessment of Saddam Hussein, he was open to information and 
contextual cues on a case by case basis. Previous studies on leadership style and foreign policy have 
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demonstrated that leaders‘ openness to information plays an important role in shaping his decisions 
on foreign policy. Leaders who are open to information prefer to follow contextual cues.  They pay 
attention to incoming information, evaluate the different options and then choose the appropriate 
foreign policy. Because diversionary behavior is a form of foreign policy, we may infer that such a 
relationship also exists between leadership style and the use of diversionary strategy. When leaders 
like Saddam Hussein, employ diversionary strategies, they prefer to follow the reactions of the public 
and shape their diversionary tactics in accordance with these reactions.  They are able to modify and 
revise their strategies by following these contextual cues. Saddam Hussein‘s gradual intensification of 
his tone against Israel was partially a result of the relative success of this strategy. As he observed 
Arab peoples beginning to oppose the policies of their own governments and launch campaigns and 
rallies to stop their governments‘ support of the US-led international coalition, he maintained and 
even intensified his attacks against Israel. In fact, during the Gulf Crisis, Saddam Hussein‘s openness 
to information gave him the opportunity to analyze the outcomes of his use of diversionary strategy. 
After the invasion of Kuwait, he continued this strategy by employing linkage politics. Through this 
linkage proposal, he was able to strike another cord with the Arab public. Arabs staged 
demonstrations in the streets in their countries and conveyed messages of appreciation for Saddam 
Hussein‘s commitment to the Palestinian cause and his courage to challenge Israel and support of 
his proposal. When Saddam Hussein saw this high level of public mobilization around his policy, he 
intensified the use of this diversionary strategy through different mechanisms, including blaming the 
Zionist conspiracy for the increasing tension in the region. After the beginning of the armed conflict 
between coalition forces and Iraq, Saddam Hussein implemented further diversionary strategies by 
sending SCUD missiles to Israel, which further raised his stature among Arab public opinion. 
The final leadership attribute of Saddam Hussein that was analyzed was his motivation towards the 
world. As the leadership trait analysis demonstrated, in Saddam Hussein‘s view, the world was a 
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conflictual place where there was good and evil. However, because of his low in-group bias, he still 
considered the possibilities of cooperation. From a foreign policy perspective, this worldview may 
account for the type of diversionary behavior that he chose during the Gulf Crisis. He selected 
relatively violent means of diverting the attention of his people and continuously scapegoated 
Zionism and Zionist forces in the United States to explain the sources of domestic economic and 
social problems in Iraq.     
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
DIVERSIONARY FOREIGN POLICY OF KING HUSSEIN DURING THE GULF 
CRISIS 
 
Introduction 
 
King Hussein of  Jordan was one of  the most enigmatic figures of  Middle Eastern politics in the 
post-World War II period. He served as the King of  Jordan for 47 years without interruption, which 
was unprecedented in the history of  the Middle East. During his tenure as the King of  Jordan, he 
was one of  the most prominent political figures in the region. He was an important actor in each 
and every political incident in the region, including the Gulf  Crisis. During this crisis, King Hussein 
became a key player again with his policy of  active neutrality. Numerous explanations have been 
provided for his position of  neutrality during the Gulf  War, including the influence of  the economy 
and his close rapport with Saddam Hussein (Dann, 1990). This chapter will provide an alternative 
explanation and focus on King Hussein‘s use of  foreign policy for domestic purposes throughout 
the crisis. As stated by several scholars of  Jordanian politics, King Hussein tried to divert the 
attention of  his people from dire economic and social problems by following an active policy of  
mediation and an implicit support of  Iraq. Although he never recognized the annexation of  Kuwait 
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by Iraq, he did not condemn the invasion of  Kuwait either. Furthermore, although towards the end 
of  the crisis King Hussein began to criticize Operation Desert Storm and partially blamed Israel for 
the international campaign against Iraq, he continued his secret negotiations with Israel, consistently 
met with US officials and regularly sent his envoys to Western capitals to explain Jordanian policy. 
The leaders of  Israel and many Western observers contend that Hussein‘s discourse during the crisis 
intended to influence the domestic audience. Because of  that, although some of  his remarks were 
criticized by Western leaders, he was not punished or isolated during the Gulf  Crisis or in its 
immediate aftermath. His diversionary foreign policy made him the target of  international criticisms, 
but also brought him unprecedented domestic popularity. 
The chapter will analyze the decision making of  King Hussein as a predominant leader during this 
conflict. After giving a brief  overview of  the decision context in Jordan, the authoritative decision 
unit in Jordan during the war will be examined. The last part of  the chapter will explain the 
diversionary behavior of  King Hussein during the conflict and assess the relationship between this 
behavior and his leadership traits.  
DECISION CONTEXT 
In the last days of  the 1980s, Jordan was facing serious domestic economic, social, and political 
problems. The economy was shattering. Decreasing worker remittances and foreign aid from the 
Gulf  countries paved the way for chronic inflation, huge foreign debt and lack of  government 
income to fund social services. The government was paralyzed and as a last resort, began to 
negotiate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reschedule foreign debts and restructure 
the economy, which led to the Ma‘an riots. The riots, which spread to different parts of  Jordan, 
threatened the social base of  the Hashemite monarchy. Political developments in the world also 
threatened the future of  the monarchy.  For example, the overthrow of  authoritarian regimes in 
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Central and Eastern Europe by popular protest endangered the autocracies and monarchies in the 
Middle East. In addition, the end of  the Cold War resulted in some unexpected consequences for 
the Arab countries of  the Middle East, including Jewish migration to Israel. This massive flow of  
Jewish people to Israel and the increasing number of  settlements in the occupied territories 
constituted grave dangers to the stability of  Jordan and made it more difficult to resolve the 
problems in the region.   
Since the establishment of  the Transjordanian state in the 1920s, the government of  Jordan had 
constantly suffered economic problems.55 Unlike its eastern and southern neighbors, Jordan did not 
have oil or natural gas and possessed only a few natural resources, such as phosphates and potash 
(Al-Khazendar, 1997; 29). It also had scarce water resources and little arable agricultural lands. 
Because of  these factors, from the time of  its creation, Jordan had remained mostly dependent on 
foreign aid from Western patrons, Gulf  countries or the workers‘ remittances from Gulf  
countries.56 
The Jordanian economy depended mostly on British foreign aid until the 1950s. Over time the 
source of  foreign aid changed due to the transformations in international politics and economy. 
With the beginning of  the Cold War, the United States replaced Britain as the main source of  
foreign assistance. However with the increasing oil prices in 1970s Arab countries in the Gulf  and 
Saudi Arabia became major donors to Jordan (Cunningham, 1997: 494-495). For these donor 
countries, Jordan was usually an important geopolitical asset. ―For Britain, Jordan‘s utility was as a 
buffer state against Wahhabi and French expansionism; for the US, Jordan emerged as a bulwark 
                                                          
55 For a comprehensive overview of  Jordanian political economy, see Brand, Laurie A. Jordan's Inter-Arab 
Relations: the Political Economy of  Alliance Making.  
56 For more information, see Khatib, Fawzi. "Foreign Aid and Economic Development in Jordan: An 
Empirical Investigation." 
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against Communism; for the principal Arab states, Jordan was important, both as a barrage against 
Israel and to avoid the kingdom becoming a client of  any one of  their number‖ (Robins, 2004: 142). 
Jordan‘s economic condition changed dramatically with the end of  the oil boom in early 1980s and 
with the eruption of  the war between Iran and Iraq. The economies of  the Gulf  countries were 
negatively affected by the fall of  oil prices, which led to a dramatic decline in the amount of  foreign 
aid to Jordan.57 The fact that Jordan used most of  the foreign aid from the Gulf  States to fund 
public services made the effect of  this decline much more serious. Secondly, the deteriorating 
economic conditions in the Gulf  countries led to the termination of  many Jordanian workers‘ job 
contracts. According to Rath, almost 40 percent of  the labor force of  Jordan was employed in Gulf  
countries in the 1980s (approximately 350.000 people) (1994: 537).  The return of  many of  these 
workers resulted in a dramatic rise in unemployment and a sharp decline in workers‘ remittances, 
which constituted a substantial portion of  Jordan‘s budget (Cunningham, 1997: 505).  
As a result of  the external developments, the economy in Jordan faced major setbacks, in terms of  
foreign debt, growth rate, and inflation. With the decline in its most important sources of  income, 
Jordan resorted to extensive domestic and external borrowing. 58 Jordan‘s foreign debt, which was 
around 2 billion dollars in 1980, reached almost 9 billion dollars in 1990. The latter amount was 234 
percent of  the GNP of  the Jordanian economy (Cunningham, 1997: 502). It was also the largest 
debt in the world, measured on a per capita basis (Robbins, 2004: 166). In addition, between 1985 
and 1990 the annual average growth rate of  the GNP was -3 percent per year (Cunningham, 1997: 
                                                          
57 Despite this decrease, the Gulf  countries remained the major contributor to the Jordanian economy, 
According to Brand, Jordan received a total of  2.2. billions from Kuwait over a few years, which constituted 
more than 7 percent of  its foreign aid package. The foreign aid from Saudi Arabia was even higher. In 1989 
alone, Saudis contributed $200 million to the Jordanian economy (Brand, 1994: 111).   
58 For an analysis of  the balance of  payments problems, see Share, Monther. "Jordan's Trade and Balance of  
Payment Problems."  
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482); and again between 1987 and 1989, the gross domestic product fell by over nine percent (1997: 
505). Inflation also rose dramatically in 1988 and 1989 and the government‘s attempt to solve the 
problem led to the devaluation of  the dinar by 23 percent. Finally, unemployment in Jordan reached 
one of  the highest points in Jordanian history in 1990. In addition to the returning workers from 
Gulf  countries, the recent graduates of  universities in Jordan were also unable to find jobs. The 
unemployment rate was officially at 14 percent, although many observers claimed that it was as high 
as 20 percent. More importantly, according to Robbins, the only man who could do something about 
the Jordanian economy, King Hussein, was uninterested in the economy (1997: 169). Despite these 
negative developments in the economy, the Jordanian government was unwilling to stop providing 
subsidies and implemented a populist domestic economy. At the height of  the economic crisis, the 
Council of  Ministers declared the continuation of  price controls in basic commodities despite rises 
in the prices in these commodities in the countries from which they were imported. The 
government decided ―to pay the difference between the higher, real cost of  these materials and the 
prices at which they will be sold to citizens‖ (FBIS-NES-90-040, 1 March 1989). In addition, the 
Jordanian government continued to spend large portions of  its budget on defense spending due to 
its large unstable Palestinian population and its long border with Israel.   
In order to cope with the economic problems, the Jordanian government invited the IMF to craft a 
program to restructure Jordan‘s economy. Under this plan, IMF would assist Jordan in restructuring 
its foreign debts and in return, the Jordanian government agreed to adopt some austerity measures. 
These measures included implementing prudent borrowing policies, strengthening foreign reserves, 
reducing inflation, reforming the tax system and reducing the budget deficit (Brynen, 1992: 90). 
Reducing the budget deficit required a decrease in government spending and an end to the 
subsidization of  certain consumer goods. In accordance with this agreement, the government 
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increased the prices of  a wide range of  commodities, including cooking gas, gasoline, diesel fuel, 
bread, and cigarettes. This move was a major blow to low-income families in southern Jordan. 
A few hours after the announcement of  price increases, spontaneous demonstrations erupted in the 
southern towns and cities (Rath, 1994: 540). The disturbances began among the taxi drivers in the 
southern city of  Ma‘an, who were not permitted to raise their tariffs despite the steep rise in oil 
prices. However, in a very short period of  time, the demonstrations spread to different regions of  
Jordan, including the capital Amman (Cunningham, 1997: 443). In response, the government 
imposed curfews on some cities in the South and dispatched strong armed units to suppress the 
riots. Although the participants in the riots launched their protests to oppose the price increases, 
after a few days, they began to express their resentment regarding the al-Rifai government, 
particularly the nepotism and corruption of  the people around the Prime Minister. In fact, early 
opposition to price increases was replaced with a ―nation-wide struggle for a fairer distribution of  
wealth and a wider popular participation‖ (Rath, 1994: 540). Queen Noor, who was with King 
Hussein in the United States, candidly criticized the Jordanian government‘s lack of  responsiveness 
to economic and political problems prior to the crisis. She wrote: 
I knew, as did many people around me, that the rise in prices and the resulting riots 
were indicative of  a far larger national crisis in the country. Through my own work I 
had seen mounting anger and frustration among our people over what they view as a 
lack of  responsiveness to their economic hardship. Criticism of  the government‘s 
autocratic policies, especially restrictions of  freedom of  expression, had boiled over. 
There were also charges of  widespread corruption. My husband had been only partly 
apprised of  the full extent of  the malaise, and now he was criticized for being out of  
touch. In a sense it was true. His focus on the search for peace and on mobilizing 
international support for his impoverished nation had consumed most of  his time 
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and energy and he had not been actively monitoring the government, which was 
responsible for the day-to-day running of  the country (2003: 290-291). 
The fact that the riots originated from the stronghold of  the Hashemite monarchy was an alarming 
development for King Hussein. The region had been known as the bedrock constituency for the 
House of  Hashim since the emergence of  the Jordanian state (Ryan, 1998: 393). During the 
economic boom in Jordan, most of  the state‘s resources were disproportionately ―directed towards 
the provision of  services and infrastructure to those areas of  the country predominantly populated 
by Transjordanian rather than Palestinian citizens.  Government employment and benefits were thus 
particularly important for East Bankers, of  whom perhaps three quarters were employed in the 
public sector‖ (Brynen, 1992: 82).  The IMF austerity measures disproportionately affected the 
southern region of  the country and the resulting anger of  the people in the South was a major 
problem for the Kingdom, as Hussein had always viewed these people as the guarantee of  the 
regime‘s survival. Eighty percent of  the army, including his palace lieutenants, the royal guards, and 
individuals placed in other strategic positions in the army and the security services, had been 
recruited from these southern towns. As a result of  the new economic policy, the people of  the 
South turned their back on the regime and began attacking symbols of  the Hashemite Kingdom, 
including bringing down and tearing apart Jordanian flags. They also attacked local government 
buildings and institutions (Salloukh, 2000: 125). The only calm cities in Jordan were those populated 
with Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian-dominated cities and the North were less affected by the 
austerity measures than southern Jordan, which was largely dependent on government subsidies. 59 
However, in addition to the riots‘ demographic and geographic origins, their timing was alarming for 
                                                          
59 Later, in an interview, King Hussein thanked the Palestinian people and the PLO for their pacifying roles 
during the demonstrations. See FBIS-NES 2704091089, 28 April,.1989. 
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King Hussein. He was particularly worried about the spread of  the intifada to Jordan as a result of  
these riots.  
The riots were a huge blow and a serious embarrassment for King Hussein. Eight people died in the 
clashes between protesters and security forces and dozens were wounded. Although the incidents 
lasted only four days, their ramifications were more enduring. In order to appease the rioters, King 
Hussein decided to respond some of  their demands.  He quickly accepted the resignation of  Prime 
Minister Rifai and appointed Zeid bin Shaker as Prime Minister. In order to allow the angry 
protesters to blow off  steam, King Hussein decided to hold the first general election in Jordan in 
more than twenty years (Ashton, 2008: 254).  In addition, he promised to form a national charter, a 
new social contract between the state and the society. However, as stated by Robinson, the regime 
initiated this attempt at democratization in order to strengthen its legitimacy, not to yield to domestic 
forces (1998: 391). 60 
The events in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s also influenced state-society relations in 
Jordan. According to Cunningham, the Jordanian people were caught in the idea that democracy 
meant economic prosperity and international support (1997: 444) King Hussein and the Hashemite 
Monarchy were concerned about the effects of  these global political movements on Jordanian 
society. The fate of  authoritarian leaders in Central and Eastern Europe was also a wake-up call for 
                                                          
60 Although the elections took place in a peaceful environment a few months after the riots, they were not 
completely democratic. Political parties were banned from the elections. The campaign period was less than a 
month and therefore was insufficient for most of  the candidates to organize effective campaigns. Radio, 
television and the Arabic-language newspapers remained government-owned and controlled during the 
elections (Vandenberg, 2000: 116). Moreover, the elections took place while martial law was still effect in 
Jordan (Robinson, 1998: 392). In addition, the Election Law was biased toward Bedouin and rural areas, 
which were considered the pillars of  Hashemite legitimacy. ―For instance, the three largest urban centers - 
Amman, Irbid City and Zarqa - represented about 65 per cent of  the total population but were allocated only 
45 per cent of  the parliamentary seats. The trend became even clearer when contrasting the populous Second 
District of  Amman, which had over 73,000 registered voters and was allocated three seats, to the 
Governorate of  Ma'an with 28,000 registered voters and an allotment of  five seats‖ (Rath, 1994: 547).   
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Middle Eastern leaders who had been against regime changes for decades. Under these domestic and 
international circumstances, a popular uprising against Hussein‘s rule would find a great deal of  
support within Jordan and might result in the overthrow of  the Hashemite Monarchy. 
Another major issue that threatened the stability of  the Jordan was its large Palestinian population. 
The Palestinian problem was regarded as the most significant domestic problem of  Jordan since the 
1970s. As stated by Kleiman: 
No issue has such potential for tearing apart the body politic reconstructed on the 
East Bank in the aftermath of  the 1970s crisis as does the constant testing of  
Hussein‘s subjects in Amman and the adjacent refugee camps in terms of  their true 
loyalty to the Hashemite Crown and to the concept of  a Jordanian entity. As 
tribalism continues to recede and is replaced by nationalism as the chief  unifier, the 
ground is being laid for a clash between two competing and possibly antithetical 
nationalist allegiances: a Jordanian identity and a Palestinian one. To the extent that 
such a confrontation is forced out into the open, it could well threaten to expose 
Jordan as a divided society and a dual monarchy. So long as this issue remains 
dormant, East Bank Palestinians and their true political loyalties will remain the great 
enigma to the Hashemite Kingdom and the Jordanian political process (1988: 128). 
Palestinians constituted around sixty percent of  Jordan‘s population and the majority of  them lived 
in big cities, including Amman. Since they fled to Jordan from their lands in Palestine, their 
resistance to integration within Jordan society had always been a major source of  concern for the 
Jordanian administration. During the late 1980s, the situation became more serious with the 
increasing frustration of  Palestinians from the status quo and their mobilization as a result of  the 
intifada of  their counterparts in the West Bank. Jordan‘s decision to disengage from the West Bank 
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in 1988 and its recognition of  the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole 
representative of  the Palestinian people did not eradicate the problems. Although they were not 
well-armed and organized like the Palestinian fedayeen groups of  the 1970s, sporadic protests were 
recurrent in the refugee camps and there was a possibility of  the spread of  these protests to 
Amman. This would endanger the domestic stability of  Jordan and King Hussein did not have the 
same support of  the southern Bedouin groups as he had had in the 1970s when they tirelessly 
defended him against assassination and coup attempts. Most of  these Bedouin groups were among 
those who had revolted against King Hussein a year before and Hussein had still not repaired his 
stature among these people (Sayidh, 1991: 175).  The launch of  the intifada in the West Bank in the 
late 1980s made the situation of  the region more unstable. The East Banker Palestinians were 
following the developments closely and trying to support their West Banker counterparts through 
rallies and demonstrations. King Hussein was extremely concerned about the spread of  the intifada 
to Jordan which would pull the state of  Jordan into a conflict with Israel.  
The events that took place in the West Bank during the Gulf  War aggravated the situation for the 
Jordanian government. In May 1990, an Israeli citizen in Rishon LeZion killed eight Palestinian 
workers waiting at a bus stop, which triggered riots in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, leading to 
the deployment of  tanks in Amman (Baram, 1991: 61).  More than 60 people were wounded in 
demonstrations at the al-Baqah refugee camp and the way that Jordanian security forces handled the 
riots caused huge resentment among the Jordanian people, particularly among the Palestinian 
refugees (FBIS- NES 90-100, 23 May 1990). 
Another critical issue that endangered the social and political stability of  Jordan during this time was 
Jewish immigration to Israel. After the opening of  the borders of  the Soviet Union, thousands of  
Jews from the Soviet Union migrated to Israel and the United States. The Israeli government 
184 | P a g e  
 
welcomed the influx of  Jews for demographic reasons. The rate of  migration was alarming to many 
Arab countries, particularly to Jordan and King Hussein. The migrants were arriving at the rate of  
1400 people a week and being settled in the Occupied Territories in violation of  the international 
agreements. According to projections, by the summer of  1991, there would be around 100,000 
settlers in the Occupied Territories, and 127,000 in East Jerusalem (Noor, 2003: 300). King Hussein 
considered the Jewish migration a significant threat to the security and survival of  the Jordanian 
state. For King Hussein, Israel‘s policy was not only a step toward the Palestinization of  the 
Jordanian state, but was also an affront to the Middle Eastern peace process. Although the issue was 
placed on the agenda of  the Arab Cooperation Council in February and although King Hussein 
conveyed the concern of  the Jordanian people to the leaders of  the United States and Western 
countries, attempts to stop the mass migration of  Jews to Israel proved futile. 
KING HUSSEIN: THE KING/ THE PREDOMINANT LEADER 
King Hussein became the King of  Jordan when he was only eighteen years old. He did not have 
prior political experience other than accompanying King Abdullah to some diplomatic negotiations 
and meeting with foreign dignitaries. Although King Abdullah had started to prepare him for the 
throne, the preparation time was insufficient because of  Abdullah‘s sudden death. When Hussein 
became the King of  Jordan, he had little knowledge of  the intricacies of  Jordanian domestic politics 
and of  the complexities of  its relations with the Great Britain. In addition, his education abroad 
estranged him from Jordanian society to a great extent. Furthermore, King Talal‘s liberal political 
reforms during his short tenure made politics in Jordan more complicated than ever before. Even 
more importantly, the British officers in the Jordanian government were playing a bigger role than 
just being advisors. Both the intelligence operations and the Jordanian army were run by the British 
officers who were much more experienced and knowledgeable about Jordan than King Hussein. 
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Despite these unfavorable conditions, King Hussein managed to establish his control over the 
government and society shortly after his enthronement. By using different strategies, he was able to 
become the predominant leader of  Jordan and the ultimate foreign policy decision maker. As stated 
by Klieman, few can recall a Jordan without him as the head of  state and few can speak about 
politics in the Middle East without mentioning his role (1988: 12). 
King Hussein employed multiple strategies in order to enhance his grip over Jordanian society and 
government. When he ascended to the throne, the constitution of  Jordan recognized the political 
system as a hereditary monarchy and gave a lot of  power to the king. The king was vested with 
executive powers as well as the right to appoint and dismiss prime ministers and cabinet ministers. 
He also had the right to appoint the members of  the Upper House and call elections.  However, 
Hussein‘s father had also integrated some liberal principles into the constitution, such as a higher 
level of  legislative authority and basic rights and freedoms for civil society as well as the press. In his 
first years as the king, Hussein extended these freedoms and liberties. The legislative elections, which 
took place in 1956, were considered the freest election in the history of  Jordan (Rath, 1994: 532). 
The democratization in Jordan, however, did not last long because the political liberties and free 
elections placed King Hussein under constant pressure by civil society in his handling of  foreign 
policy. Although constitutionally King Hussein had the authority to determine the direction of  
foreign policy and alignment choices, the new active and open civil society proved to be a major 
stumbling block for King Hussein. The debate about the Baghdad Pact was the first demonstration 
of  the impact of  democratization on Hussein‘s foreign policy decision making. The empowerment 
of  the public also resulted in the increasing influence of  government vis-à-vis the palace in 
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determining foreign policy orientation of  Jordan.61 In addition, the rise of  Pan-Arabism, 
particularly the increasing influence of  Nasserism, and the organization and empowerment of  
communist groups began to jeopardize the future of  monarchy in the country. King Hussein was 
discontented with these developments and realized that if  his regime was to survive, he needed to 
protect himself  from attempts to shift political power away from his throne (Thompson, 1999: 122).  
In order to achieve his regime security, he decided to halt the process of  democratization and 
strengthen his position vis-à-vis the government, civil society and the parliament (Rath, 1994: 534). 
His first step was imposing martial law in Jordan under the pretexts of  civil disturbance and a coup 
attempt against the monarchy by officers close to the Prime Minister. During the imposition of  
martial law, political parties were banned, members of  opposition groups were either exiled or sent 
to prison, and freedom of  the press was curtailed. In addition, Hussein bolstered the capacity of  
intelligence agencies; he gave them necessary authorization to monitor dissent groups and 
individuals (Vandenberg, 2000: 95). After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, King Hussein further 
extended his executive powers and dismissed the House of  Representatives. During the absence of  a 
legislative assembly, which lasted several years, the ―regime relied to a great extent on a system of  
royal decrees, regional military governors and special security courts to provide it with an 
administrative and judicial framework‖ (Rath, 1994: 541). 
King Hussein continued to consolidate his rule and authority in Jordan throughout the 1970s and 
1980s through both formal and informal methods. When the Gulf  Crisis erupted between Iraq and 
Kuwait on the eastern border of  Jordan, King Hussein still retained his position as the predominant 
                                                          
61 According to Alberts, there were two events that demonstrated the increasing effect of  the government. 
The first was ―Prime Minister‘s Nabulsi‘s establishment of  diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the 
intimation of  perhaps even recognizing the Chinese People‘s National Republic.‖ In addition to this, Nabulsi 
―broadcasted from Amman radio that his government did not want nor need the aid coming from the 
Western Bloc (United States) and that Jordan‘s government would accept all and any aid coming from the 
Soviet Union‖ (1973: 18) 
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power of  Jordan. The articles of  the 1952 Jordanian constitution that vested executive power in 
King Hussein were still in effect. Among those, Article 16 stated: 
The Executive Power shall be vested in the King, who shall exercise his powers 
through his Ministers in accordance with the provisions of  the present Constitution. 
He also had legislative and executive rights, as set forth in Articles 34 and 35; 
The King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss him or accept his 
resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or accepts their 
resignation, upon the recommendation of  the Prime Minister. 
(i) The King issues orders for the holding of  elections to the Chamber of  Deputies 
in accordance with the provisions of  the law. 
(ii) The King convenes the National Assembly, inaugurates, adjourns, and prorogues 
it in accordance with the provisions of  the Constitution. 
(iii) The King may dissolve the Chamber of  Deputies. 
(iv) The King may dissolve the Senate or relieve any Senator of  his membership. 
King Hussein used this power frequently during his reign. Between 1953 and 1989, a period of  
thirty-six years he dismissed 39 prime ministers. It became commonplace for him to ask for the 
resignation of  the prime minister when there was a serious economic and social crisis in Jordan.  
King Hussein also had immunity from any kind of  judicial or legislative oversight. According to this 
article in Jordan‘s constitution: 
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The King is the Head of  the State and is immune from any liability and 
responsibility. 
The constitution also gave total control of  the armed forces of  Jordan to the king with Article 32: 
The King is the Supreme Commander of  the Land, Naval and Air Forces. 
Article 33 of  the constitution gave King Hussein full authority over Jordan‘s foreign policy. 
The King declares war, concludes peace and ratifies treaties and agreement. 
The cabinet was only an executive arm of  the king and had no power in the making of  foreign 
policy decisions. Throughout the Gulf  Crisis, King Hussein was formulating Jordan‘s foreign policy 
all by himself  and participating in the implementation of  these decisions.  The prime minister was 
King Hussein‘s loyal cousin bin Shaker and also was not involved in the decision making process 
(Al-Khazendar, 1997: 26). In addition, even the foreign ministry did not have input in the foreign 
policy decisions. As Curtis Ryan succinctly captured: 
Contrary to what one might expect from its portfolio, the Jordanian foreign ministry 
is among the least influential institutions in Jordanian foreign policy. The foreign 
minister and his ministry have virtually no role in the decision making process, and 
little role even in advice or consultation. Instead, the foreign ministry has a 
predominantly executive function. It is charged with the implementation of  decisions 
that have already been made elsewhere. In addition, the foreign minister has the role 
of  representing Jordan abroad, and articulating its foreign policy to other countries. 
Yet even this role is often circumscribed by the king, who frequently prefers his 
personally designated envoys to carry out this function of  representing the kingship 
189 | P a g e  
 
and the Jordanian policy. These representatives are most often selected from among 
the trusted advisers (2002: 68). 
As shown above, the constitution vested the king with extraordinary power. Throughout years, he 
crafted a role for himself  above the state machinery (Lucas, 2000: 76). 
From the very early days of  his rule, Hussein also solidified his rule through strict limitations on the 
press and civil society organizations. One of  the earliest examples of  these laws was the Law of  
Societies and Social Organizations of  1966, which was implemented to curb any form of  domestic 
political mobilization (Wiktorowicz, 1999: 609-610). The 1973 Press and Publication Law imposed 
limitations on freedom of  the press and expression, and the Law on Resistance to Communism 
outlawed communist political activity and was used extensively against Jordanian and Palestinian 
leftist groups. In addition, the Law on Public Assemblies significantly constrained freedom of  
association and the Labour Law of  1960 gave the ministers extensive discretionary powers over 
trade union activities (Brynen, 1992: 77). Finally, the Emergency Defense Regulations provided 
pretexts for the regime to curb the emergence of  political opposition (Salloukh, 1994: 81). 
In addition to using his constitutional powers, King Hussein utilized the coercive mechanisms of  the 
state apparatus to control Jordanian society, to quell the opposition groups and suppress 
disturbances. He also empowered his loyalists and bolstered the intelligence agencies within the 
country. In fact, ―rewarding loyalists and removing those who have lost the palace‘s favor was a basic 
tool for cooptation and thus of  regime power‖ (Vandenberg, 2000: 93 and Harknett and 
Vandenberg, 1997: 132).  King Hussein particularly selected members of  the loyal Bedouin tribes, 
such as the Huwaytat, the Bani Skhr, and the Sirhan to serve in the elite Royal Guards and officer 
corps. The members of  these tribes were also lavished with material and political awards in order to 
maintain their loyalty to the regime (Salloukh, 1994: 80).  
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King Hussein tried to ensure the gathering of  information and intelligence about different segments 
of  his society. He paid particular attention to monitoring the political activities of  civil society 
organizations, trade unions and political parties, especially leftist groups, whether or not they had 
connections with the Soviet Union and Arab nationalists, including the Ba‘athists, pan-Arabists, and 
Nasserists and active members of  the Palestinian groups.  In addition, to discourage people from 
participating in these organizations and to make the bureaucracy an opposition-free zone, the regime 
asked the Jordanian people to have  ―a clean history‖, which entailed having official clearance papers 
and certificates of  good behavior.  Of  course in most instances ―good behavior‖ meant to stay loyal 
to the Royal Court and not to participate in any oppositional political activity.  
During his reign, King Hussein cultivated an image for himself  as the defender of  Arabs and a 
father of  the Jordanian nation. His posters and pictures always presented him as a father figure and 
as the head of  the extended Jordanian family. According to Salloukh, with these strategies, ―Hussein 
tapped into the existing patriarchal social structure to rally support from the traditional sectors of  
society, especially the Bedouin tribes, whose first loyalty is to the family‖ (2000: 88). In addition, the 
Hashemites‘ status ―as descendents of  the Prophet Muhammad and their historical role as guardians 
of  the holy cities of  Mecca and Medina provided King Hussein with a degree of  religious legitimacy 
and insulated him from some of  the criticisms and challenges that other leaders of  the region faced 
from Islamist groups‖ (Vandenberg 2000: 101). He also frequently asserted his nationalist credentials 
by emphasizing the significance of  his great- grandfather Sharif  Hussein and his grandfather King 
Abdullah for leading the Arab revolt during World War I and for bringing about the emergence of  
independent Arab nations in the Middle East.  
In sum, the regime in Jordan during the Gulf  Crisis was dominated by King Hussein, its 
Transjordanian allies and the coopted Palestinians (Salloukh, 2000: 74). Vandenberg characterized 
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the regime as ―Husseinism‖ (Vandenberg, 2000: 74). During his tenure, King Hussein was always the 
predominant leader in terms of  foreign policy and had the authority to commit the resources of  his 
country to a certain foreign policy goal. He also had interest in implementing his foreign policy 
decision (Ryan, 2002: 79). This was obvious from his engagement in regional, international, and 
Arab affairs, his recurrent trips abroad, and his constant meetings with foreign leaders.  As Al-
Khazendar stated, King Hussein tried to be aware of  most of  the details of  Jordan‘s foreign policy. 
He also did not empower his representatives in the realms of  foreign and security policy as he did in 
issues related to internal affairs (1997: 20).  Neither the cabinet nor the parliament had any say in the 
foreign policy decisions of  the king during the Gulf  War. He was the predominant leader and all 
other people, including ambassadors and foreign policy officials, were just implementers of  his 
decisions. Moreover, he was the controller of  the means of  force and had the ability to reverse 
foreign policy decisions that he made during the Gulf  Crisis. In fact, as Al-Zu‘bi stated in 1991: 
The Jordanian political system has continued to revolve around His Majesty King 
Hussein …Foreign policy and decision making are in his domain. It is the King 
who outlines Jordan foreign policy and supervises its implementation. He is 
considered crucial for the execution of  foreign policy through his global relations 
and the utilization of  his personal relations and the utilization of  his personal 
relations with many world leaders. His political beliefs, his reason and his 
experience as a ruler mean he can establish strong personal relations with leaders 
of  the world and establish good bilateral relations between Jordan and other 
states. (232-233) 
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KING HUSSEIN’S LEADERSHIP STYLE 
The leadership profile of  King Hussein is based on an analysis of  his interview responses by 
Profiler +, developed by Hermann (2005). His interview responses will be assessed in order to 
understand the relationship between his leadership traits and his selection of  diversionary strategy. 
During the Gulf  Crisis, King Hussein and Prince Hassan were two of  the most visible personalities 
from the Middle East in the Western media and capitals. From the very beginning of  the crisis, King 
Hussein made numerous trips to meet with the leaders of  the Arab countries as well as with foreign 
policy officials of  Western European countries and the United States. His personal friendships with 
Western leaders allowed him to meet with them at short notice and his close rapport with Saddam 
Hussein allowed him to carry messages to and from Hussein and conduct shuttle diplomacy at the 
beginning of  the crises. Both his trips abroad and his meetings in Jordan were widely covered by 
news agencies. During these trips and meetings, he also gave numerous interviews to journalists and 
conducted press conferences with the foreign dignitaries. However, like Saddam Hussein, he gave 
few interviews to domestic media and preferred to make public speeches when he wanted to address 
the people of  Jordan. The number of  interviews he granted to Jordanian media outlets and 
newspapers was far less than the number of  interviews he gave to foreign correspondents. 
Considering the focus of  this research, these domestic interviews will be taken into account. All of  
these interviews were conducted in 1990 and 1991 during the Gulf  Crisis.   
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King Hussein 
 
Interview 
 
 
Norming Group 
Mean Score 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Compared 
Norming Group 
 
Belief in 
Controlling 
Events 
 
 
0.25 
 
0.32 
 
0.04 
 
 
Low 
 
Need for Power 
 
 
 
0.26 
 
0.25 
 
0.03 
 
Moderate 
 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
 
 
0.52 
 
0.58 
 
0.03 
 
Low 
 
Self-Confidence 
 
 
 
0.57 
 
0.36 
 
0.10 
 
High 
 
Task Orientation 
 
 
 
0.58 
 
0.59 
 
0.06 
 
Moderate 
 
Distrust of Others 
 
 
 
0.09 
 
0.18 
 
0.06 
 
Low 
 
In-Group Bias 
 
 
 
0.12 
 
0.13 
 
0.02 
 
Moderate 
Table 3: Leadership Style of  King Hussein 
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Challenging Constraints 
According to the leadership trait analysis, King Hussein‘s score on ―need for power‖ is moderate 
compared to other Middle Eastern and Islamic leaders and his score on ―belief  in controlling 
events‖ is low compared to his norming group. These scores demonstrate that King Hussein 
respected constraints during the Gulf  Crisis but he also evaluated the situation on a case by case 
basis. His policies during and immediately after the Gulf  War show that he respected some of  the 
regional and domestic constraints. For instance, his constant emphasis on the fact that he did not 
recognize the annexation of  Kuwait by Iraq was respecting the challenge of  the international 
coalition, led by the United States. In addition to this, despite overlooking some breaches of  
international sanctions by the Jordanian groups, his recognition of  the sanctioned regime was a form 
of  respecting constraints of  the UN system. In addition, although he enjoyed the rallying of  
Palestinians in Jordan around his flag during the Gulf  Crisis, his support for the linkage politics of  
Saddam Hussein was also a result of  respecting the constraints of  the political demands of  
Palestinians within Jordanian territories. He knew that the possible spread of  the intifada to the 
Jordanian territories would be detrimental to the rule of  the Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan, and 
because of  that the political demands of  the Palestinian groups were recognized by King Hussein. 
In his memoirs of  the Gulf  War, former Secretary of  State James Baker also raised this issue and 
emphasized King Hussein‘s position during the Gulf  War as a result of  his concern about domestic 
constraints, particularly the Palestinian groups. 62     
Openness to Information 
According to the leadership trait analysis, King Hussein‘s score on ―conceptual complexity‖ is low in 
comparison to other Middle Eastern and Islamic leaders and his score on ―self-confidence‖ is high 
                                                          
62 See Baker, James A. and Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics of  Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992. 
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in comparison to his norming group.  A low score in ―conceptual complexity‖ together with a high 
score in ―self-confidence‖ demonstrate that King Hussein was close to information and contextual 
cues during the Gulf  Crisis. 
Some of  King Hussein‘s biographers and the observers of  Jordanian politics have asserted that 
Hussein usually relied on his political instincts and experiences in making foreign policy decisions 
(Shlaim, 2008). He was reportedly an intensely private man who did not rely on anyone (Klieman, 
1988). This characteristic of  King Hussein‘s personality was most obvious in his selection and use of  
advisors. He had a limited number of  political advisors around him when he was making these 
decisions. One reason for this was his lack of  trust in the politicians and political operatives in 
Jordan. In his autobiography, Hussein linked this distrust to the political events that had taken place 
after the assassination of  his grandfather in Jerusalem. He stated: 
I can see now, these men of  dignity and high estate, doubled up, cloaked figures 
scattering like bent old terrified women. That picture, far more than the face of  the 
assassin, has remained with me ever since as a constant reminder of  the frailty of  
political devotion… 
…I could go back to Victoria, away from the power lust and avarice that followed 
my grandfather‘s death as rapacious politicians fought for the crumbs of  office, 
sullen, determined, hating each other, like the money-hungry relatives who gather at 
the reading of  the will. 
Within a matter of  hours the politicians were starting to fight. There were those who 
whispered, Was my father well enough to succeed to the throne? They were the ones 
who hoped he would never reign, simply because they themselves wanted power. 
Powerless for the moment, I was forced to watch how some of  his former friends 
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changed without a thought for our country: I saw his great work jeopardized by 
weakness on the part of  those around him, by the way they permitted opportunists 
to step in, even if  it meant the ruin of  little Jordan. (Hussein, 1962: 8-9, 25) 
According to Klieman, Hussein‘s distrust of  political operatives was reinforced during his first few 
years in office. He argued that: 
Hussein‘s sense of  isolation was probably reinforced by reports of  intrigues against 
him in earlier years from within the royal court. The principal alleged conspirator in 
the 1957 aborted was Ali Abu Nuwar, previously a close confidant of  the King. 
Again, Hussein felt betrayed by Nasser in 1967 and by Sadat both in 1974 and 1977, 
when the Egyptian leader paid his surprise visit to Jerusalem. (1988: 124) 
For other biographers of  Hussein, like Shlaim, another reason for his repugnance toward political 
operatives and advisors was his disappointment with the performance of  many of  his advisors 
during the first few years of  his reign. For Shlaim, one of  the decisive moments with regard to this 
issue was the Suez Crisis, and the resistance of  King Hussein‘s advisors to his insistence on joining 
the conflict on the side of  Egyptians. 
Hussein was young and impetuous, and he acted with a rush of  sudden energy. He 
had the scent of  battle in his nostrils and was bitterly disappointed by the attitude of  
his advisers. Prince Hassan recalls Hussein‘s frustration: ―My brother wanted to make 
his own mark….he was thwarted by not having a confrontation in 1956.‖ (2008; 122) 
In fact, trust in his own intuition and ignorance and indifference toward the views of  those around 
him became powerful themes in his worldview. This attitude was reflected in his frequent changes of  
prime ministers and the high-level officials around him.  
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On the rare occasions when King Hussein did involve advisors in the decision making, they were 
either extreme loyalists or family members, such as his uncle Sharif  Nasser bin Jamil, his cousin 
Sharif  Zaid bin Shaker, and his brother Prince Hassan. The relationship of  some of  these advisors 
to King Hussein and their influence on decision making led to some controversies within Jordan. As 
Shlaim stated: 
There was increasingly loud criticism of  the royal family for….surrounding 
themselves with sycophants who kept them in ignorance of  the true state of  the 
nation… 
Sharif  Nasser was controversial because of  his forceful personality and ostentatious 
lifestyle. He liked hunting, riding and fast cars, women, drinking and gambling. 
Hussein‘s uncle appeared to outsiders to be one of  his closest advisors, friends, and 
supporters… An ultraconservative monarchist who was entirely dependent on the 
king‘s favour, he was also one of  the regime‘s strongest bulwarks and was known to 
maintain an extensive intelligence network within the army… Nevertheless his image 
was poor; he was feared and hated by Palestinians throughout the kingdom… (2008: 
308-309) 
King Hussein‘s closeness to information was particularly observable in issue areas where Hussein 
thought he had sufficient knowledge and capacity. Foreign and security policy was on the top of  this 
list. As mentioned above, he had been a predominant leader in Jordan in the formulation and 
implementation of  foreign policy decisions for almost four decades. Although he never received 
formal education in foreign politics and diplomacy, he acquired substantial confidence and 
familiarity with foreign policy-related issues during his tenure. He also developed a rapport and 
friendly relations with various statesmen in the Middle East and around the world. The historical 
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records proved that he made the most critical foreign policy decisions of  his reign, either by himself, 
or with a group of  advisors who had already proven that they had the same views as King Hussein.  
These critical policy decisions included the decision to engage in armed conflict with Israel in 1967, 
the decision to expel fedayeen groups from Amman from 1970 to 1971, the decision not to engage 
in direct armed conflict with Israel during the Yom Kippur War of  1973, the decision to condemn 
Egypt during the Camp David meetings, the decision to support Iraq against Iran during the Iran-
Iraq War, and the decision to disengage from the West Bank in 1988.     
Scholars and journalists who observed and analyzed the decision making mechanisms in Amman 
pointed out King Hussein‘s closeness to information during the Gulf  Crisis. Even though there were 
several advisors around Hussein, he was most often indifferent to their recommendations. As 
explained above, King Hussein had displayed this attitude even before the initiation of  the armed 
conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. According to Ashton, he was warned about the seriousness of  
the problem between Iraq and Kuwait during the first days of  the crisis by Prime Minister Qasim. 
However, King Hussein ―was not very pleased by the warning, preferring instead to trust his own 
instinct that the crisis could be managed‖ (2008: 265).  Later, after the invasion of  Kuwait by Iraq 
and the formation of  the international coalition in the Gulf, King Hussein again refused to follow 
the suggestions of  his close aides -- including his cousin Zaid bin Shaker, his brother Prince Hasan, 
and his loyal advisor Adnan Abu Obdeh -- to assume a more vociferous role in condemning the 
takeover (Shulman, 2008: 177). Instead, he chose to follow his instincts and single-handedly crafted 
his foreign policy. King pursued this policy up until the end of  the crisis. He also wrote by himself  
the speech that he gave to the Jordan public in February 1991, which was considered the most open 
statement of  his support for Saddam Hussein. According Ashton the speech was:   
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Hussein‘s authentic, unvarnished personal voice. His two main speechwriters at the 
time were both surprised when the King let them see an advance draft of  what he 
intended to say. Abu Odeh, who received a call from the King asking him to work on 
the draft whilst he was in discussion with Zeid bin Shaker, was shocked when he 
received the provisional text. He telephoned the King immediately to advise him that 
the wording was far too strong and that he shouldn‘t make the speech at all. The 
King was not at all pleased with Abu Odeh‘s advice and sent the speech to his other 
speechwriter instead. (2008: 279) 
Motivation by Problem or Relationship    
King Hussein‘s leadership trait analysis during the Gulf  Crisis demonstrates that his score in 
―motivation for seeking office‖ is moderate compared to other Middle Eastern and Islamic leaders.  
This score indicates that King Hussein was focusing on a particular task or on a relationship on case 
by case basis.  He was flexible enough to change his task depending on the situation. As mentioned 
above in Chapter Three, this score is contrary to the general belief  that authoritarian leaders do not 
need to deal with the public or worry about forming relationships. However, Jordan faced many 
economic and social problems during the Gulf  War and King Hussein was very concerned about the 
fate of  his regime and his survival. Under these circumstances, his main aims became maintaining 
the loyalty of  his constituents, unifying the diverse ethnic and religious groups under the flag of  
Jordan and increasing the morale of  the Jordanian army and society. Although the regime in Jordan 
was an authoritarian one and King Hussein had extensive constitutional and legal powers and had 
great capacity to use violence against those who challenges his rule, he still needed the support and 
backing of  his people.  
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In fact, King Hussein took into consideration the opinion of  the public in his country in some 
circumstances and focused on his task in some other times during the Gulf  Crisis. However, the 
biographers of  King Hussein and analysts of  his policies report his focus on public opinion and his 
goal of  unifying the people of  Jordan under his leadership. According to Uriel Dann, an important 
constant in Hussein‘s leadership was his need, throughout his reign, for constant popular support as 
a necessary complement to the basically elitist characteristics of  the Hashemite regime. This factor 
distinguished King Hussein from his predecessors. For Dann, 
His grandfather and true predecessor, King Abdullah……… belonged to another 
world where populism was incomprehensible. That Hussein‘s world should be 
different is of  course part of  a historic process; however, in part it is also a strain, in 
Hussein‘s personality that was absent from his grandfather‘s- the need to feel in 
rapport with the mass of  his subjects. The specific thrusts of  these populist appeals 
or policies varied from time to time, depending on the dominant elements in the 
changing scene as well as on Hussein‘s reading of  those scenes. (1990) 
This attitude was observable during the Gulf  Crisis. In one of  the most important political crises in 
the recent history of  the Middle East, he again tried to unify his people around his flag by stressing 
the commonalities of  the people of  Jordan. He knew that the regional crisis in the Middle East 
constituted an important threat for the survival of  the Arab leaders and therefore prioritized the 
policies that will unite his people and boost his popularity among the people of  Jordan. Throughout 
the crisis, an emphasis on the shared destiny and future of  Arabs constituted an important part of  
King Hussein‘s discourse. In an interview, he stated: 
We have stood with Arab brethren whenever this area was threatened. We have stood 
and contributed, we believe, to stability in this area. We‘ve given our best and we‘ll 
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continue to do so for cohesion, for resolving problems, for creating of  this Arab 
world, the Arab world we speak about, turning that into reality, of  the family living in 
cohesion, to trust and confidence amongst its members. Our dreams are the dreams 
of  our fathers and forefathers since the Arab awakening; for the securing Arab 
rights, the rights of  the Arab people to live in peace, to live with dignity, and securing 
a better future for the generations to come.     
We are Arabs. We belong to this nation, and we as leaders bear a great responsibility 
– our responsibility towards the Arab people. If  we can fulfill our responsibilities 
with dignity, upholding the Arab people‘s dignity, safeguarding the Arab people‘s 
interest, that is what we do and what we have done. (FBIS-NES-90-154, 9 Aug 1990) 
Motivation towards the World 
According to his leadership trait analysis, King Hussein‘s score on ―distrust of  others‖ and ―in-
group-bias‖ are both low compared to other Middle Eastern and Islamic leaders. According to these 
scores, King Hussein did not perceive the world as a threatening place. Contrary to those who see 
the world in Hobbesian terms, he did not consider conflict an inevitable part of  the international 
system. For him, international cooperation was both possible and feasible and there were 
international arenas where this cooperation could be achieved. In fact, leaders like King Hussein 
perceived conflicts as context-specific and needed to react to them on a case-by-case basis. He knew 
that his country needed to deal with certain constraints but he also believed that there was some 
flexibility in how to respond foreign policy events. His main focus was on taking advantage of  
opportunities and relationships (Hermann, 2005: 200). In an interview he expressed his belief  that 
the international conflict can be avoided through dialogue with the following statement: 
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I believe that the area is passing through one of  the most dangerous crises it‘s ever 
faced. And I believe the slide continues. Hopefully it can be halted. We will certainly 
do whatever we can towards that end. We are obviously amazed and possibly 
optimistic even at this moment in seeing how the world community can be mobilized 
and galvanized to achieve an objective; optimistic after long years of  disappointment 
in the ability of  the world to come together to uphold principles and ideals and apply 
the Charter of  the United Nations on problems throughout the world equally. 
Hopefully, this new trend will be applied wherever and whenever and on 
whomsoever merits this kind of  world attention. (FBIS-NES-90-154, 9 August 1990) 
During the Gulf  Crisis, King Hussein consistently raised the possibility of  solving problems 
diplomatically and rejected the notion that the use of  force was necessary. He emphasized the 
possibility of  regional cooperation to peacefully resolve the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. He 
tried not to antagonize any state in his speeches and refrained from blaming anyone for the crisis. 
He also criticized those who saw the world as black and white. In an interview with a Japanese TV 
station, King Hussein stated: 
We found a very strange phenomena in the world, though many of  our old friends 
adopted the attitude that you are either with us or against us. The answer is that 
neither with you nor against you. But I am against war, against the destruction that 
can occur, against creating wounds that might cause a lot of  damage, material losses, 
the environment to suffer, may be even beyond this area. (FBIS-NES-91-127, 2 July 
1991) 
King Hussein also expressed his belief  in solving problems peacefully in the region and in the 
possibility of  cooperation among Arab countries. In another interview he stated that:     
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I feel very, very strongly that Arab solutions to Arab problems are possible. And if  I 
didn‘t believe that, I wouldn‘t be wasting my time. And every moment of  my time in 
point of  fact has been devoted to halting the escalation of  this crisis and beginning 
to defuse it. And I believe very much indeed that there is an Arab role to be played. 
Jordan has tried, but with the help of  others, hopefully we will continue and we will 
succeed while you are in touch with the realities of  this world and the rest of  the 
world. (FBIS-NES-90-164, 23 August, 1990) 
THE USE OF DIVERSIONARY FOREIGN POLICY 
During his rule until the Gulf  War, Hussein was known to be a stable, pro-Western Arab leader in a 
region increasingly viewed as full of  radical and hostile forces to the West. During this period, he 
aligned Jordan with the United States and other Western powers in most regional crises, including 
the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and the bombings of  the US Marine barracks in Beirut (Friedenberg, 
2000; 78). In addition to this, he built very close personal relations with Western leaders, including 
Margaret Thatcher and George H.W. Bush.63 Moreover, Hussein constructed a relatively collegial 
relationship with the leaders of  Israel and earned their trust. After the 1967 War, he refrained from 
engaging in an armed conflict with Israel and from directly supporting Arab troops during the war 
in 1973. Although he condemned the Camp David Accords and Sadat‘s visit to Tel Aviv, he did not 
do these things because he was against peace but because he was in favor of  an international 
conference to solve all of  the problems between Israel and Arab countries. 
                                                          
63 The rapport between Bush and King Hussein dated back to the early 1970s when Bush was the 
ambassador of  the US to the United Nations. They consolidated this friendship when Bush served as the 
director of  the CIA during the mid-1970s. During Bush‘s vice-presidency and after Bush became the 
president of  the United States, Bush and Hussein exchanged numerous letters and met frequently to discuss 
issues related to Middle East politics. (Ashton, 2008: 258-259) 
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However, during the Gulf  War, Hussein found himself  in a major dilemma. Although he had known 
that there was trouble between Kuwait and Iraq, he had not realized that it would become an 
international issue.64 In his meetings with Kuwaiti leaders, he had opined that Saddam Hussein 
would not use force against Kuwait.65 King Hussein had believed that he knew and understood 
Saddam Hussein. During the Iran- Iraq war, the two leaders had developed a political as well as 
personal rapport. They had met at least once a month to evaluate political developments in the 
region. King Hussein had also become a friend of  Saddam Hussein‘s family and Saddam Hussein‘s 
wife Sajida had regularly called on him to mediate family feuds. For all of  these reasons, King 
Hussein had been pretty confident about his political instincts regarding Saddam Hussein‘s 
intentions and during their meetings, Saddam Hussein had never given King Hussein signs of  his 
intentions toward Kuwait. Therefore, in several instances, King Hussein had told the leaders of  
Gulf  countries that Iraq was just trying to show its muscles in order to acquire further concessions. 
When King Hussein heard of  Iraq‘s invasion of  Kuwait from King Fahd, he was as shocked and 
staggered as every other leader in the region. His first reaction was to talk with Saddam Hussein 
about the invasion and to ask him to withdraw from the Kuwaiti territories. Immediately after his 
phone call to Saddam Hussein, King Hussein traveled to Alexandria to meet with Mubarak, and with 
Mubarak, called King Fahd and President George H.W. Bush and tried to develop a diplomatic 
                                                          
64 According to George H.W. Bush, King Hussein repeatedly asserted that Saddam Hussein had no intention 
of  using force against Kuwait. Considering the personal rapport between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein, 
US officials accepted King Hussein as a reliable source. He was extremely confident about his thoughts and 
because of  that, for a long time, he couldn‘t convince the leaders of  Gulf  countries about his lack of  
information about Saddam Hussein‘s plans (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). 
65 After Iraq‘s invasion of  Kuwait, the king of  Saudi Arabia and Kuwaiti leaders became extremely suspicious 
about King Hussein‘s true intentions. For them, King Hussein might have the ulterior motives of  sharing 
Kuwait‘s oil wealth with Iraq and of  annex the holy lands of  Saudi Arabia once ruled by King Hussein‘s 
great-grandfather. See Friedenberg, Robert E. 2000. The Throne at all Costs. 
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action plan. However, King Hussein‘s endeavors to solve the dispute within Arab friends failed 
within three days.  
After the failure to solve the dispute peacefully, King Hussein found himself  at the center of  an 
important foreign policy dilemma. In his country, both the Palestinian majority and the Bedouin 
minority were vigilant about his foreign policy decisions. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf  countries, including Kuwait, had been the most important sources of  financial aid since the 
1970s and the United States was the most significant source of  military aid for the Jordanian army. 
During the last economic crisis in 1989, King Hussein had only been able appease the rioters with 
the help of  urgent funds from the Gulf  countries and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Iraq was the 
biggest trading partner for Jordanian exports and ever since King Hussein‘s support of  Saddam 
Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq had been providing oil to Jordan far below its market value. 
He was aware that, regardless of  his alignment choice, Jordan would face further economic 
problems and possible social instability as a result of  this conflict. Although the political 
liberalization and parliamentary elections had brought a slight increase in the popularity of  King 
Hussein, the domestic social and economic situation was still very volatile.  
The Gulf  Crisis and King Hussein‘s diplomatic maneuvers deflected the attention of  the Jordanian 
public in the first days of  the crisis. The political developments in a neighboring region and the 
invasion of  an Arab country by another Arab country were already significant enough to distract the 
attention of  the Jordanian public from domestic problems. The discussions on the streets of  Jordan  
suddenly changed from economic problems to the Gulf  Crisis and the invasion of  Kuwait. 
Furthermore, Jordan‘s state-controlled media widely publicized King Hussein‘s meeting with 
Mubarak in Alexandria and his phone conferences with King Fahd and President George H.W. Bush 
about the crisis, which helped to increase King Hussein‘s stature among the Jordanian people.  
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In the first days of  the crisis the Jordanian society did not react strongly to the developments and 
mostly followed King Hussein‘s statements on the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. With the help 
of  the media, in these first days of  the crisis King Hussein achieved high esteem among the 
Jordanian people (Shulman, 2008). Especially, his endeavors for peaceful resolution of  the conflict 
constituted an important source of  his rising popularity.  There were very limited resources for him 
to boost his popularity in domestic politics because of  that he aimed to increase his popularity, 
which he needed desperately after the riots last year, through a more active pro-Iraqi foreign policy 
strategy.  King Hussein gave the first signs of  this policy in an interview in the first days of  the 
crisis, when he openly praised Saddam Hussein and described him as ―a person to be trusted and to 
be dealt with‖ and further said that he hoped that Saddam Hussein would be ―given a chance to be 
known for what he is – an Arab patriot‖ (FBIS-NES-90-152, 7 August 1990).   
In another interview, King Hussein answered a question regarding Saddam Hussein‘s personality by 
stating: 
I believe he is a man who has gone through a very difficult experience, who has 
managed to hold his country together for eight years of  war and beyond, who has 
built his country up, who believes in the Arab world, who seeks to serve it and who 
is recognized in his country as a patriot…..Iraq represented something new in the 
area; a strength of  a people united, a strength of  a people who has survived a terrible 
ordeal defending the Arab order, and that this represented a threat to some within 
the area and outside unfortunately (FBIS-NES 90-152, 7 August 1990).   
Although King Hussein never accepted the legitimacy of  Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territories and he 
never recognized the annexation of  Kuwait, he did not condemn Iraq for the invasion of  Kuwait 
either. He also ―did little to dissuade the public from its impression that he favored the Iraqi 
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annexation of  Kuwaiti territories by force‖ (Shulman, 2008: 152).  In addition, the government- 
controlled media in Jordan launched a simultaneous campaign to support Saddam Hussein. 
Considering the press law and the existence of  strict censorship in Jordan, many observers believed 
that government‘s tolerance of  the media campaign implicitly showed the government‘s 
endorsement of  Iraq. According to Lynch (1999): 
Some observers saw the press commentary as led directly by the regime ―when al-Rai 
writes that the war in Iraq is a holy war…this is not evidence of  a free press in 
Jordan giving vent to its unfettered views…it is an expression of  the opinions 
prevailing today in the royal court.‖ (160) 
Numerous editorials and articles were published in the government-owned or controlled newspapers 
during this period in support of  Saddam Hussein and his policies (Bligh, 2002). Together with 
Saddam Hussein, the media was also portraying King Hussein and his diplomatic endeavors as 
heroic attempts to stop the foreign infiltration to the region. Although, King Hussein was 
responding to questions from the Western journalist regarding the increasing pro-Iraqi stand among 
the people of  Jordan and the Jordanian media by saying that they are independent voices in Jordan, 
the observers of  the Jordanian politics knew that under strict censorship nobody in Jordan would 
dare to write those things without a form of  consent and approval of  the Royal Court.   
In addition to government-controlled media, civil society organizations, most of  which were either 
controlled or strictly monitored by the government, also launched campaigns in support of  the 
policies of  King Hussein.  Immediately after the invasion of  Kuwait, the only support that Saddam 
Hussein had among the Jordanian groups was from pan-Arabist groups, such as the Nasserists and 
the Ba‘athists which constituted a minority within the Jordanian society. They issued a statement 
calling on the Arab world to unite behind Saddam Hussein and his invasion was described as a first 
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step towards the establishment of  Pan-Arab unity (Shulman, 2008: 161). Later, groups that were 
closely affiliated with and supported the Royal Court joined in the endorsement of  Saddam Hussein. 
The most prominent of  these groups was the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.  
The cordial relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Royal Court based on mutual 
recognition were well-known in Jordan. The Brotherhood was the only group allowed to launch an 
open public election campaign during the parliamentary elections. According to analysts of  
Jordanian politics, such as Khabar, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan enjoyed official support and 
acquired the semblance of  legal status. Of  course, in return, the Brotherhood was extremely 
supportive of  the policies of  the Royal Court and endorsed the official Jordanian stance (1990). One 
of  the most observable moments of  this implicit cooperation between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Royal Court took place during the Gulf  Crisis. In the immediate aftermath of  the invasion, the 
Muslim Brotherhood refrained from making any statement about the invasion and the 
spokespersons of  the Brotherhood did not express support or denunciation about the Iraqi action. 
In fact, the Brotherhood had always been skeptical about the ultra-secular Ba‘ath government in Iraq 
and its relations with Saddam Hussein had never been excellent (Vandenberg, 2000: 194).  As 
Mustafa Hamarneh captured succinctly, immediately after the invasion, only an individual Muslim 
Brotherhood member of  Parliament made a statement about the invasion.  
Mr Abdallah Akaileh, a Muslim brotherhood member of  Parliament, reiterated his 
party‘s stand on Arab and Muslim unity, and hoped that differences between 
brothers would be solved through dialogue...as it was perceived the monarchy 
supported Iraq, the traditionally pro-Hashemite Muslim brotherhood party followed 
suit. (Hamarneh, 1992: 28) 
209 | P a g e  
 
However, after the government‘s tolerance of  comments in Jordanian media and King Hussein‘s 
statements on Saddam Hussein, the Brotherhood chose to follow a more proactive strategy in 
support of  Iraq.  The Brotherhood‘s initial official statements on the crisis were in line with the 
policies and discourse of  King Hussein. In its first statement, it declared that it wanted to see an 
Arab solution to the problem and appealed to the Kuwaiti and Saudi governments not to accept 
foreign troops to solve the problem (FBIS-NES 90- 15, 2 Aug 1990). Later, the tone of  the 
Brotherhood‘s statements became more aggressive and the nature of  its demands became more 
assertive, which really started to mobilize people of  Jordan in support of  the King Hussein and 
Saddam Hussein. 
More importantly some members of  the Jordanian government and Jordanian parliament started to 
express their support to Saddam Hussein without any limitations and did not face any sanctions as a 
result of  these statements. For instance, against a religious fatwa by the Egyptian Mufti, Muhammad 
Sayyid Tantawi, allowing believers to use arms against the Iraqi leader, the Jordanian minister for 
religious affairs stated that the fatwa of  Sayyid Tantawi was ―wicked, erroneous and smacked of  oil‖ 
and called ―to expel the crusaders from the Arabian Peninsula‖ (Podeh, 1994). In addition a 
parliamentary delegation issues a communiqué stating that ―any attack against Iraq would be 
considered an attack against the entire Islamic and Arab nation‖ (Podeh, 1994). King Hussein, who 
had the authority to dismiss any ministers and members of  the parliament, did not take any action 
against these statements and did not voice any criticism.  
Although these statements had a significant impact on the Jordanian people‘s perception of  the 
crisis, the real mobilization began with the rallies organized by the Muslim Brotherhood. Following 
the riots of  the previous year and the spread of  the intifada in the West Bank, the Jordanian 
government adopted strict regulations regarding mass meetings. These regulations prohibited almost 
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any form of  political gathering in the cities. However, only a few weeks after the invasion, the 
Muslim Brotherhood managed to stage huge demonstrations in every big city in the country. 
According to observers of  Jordanian politics, there was definite government support and approval 
of  these rallies, which were playing an important role in increasing the popularity of  King Hussein.  
According to Lawrence Tal (1997): 
When the Gulf  crisis erupted, Hussein and his advisers were presented with an 
excellent opportunity to bolster their flagging legitimacy. For the first time in 
Jordanian history, the regime allowed, and even encouraged, anti- Western 
demonstrations to occur in public places. The Muslim Brotherhood was given a fairly 
free hand to channel popular dissent toward constructive ends; that is toward 
backing the king‘s policy of  opposition to Western military intervention in the Gulf. 
Consequently, Hussein emerged from the crisis enjoying unprecedented popularity. 
(121) 
In a very short period of  time, the Brotherhood transformed the mosques to the main bastions of  
the anti-Western and pro-Saddam demonstrations. On August 10, 1990, only ten days after the 
invasion of  Kuwait, thousands of  Jordanians gathered in the main mosques of  Amman, burned the 
flags of  the United States and Israel, and chanted slogans in favor of  King Hussein and Saddam 
Hussein (FBIS-NES 90- 152, 7 Aug 1990). Even underground and illegal organizations, such as the 
Islamist Party of  Jordan, were allowed to make public appearances and hold press conferences to 
support King Hussein‘s stance (FBIS- NES 90-159, 16 Aug 1990). 
After the demonstrations of  these Islamic groups, other civil society organizations also started to 
organize demonstrations and rallies. For example, university students, who had been kept under 
strict government control for decades, began to organize mass demonstrations. These rallies were 
211 | P a g e  
 
unprecedented in Jordan and every observer of  Jordanian politics knew that such huge-scale 
demonstrations were inconceivable without the permission and endorsement of  the state 
establishment. The demonstrating students carried pictures of  King Hussein and Saddam Hussein 
and chanted slogans in support of  Saddam Hussein (FBIS-NES 90-154, 9 Aug 1990). In addition to 
these demonstrations, various organizations were founded to support Saddam Hussein and help the 
Iraqi people, such as the Popular Jordanian Committee to Support Iraqi Arab People, which 
recruited 80,000 people within Jordan to fight alongside the Iraqi army should Iraq be attacked by 
the coalition forces (FBIS-NES 90-159, 16 Aug 1990). Also ―charitable societies and labor unions 
collected food to send to Iraq while thousands chanted slogans in the Roman amphitheater in 
Amman, marched on the US and Iraqi embassies and rallied after Friday prayers. Such 
demonstrations would have been forbidden a year earlier, but in 1990 they were not only condoned 
but encouraged‖ (Lesch, 1991: 44). The Royal Court was content with the deflection of  the public‘s 
attention from domestic issues to the foreign policy realm and allowed the Jordanian people to 
exercise freedom of  association and expression on foreign policy-related matters, as they had never 
done before. 
The mobilization in support of  Iraq diverted the attention of  the Jordanian people from domestic 
economic problems and rallied them around the leadership of  King Hussein. However, the society 
was still divided. Those who supported King Hussein‘s foreign policy and attended the 
demonstrations were mostly the Jordanians. The Palestinians in Jordan, who constituted 60 percent 
of  the population, were initially ambivalent and unwelcoming in their reaction to the invasion of  
Kuwait. Even after the Muslim Brotherhood began its mobilization efforts, the Palestinian groups 
were reluctant to react to the events like other Jordanians did. As Hannan Ashrawi mentioned, the 
Palestinian Authority stated the inadmissibility of  territorial changes by force and demanded respect 
for the norm of  self-determination (1991: 183).  However, after Saddam Hussein‘s statements on the 
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Palestinian issue and his initiation of  the linkage politics, which suggested a simultaneous withdrawal 
of  Syria from Lebanon, Israel from the occupied territories in Palestine, and Iraq from Kuwait, the 
Palestinians in Jordan started to show increasing interest to the Gulf  War and King Hussein‘s foreign 
policy towards Iraq. Until then, they were mostly preoccupied with the ongoing intifada in the West 
Bank and increasing Jewish migration and settlements in the Occupied Territories.. 
Until the Gulf  Crisis, the Palestinians in Jordan lacked any form of  loyalty to King Hussein and the 
Hashemite Dynasty. Many Palestinians, particularly the ones who had lived in refugee camps for 
decades, remembered Black September and King Hussein‘s betrayal of  the Palestinian leadership in 
various instances, including his last unilateral disengagement from the West Bank. King Hussein had 
always been concerned about the political mobilization of  these groups and the possible threats that 
these groups posed to the regime. Saddam Hussein‘s linkage policy initiated the mobilization of  
some of  these groups in support of  Saddam Hussein and inspired King Hussein to try to ―win‖ the 
hearts and minds of  the Palestinian majority in his country.  In a very short period of  time, his 
foreign policy had provided him with unprecedented support among Jordanians and he believed that 
the continuation of  this policy might help him to win over the Palestinian people as well. Moreover, 
Hussein believed that the tension between Jordanians and Palestinians, which had intensified after 
the economic crisis in 1989, could be contained through a foreign policy discourse that could unify 
these groups. During the crisis, he attended the International Day of  Solidarity with the Palestinians, 
met with his Palestinian opponents, began to implement his own version of  Saddam Hussein linkage 
policy, and stated his support of  Saddam Hussein on this subject.  
However, while taking these actions, King Hussein was also secretly meeting with Israeli leaders, 
including Prime Minister Itzakh Shamir, and giving various guarantees about Jordan‘s stance. In 
addition to this, while expressing his grave concerns over the massing of  foreign troops to Saudi 
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Arabia, he also avoided direct criticism or condemnation of  Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for their 
willingness to host this overwhelmingly Western coalition (Brand, 1991). Moreover in response to 
the concerns from the Western governments on his increasing support for Saddam Hussein, King 
Hussein told the Western diplomats that there is a distinction between his public support for 
Saddam Hussein for domestic reasons and his real, covert pro-Western position, which basically had 
not changed (Bligh, 2002). 
With King Hussein‘s pro-linkage politics, which was in line with the Palestinian demands, for the 
first time since their emigration, Palestinian groups felt allegiance to the Hashemite Monarchy. In 
fact, as Hamarneh (1992) stated: 
For decades, the majority of  Palestinians were under the impression that the 
Hashemite policies concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict were in collusion with the 
Zionist. The King‘s stand during the crisis has been the most important factor in 
contributing to better relations between the two communities. The King‘s popularity 
reached unprecedented levels. Although he always enjoyed a high level of  popular 
support among the Jordanian majority, during the crisis he made sizeable inroads 
among the Palestinian portion of  the population. This led to a considerable lessening 
of  tensions between the two segments of  the population (238). 
The demonstrations in Jordan spread to different segments and classes of  the Jordanian society 
(Azzam, 1991: 476). The support of  King Hussein took the form of  rallies, marches, and 
demonstrations, ―including a march of  ten thousand people in Madaba on August 12, a fifteen 
thousand strong demonstration in Mafraq the same day, a rally of  twenty five thousand in Zarqa on 
August 25, and a massive pro-Saddam demonstration attended by seventy thousand Jordanians on 
September 10 in Amman‖ (Vandenberg, 2000: 191). Although the government‘s unprecedented 
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lenience towards anti-Western demonstrations and the King‘s unwillingness to condemn Iraq 
incurred the wrath of  the Western powers, in the King‘s view, such popularity in the midst of  a 
financial and social crisis was worth paying a heavy price (Baram, 1991: 68).  
At the rallies, demonstrators from different walks of  life glorified the very symbols of  the 
Hashemite Monarchy that they had torn down the previous year. Palestinians waved the flag of  
Jordan together with the flags of  Iraq and Palestine. Demonstrators in Amman carried posters of  
King Hussein together with pictures of  Saddam Hussein. The domestic public opinion became one 
that did not oppose the government, even after the devastating effects of  sanctions on the Jordanian 
economy.66 The society was unified and there was no wedge between Palestinians and Jordanians. 
Both camps were ready to make any kind of  sacrifice for King Hussein and for Saddam Hussein. 
King Hussein continued this policy until the end of  the war, which helped him to have the public‘s 
support while an intifada, which might have a spillover effect on Jordanian society, was being waged 
to the west of  Jordan and a war whose economic consequences might endanger the future of  the 
Hashemite Monarchy was being waged to the east of  Jordan. His use of  foreign policy helped him 
to secure his throne and regime during these crises. 
While playing this card domestically, King Hussein also tried to maintain warm relations with the 
Western countries by paying visits to Western capitals to explain his viewpoints. According to 
Alexander Bligh, King Hussein was trying to play to multiple audiences at the same time with 
contradictory messages: 
                                                          
66 According to Shulman, the sanctions brought pressures to three different fields of  Jordanian economy : 
―1-) transit trade through the post of  Aqba , from which approximately 70 percent of  imports and 25 percent 
of  the exports en route to Iraq; 2-) industrial exports, with some 75 percent of  Jordan‘s industrial output 
bound for Iraq; and 3-) oil imports, 80-90 percent of  which Jordan  received free of  charge from Iraq n 
payment of  the larde debt to Jordan that Iraq had accumulated during the Iran-Iraq war‖(2008; 170). 
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On the domestic scene , it was a conscious attempt to cater to the public feeling of  
sympathy with that new symbol of  Arab solidarity, Saddam Hussein; on the foreign 
diplomatic and media scene in short, the Western field, it was a clear effort to 
convince his audience that he did not really mean to harm Western interests or to 
deviate from his traditional pro-Western policies; thirdly while allowing his people to 
publicly attack Israel he continued his secret dialogue with its leaders- a complicated 
game of  global, regional and local interests which eventually in spite of  the 
temporary setback after the war, paid off  and not only guaranteed once more the 
preservation of  the regime, but as early as the spring of  1991 made Jordan pivotal 
power in the US approach to the peace process, a position unequalled at any time 
before the war  (2002: 184). 
In the midst of  coalition attacks against Iraq, King Hussein made several appearances on Jordanian 
television and expressed his support of  Iraq. However, his advisors met with the political officers of  
the US embassy in Amman immediately after the speeches and assured them that the speeches were 
intended for domestic consumption (Shalim, 2008). Observers, especially those in Israel, also knew 
that the speeches were intended to create a rally effect domestically. As a result, immediately after the 
war, Israel‘s prime minister asked Secretary of  State James Baker and other US officials with whom 
he met to include Jordan in the peace process, which consequently, the US did (Baker, 1995: 423).  
Some alternative explanations have been provided to explain the foreign policy decision making of 
King Hussein of Jordan during the Gulf Crisis. Some asserted that the alignment of Jordan with Iraq 
during the crisis was due to an attempt, on the part of King Hussein, to balance the threat of Israel 
by the help of Iraq. However people like James Baker argued that King Hussein was already in the 
process of negotiating secretly with the leaders of Israel before the war (1995). In addition, just 
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before the war, the Israeli foreign secretary David Levy publicly reassured Jordan that Israel had no 
hostile intentions against Jordan or the regime of King Hussein (Cited in Lynch, 1998: 358). After 
the invasion of Kuwait, King Hussein met several times with Israel‘s premier and negotiated a deal 
of non-aggression during these meetings. As part of this agreement, King Hussein asked the Iraqi 
leader not to use the airspace of Jordan to attack any third party and made clear that in case of an 
Iraqi breach of Jordanian airspace, Jordan would use its air defense system.  
The second alternative explanation is related to economic interests. According to this explanation, 
King Hussein acted in favor of Iraq in the Gulf Crisis because of strong economic ties between 
Jordan and Iraq. Scholars like Stanley Reed asserted that King Hussein preferred to take a pro-Iraqi 
stand during the Gulf Crisis because of Jordan‘s fragile economy during the Gulf Crisis. He argued 
that, when the invasion took place, Iraq was Jordan‘s biggest trading partner and Iraq was selling oil 
to Jordan with a lower market price (Reed, 1990). However, despite this close economic relations, 
Iraq was not biggest economic financier of the Jordanian economy.  The financial assistance from 
the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia constituted an important portion of the Jordanian economy. 
The direct contributions to the Jordanian budget from these countries were very critical to provide 
the continuation of public services in Jordan. In addition, the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia were 
the most important destinations for unemployed Jordanians, which alleviated the unemployment 
problem in Jordan. Moreover, the remittances from the Jordanian workers in these countries to their 
families back in Jordan constituted an important portion of the Jordanian economy. In addition to 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Jordanian economy relied heavily upon financial and military assistance 
from the United States and international organizations.  The United States in particular had been the 
major source of military aid for Jordan. This shows that Jordan had more significant economic 
relations with the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia than Iraq and thus the economic interest cannot 
explain the foreign policy behavior of King Hussein. Moreover, the Gulf countries and the United 
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States were generous in rewarding those countries that join the international coalition and 
compensated economic losses of oil-poor countries. So if Jordan joined international coalition, it 
would also enjoy the economic resources from these countries.  
Finally, some others argue that King Hussein acted the way he did because of the fear of public 
reaction. For scholars like Brand, it was public opinion that forced King Hussein to act in support of 
Saddam Hussein; because the society in Jordan was attracted to the pan-Arabist messages of Saddam 
Hussein (Brand, 1994). This argument was also refuted by scholars such as Lynch, who argued that 
there was not any unified and pre-existing position about the Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait. Most of 
public opinion was shaped by the Jordanian media, which was under the control of King Hussein at 
that period. The strict censorship at that period wouldn‘t allow let the expression of opinions of 
different groups independently (Lynch, 1998: 366). 
 
LEADERSHIP STYLE AND THE SELECTION OF DIVERSIONARY STRATEGIES 
The analysis of  King Hussein‘s leadership style during the Gulf  Crisis demonstrates how certain 
leadership traits can account for the diversionary decision making of  political leaders.  According to 
this analysis, King Hussein was a leader who decided to respect constraints depending on the 
context. He was also a leader with high self-confidence and low conceptual complexity, which made 
him close to outside information and contextual cues. Furthermore, he showed the qualities of  a 
leader with interpersonal emphasis. Finally according to Hussein cooperation was not only possible 
but also feasible in world politics. 
Under strong domestic economic and societal pressures, King Hussein preferred to respect the 
constraints of  domestic groups. Throughout the crisis, he neither antagonized Western forces nor 
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overtly supported Iraqi forces. He respected the societal pressure to support Iraqi leader in his 
actions but also respected international demands by not recognizing the annexation of  Kuwait by 
Iraqi forces. Among the different domestic constraints he was particularly considerate to the 
demands of  the Palestinian groups. He tried not to antagonize the Palestinian groups, especially after 
the announcement of  the linkage politics by Saddam Hussein, and tried to be considerate of  their 
demands as well.  
The second common leadership trait for leaders that use diversionary strategies is the relationship 
focus and King Hussein‘s score on ―relationship focus‖ also shows that he is more focused on 
relationships than on tasks.  Like other leaders with a relationship emphasis, he was particularly 
sensitive toward the maintenance and establishment of  relationships with his constituents. In the 
midst of  an economic and social crisis and an international conflict, he tried very hard to maintain 
the loyalty and allegiance of  his constituents. King Hussein‘s focus on relationship shows that both 
democratic and authoritarian leaders take into account the opinions of  the domestic public and want 
to maintain the support of  their people. In Jordan, during the Gulf  Crisis the elected parliament had 
no influence on the country‘s foreign policy making. The executive branch could be ousted by King 
Hussein when he deemed it necessary. The law placed restrictions on press freedom and the King 
had absolute authority over all forms of  foreign and security policy decision making. Moreover, the 
most powerful and organized social group in Jordan – the Muslim Brotherhood - had absolute 
loyalty to King Hussein and the Hashemite monarchy. However, even under these circumstances, 
King Hussein was worried about public opinion among the Jordanian masses and was playing the 
foreign policy card in order to win domestic legitimacy. 
As for many Arab leaders, one way to solve the question of  domestic legitimacy and to ensure the 
support of  the society was to engage in a foreign policy venture. Numerous Middle Eastern leaders 
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employed the strategy of  manipulating a foreign policy- related event in order to regain their 
legitimacy and standing. Throughout the Gulf  Crisis, Hussein aimed to unite the people of  Jordan, 
who were divided by ethnic, religious and sectarian lines, under his flag through diplomatic 
maneuvers. He actually succeeded in mobilizing the Palestinians to carry the Jordanian flag and hold 
up his picture when only a year earlier, they had burned symbols of  the Hashemite Monarchy.  He 
pursued this strategy despite its international side effects. In terms of  domestic legitimacy and 
strength, he was the only winner during the Gulf  Crisis. 
The more interesting scores of  the leadership trait analysis of  King Hussein were his ―openness to 
information‖ and his ―motivation towards the world.‖ According to the leadership trait analysis, 
King Hussein was close to information during the Gulf  Crisis. His high ―self-confidence‖ scores 
show that he thought that he knew what was right and what should be done regarding his foreign 
policy making and that he tried to persuade others about the appropriateness of  his courses of  
action. He was fairly unresponsive and insensitive to incoming information from his advisors and 
aides. Observers of  Jordanian politics argued that from the very beginning of  the crisis, King 
Hussein did not  take into consideration contextual cues. After Iraq‘s invasion of  Kuwait, he also 
ignored the opinions of  his two closest advisors Adnan Abu Obdeh and Zaid bin Shaker. Moreover, 
in the same period, he even ignored the suggestions of  his own brother Prince Hassan, who was the 
closest person to King Hussein during his reign. According to Shlaim (2008): 
One of  the very few flaming rows between the two brothers was on the subject of  
Saddam. Hassan warned Hussein repeatedly that Saddam was an incorrigible and 
dangerous despot, but Hussein would not listen (493). 
Leaders like King Hussein, who are close to contextual information, are more likely to depend on 
their instincts in their selection of  diversionary mechanisms and these instincts are shaped by their 
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former political experience. In most instances, they choose to trust their intuition and believe that 
they know how to handle issues better than anybody else. It is fairly easy for them to reach decisions. 
They believe that the most secure and reliable method is to exercise consistency in diversionary 
action. If  a leader in this category has employed scapegoating in the past in his career, he is going to 
continue to utilize the same mechanism again and if  he has used peaceful methods of  diversion in 
the past, he will pursue this strategy in other domestic crises that he faces. During the Gulf  Crisis, 
King Hussein repeated the same diversionary strategies that he had previously employed in his 
career in order to divert the attention of  the domestic public and unify and rally the society around 
his flag. 
Prior to the Gulf  Crisis, King Hussein had frequently resorted to diversionary peacemaking when 
confronted with domestic problems and when his rule started to be challenged by opposition 
groups. An early example of  his use of  this strategy took place after his controversial marriage to 
Antoinette Avril Gardiner in 1961. After divorcing his first wife, King Hussein decided to marry 
Gardiner, who was an award-winning field hockey player and the daughter of  a British army officer 
turned innkeeper.  His decision was opposed not only by the members of  the royal family but also 
by his close advisors and loyal politicians on the ground of  rising anti-British sentiments within 
Jordanian society. Even Henniker-Major, the British ambassador to Jordan met with King Hussein 
and tried to dissuade him from this marriage considering the damage that it could cause to his 
prestige and legitimacy in Jordan (Shlaim, 2008: 183). After King Hussein married Gardiner, he was 
confronted with criticism from various segments of  the society.  His reputation had already been 
damaged by his resistance to joining the United Arab Republic and his willingness to be part of  the 
Baghdad Pact. Radio Cairo, which was the most important pan-Arabist propaganda tool of  Egyptian 
President Nasser, started a campaign against King Hussein regarding his marriage to a British 
woman. This campaign was later complemented by protests on the streets of  Amman against the 
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pro-British foreign policy stand of  King Hussein. Amid all these domestic criticisms, King Hussein 
launched a foreign policy process of  repairing relations with his Arab neighbors. His visits to 
Baghdad and Cairo were interpreted by observers of  Jordanian politics as using foreign policy for 
domestic purposes. Scholars like Ashton interpreted Hussein‘s sudden turn to the Arab world as an 
attempt ―to forestall criticisms of  his potentially controversial marriage‖ (2008: 85). 
This was not the only example of  King Hussein resorting to diversionary peacemaking before the 
Gulf  Crisis. He did it again in 1967 when his credibility and popularity were declining rapidly due to 
the rise of  Arab nationalism in Jordan. At the same time, the division between Jordanians and 
Palestinians was threatening the unity and integrity of  the country. The smear campaign against 
King Hussein from Cairo was making his job more difficult. According to foreign observers, King 
was facing an imminent danger to his rule. ―How far he would be able to hold the country together 
and rely on the support of  the army in these circumstances was a moot point. There were many 
imponderables in both courses of  action, and either way, the King‘s domestic political authority 
seemed likely to be challenged‖ (Ashton, 2008: 114).  Under these difficult domestic circumstances, 
King Hussein decided one more time to approach Nasser‘s Egypt. By signing the defense pact with 
Egypt, King Hussein gained the support of  various segments of  the Jordanian society. Those who 
had criticized him for being a British puppet rallied around him after signing of  this agreement. As 
Shlaim observed ―on his return home later in the day, Hussein basked in the glory of  his friendship 
with Nasser. Jubilant crowds lined the streets as the royal procession drove to the hilltop palace‖ 
(2008: 240).  
The final part of  King Hussein‘s leadership style was his motivation towards the world. As 
mentioned above, for King Hussein, the world was not a zero-sum place and his outlook towards 
the world was not conflict-prone. For him, conflicts were context-specific and he preferred to deal 
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with them on a case-by-case basis. He thought that cooperation was possible and feasible among 
different states. His worldview and attitude toward foreign policy informed his way of  using 
diversionary strategies. Since he thought that cooperation is always achievable among countries, 
when looking for a foreign policy event to distract public attention, he was more inclined to choose 
peaceful strategies. Throughout the Gulf  Crisis and domestic crises that he experienced in his career, 
he usually opted to use peaceful strategies, such as summits with Arab leaders or alignment with 
Arab countries.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
HAFIZ AL-ASSAD AND THE USE OF MULTIPLE FORMS OF DIVERSIONS 
 
Introduction 
Hafiz Assad of  Syria was one of  the most influential personalities of  Middle Eastern politics. 
During his presidency, he was not only the single most powerful leader of  Syria but also an effective 
player in the regional conflict and cooperation in the Middle East. Unlike his counterparts in Jordan 
and Iraq, for most of  his thirty-year rule he lived a private life, did not make a lot of  public 
appearances and rarely gave interviews. He was known to be a workaholic and extremely self-
disciplined. Western leaders who met him during their tenure, such as former President Clinton and 
former Secretary of  State Kissinger, called him one of  the most intelligent and shrewd policy 
makers in Middle Eastern politics. 
He played a significant role in each and every important crisis in the Middle East, including the Yom 
Kippur War of  1973, the Lebanon Conflict, and Iran-Iraq War. During the Gulf  Crisis, Assad again 
became a key player in regional politics and his decisions impacted the nature and the outcome of  
the conflict. His support of  the coalition forces against Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq provided symbolic 
power and legitimacy to the war efforts of  the United States and was instrumental in the 
reintegration of  Syria into the Arab regional order and world politics. Although his personal 
animosity towards Saddam Hussein constituted an important part of  his foreign policy decision 
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making during the crisis, he employed a well-articulated strategy during his negotiations with leaders 
of  Western and Gulf  countries and he was given important economic and political rewards for his 
support. Moreover, with the acquiescence of  the Western governments and regional actors, he was 
able to strengthen the status of  Syria in Lebanon.  
However, in addition to these rewards, Assad had to incur significant economic and political costs as 
a result of  his foreign policy decisions during and after the Gulf  Crisis. First of  all, in the aftermath 
of  the crisis Assad faced significant economic problems as a result of  increasing unemployment and 
rising inflation. In addition, with the fall of  communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
financial assistance from these countries stopped abruptly. Although, he received a significant 
amount of  financial assistance from the Gulf  countries after the Gulf  War, he spent most of  this 
assistance in order to acquire new weaponry to deter his enemies, after seeing the military supremacy 
of  Western countries in the Gulf  War. This led to a steep increase in the defense budget and a 
decrease in social service spending. Syrian people started to raise their voices against the economic 
policies of  the government. Especially labor unions increasingly expressed their grievances about the 
economic condition of  workers to the government. Secondly, the first months of  1990 witnessed 
the end of  the Cold War and the fall of  the regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. These 
developments were particularly significant to Assad whose regime had been supported both 
financially and militarily by the brethren communist governments of  these countries for decades. 
Moreover, the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the rise of  popular movements 
that overthrew authoritarian regimes constituted major threats to the survival of  Assad‘s regime in 
Syria.  
Amid all these difficulties, Assad began playing a foreign policy card to deflect the attention of  the 
Syrian public from domestic problems. While doing this, he employed multiple strategies including 
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escalating tension with Israel and endorsing the US-led peace process. Assad achieved a change in 
the debates in his country from economic problems, such as rising unemployment, to negotiations 
and the peace process with Israel, particularly with the help of  state-controlled media. However, 
when he saw that the temporary rallying effect of  peace negotiations was almost over and that the 
people of  Syria were again beginning to raise their voices against the regime due to the recurrent 
problems, he shifted his discourse and began to attack Israel verbally in speeches and public 
messages and fed the nationalist feelings of  his people.   
DECISION CONTEXT 
There were important domestic challenges to Assad‘s rule in the last days of  1980s, including an 
ailing economy and growing social instability (Huber, 1992: 55). Moreover, changes in the  
international system and its repercussions for Syria were not helping the Assad regime either. The 
changes in Eastern and Central Europe and the fall of  the Soviet Union affected  politics and the 
economy in Syria. With the invasion of  Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1990, Assad faced another 
major challenge. Throughout the 1980s, Assad had supported Iran in its war against Iraq and had 
been the archenemy of  Saddam Hussein‘s regime. He had also been isolated from the Arab regional 
order because of  this support. After the international reaction to the invasion and the deployment 
of  American soldiers to the Gulf  region, Assad rushed to bandwagon with the American-led 
international coalition despite the opposition of  Arab and Syrian masses. Although Assad‘s regime 
was one of  the most significant beneficiaries of  the Gulf  War in terms of  economic and financial 
aid, it also faced a great deal of  adverse effects from pursuing this foreign policy. 
The most important problem that the Assad regime was confronting in the first months of  the 
1990s related to the changes in the international system. The fall of  the authoritarian regimes of  
Central and Eastern Europe, which had been natural allies and trade partners of  Syria for decades, 
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was a huge blow to the Assad regime. The wave of  democratization and political openness in these 
countries was a major source of  concern for the authoritarian regimes of  the Middle East. Middle 
Eastern leaders were particularly worried about a possible domino effect that could destroy their 
rule. The fall of  the communist regime in Romania and the execution of  the toppled president 
Ceausescu and his wife particularly traumatized Hafiz Assad. The rise of  similar mass movements 
could overthrow the regime in Syria and endanger his life and his family. Despite the high level of  
censorship and surveillance, the walls of  Damascus began to be filled with graffitis that said 
―Assadcescu‖ or ―every Ceausescu has his day‖ (Zisser, 2001: 48).  In an editorial in Al Hayat of  
London during this time, Hafiz Assad was compared to Ceausescu and was called an ―Arab 
Ceausescu‖ (Pipes, 1991: 14). In addition, during these days he was feeling societal pressure from 
different segments of  Syrian society, including new business class, who wanted to transform its 
economic power to a political one and the Sunni majority, whose members were asking for greater 
political inclusion (Robinson, 1998: 170). In order to stop a possible public reaction against his 
regime, Assad first tried to use his censorship mechanisms to stop dissemination of  information 
about the incidents in Eastern Europe. Later, he made some important public appearances and 
underlined the differences between Romania and Syria and stressed that he would not share the 
same fate as Ceausescu of  Romania. 
Thus, in a direct response to upheavals in Eastern Europe, Assad…stressed that 
Syria would not copy, and had never copied in the past, the examples of  other 
countries. Changes in Eastern Europe were not going to compel Syria to alter its 
system, in as much as Syria had been ahead of  these countries, implementing a multi-
party system and a mixed economy as early as 20 years previously. Freedom, Assad 
said, would have to be organized…(Bahout, 1994: 65) 
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He also took some extra precautions, such as increasing surveillance and monitoring of  political 
groups, in his well-controlled country in order to make sure that something of  this magnitude would 
not take place within Syrian territories. 
The regime changes and people‘s movements in Central and Eastern Europe also brought some 
important changes in the relationships of  these countries with Syria. For decades, many of  these 
countries‘ foreign policies had been shaped by the principles and doctrines of  the Warsaw Pact. In 
most of  these countries‘ relations with Syria, they had followed a common foreign policy and had 
become natural allies of  Syria. The members of  the Warsaw Pact had particularly endorsed the 
position and policies of  the Syrian government in Syria‘s confrontation with Israel. As a result, Syria 
had received a huge amount of  armaments and financial and technical aid from these countries. In 
fact, during most of  the Cold War, the Soviet Union had been ―the primary source of  political, 
military, and economic assistance and support for the Syrians, and she had provided strategic 
backing in the face of  possible Israeli or US attack on Syria‖ (Zisser, 2001: 45). The communist 
regimes in these countries had refused to extend and improve diplomatic relations with the state of  
Israel. After regime changes in these countries, the new leaders not only renounced ―ties with the 
friends of  old regime, but …. they were also waiting in line to renew relations with Israel.‖ 
Moreover,  ―adding insult to injury, new governments in Central Europe have atoned for past sins by 
turning confidential files over to Israel intelligence‖ (Pipes, 1991: 14). These changes constituted 
important strategic, political, and economic losses for the Syrian government. As Pipes mentioned, 
Assad stated several times that the biggest loser of  the change in the international system were Syria 
and himself. In fact, a high ranking official in an interview pronounced that Syrians and the loyalists 
of  the Assad regime regretted the fall of  Soviet Union more than Russians or any other people 
living in communist countries (Pipes, 1996: 8).  
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In addition to disadvantaging Syria strategically and economically, the fall of  Soviet Union brought 
other important problems for Syria, such as the emigration of  Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel. 
This was an extremely sensitive issue considering the demographic equilibrium in the region. The 
migration, which began with family reunifications, accelerated in a very short period of  time. For 
Assad, this migration constituted an existential problem for the future of  the Arab world. In a 
speech on the new regional order, Assad stated: 
Let us look at the intensive Jewish immigration to the land of  Palestine...All support 
it and praise it under the slogan of  man‘s freedom to migrate, and in the name of  the 
right of  the Jew to return to his homeland- the promised land, the land of  Israel that 
God promised them according to their holy books. However, let us ask ourselves: in 
the name of  what freedom of  immigration are they speaking? Does no one see that 
the word freedom in practice means aggression? For the freedom to immigrate is in 
practice (in the case before us) the freedom to conquer another‘s land and evict him 
from his home. The Jewish immigrant does not come in search of  work or a place to 
live, he believes he is returning to the land of  his forefathers given to him by 
God…He returns to it in order to fight the Arabs, since Palestine is part of  the Arab 
homeland. Thus the freedom of  man to migrate from place to place becomes a false 
slogan, for its meaning is in fact the right to conquer another‘s land and evict the 
other from his home and from his land. (Cited in Zisser, 2001: 46-47) 
The migration of  Jews to the Israeli territories not only brought a demographic advantage to Israel 
vis-à-vis Palestinians in the occupied territories, but it also had the potential of  resulting in more 
Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights, which would help the consolidation of  Israeli rule in these 
territories. But more importantly, it might bring more refugees to Syria. The Palestinian refugees had 
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a destabilizing effect in their host countries in the Middle East, due to their militancy and reluctance 
to abide the rules of  their host states. This might destabilize the Syrian government.  
The Gulf  Crisis took place amid these difficult circumstances in Syria. The rapid international 
reaction and the Saudi government‘s permission of  the deployment of  American soldiers to Saudi 
territories in order to deter Iraqi aggression left Syria in a dilemma. In this situation, Assad made a 
bold decision, and despite negative domestic repercussions, Syria joined the international coalition 
against Iraq. At the very beginning of  the crisis, the Syrian government condemned Baghdad‘s 
action and the Syrian Foreign Ministry released a statement calling for an immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of  Iraqi troops from the territories of  Kuwait. After calling an Arab 
summit, Syria voted in favor of  a resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion of  Kuwait and asking for 
an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Later, Syria also voted in favor of  the deployment of  
Arab forces to protect Saudi Arabia (Shulman, 2008: 193). In order to curb any possible anti-
government demonstrations due to this decision, the Syrian regime made attempts to explain the 
reasons for its decision. According to Huber (1992), ―Assad directed party leaders to dispatch teams 
throughout the country to emphasize certain points to the Syrian people. These points were: Syria- 
not Iraq- is the custodian of  the pan-Arab ideal; Syria had deployed troops to the Saudi peninsula so 
that the crisis would not be exclusively in the hands of  foreigners; the Syrians were not there to fight 
Iraq- the troop movement was strictly defensive.‖ (93)  
The government in Syria also started a censorship campaign to prevent the influence of  the 
Baghdad-based propaganda campaign from influencing the hearts and minds of  Syrians. It also 
prohibited any pro-Iraq or anti-government demonstrations and political campaigns that might 
spread among the majority Sunni people in Syria. However, a few days after the Syrian decision to 
join international coalition, the Syrian public had the opportunity to acquire information from 
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different sources and began to question the decision of  the Syrian government. According to Huber 
(1992): 
Syrians were outspoken in their opposition to the deployment of  Syrian army to the 
Saudi Peninsula. Many Syrians reacted with hostility, and in some cases violence, to 
the idea of  Syrian troops serving alongside American troops. According to one 
Syrian: ‗We are not ready to defend American interest in the Gulf. I would rather die 
with honor fighting on the side of  one Arab leader who dares challenge the United 
States.‘ (90)  
In Damascus and other Sunni-dominated cities including Homs and Hama, graffiti and posters 
appeared praising Saddam Hussein and his courage to stand up against the Western coalition.  
Western sources also reported that there were mass uprisings and violent pro-Iraqi protests in Al-
Hasakah and Dair al-Zor in late August. In addition, the Palestinian refugee camps  witnessed 
massive protests in support of  Saddam Hussein (Raymond, 1991: 75-76, 78). Furthermore, the 
Islamic opposition against the Assad regime, in particular, became more vocal in its criticisms of  
Syrian foreign policy. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was suppressed in Syria in early 
1980s, issued a statement calling for the overthrow of  the Assad regime because of  its plot against 
Iraq and its siding with the enemies of  Iraq and the Arab people. The statement said that there were 
two sides in the war:  the traitors who stood beside the Zionist entity and the United States of  
America, chief  among whom was Hafiz Assad; and those who supported struggling Iraq and were 
in solidarity with Muslim and Arab fighters (FBIS-NES-90-015, 23 Jan 1991). Following this, the 
Islamic Jihad also issued a statement against Assad‘s support of  the international coalition, as well as 
his domestic politics. The statement was full of  accusations and criticisms of  Assad‘s course of  
action and expressed support for Saddam Hussein‘s regime. It was stated that ―heroic leader Saddam 
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Husayn has woken the sleepy, moved the indifferent , and revived hopes in the hearts of  the nation 
after a long period of  silence‖ (FBIS-NES-90-016, 24 Jan 1991). The statement also promised 
support for Saddam Hussein: 
We all stand behind his Excellency‘s wise leadership with all of  our energies, and the 
Syrian people will never forget their brothers even though their leaders have 
abandoned the right course (ibid). 
Later, the more secular opposition groups also began to raise their voices against Syrian support of  
the international coalition. Democratic National Groupings of  Syria, which was comprised of  a 
number of  Syrian opposition parties, issued a statement in Damascus demanding that the Syrian 
government withdraw Syrian troops from the Gulf. The statement also expressed full support for 
Iraq in its steadfastness against the international coalition (FBIS-NES-91-019, 29 Jan 1991). 
Moreover, although denied vigorously by the Assad regime, there were several pro-Iraqi 
demonstrations in different regions of  Syria, including Day-al Zur, Qamishli, and other cities in 
northeastern Syria close to the Iraqi borders. There were also several demonstrations in Palestinian 
refugee camps and in the universities of  Damascus. Furthermore, as reported by Salloukh, ―popular 
discontent with the regime‘s alignment policy was also voiced through graffiti, leaflets and in 
conversations with foreign correspondents. ….[m]any Syrians listened openly to Baghdad‘s radio 
station and expressed sympathy for Saddam and displeasure with their own government‘s policy‖ 
(2000, 444) . 
Despite economic and diplomatic gains for Hafiz Assad, the end of  the war also brought some 
negative political consequences for the Syrian regime. As stated above, the Syrian government lost 
public support in the aftermath of  the war because of  the negative consequences of  the war for 
Syria. In addition, during the war and in its aftermath, the Syrian government continued to struggle 
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with an ailing economy. Although like many Middle Eastern states, the Syrian economy enjoyed 
rapid development in the 1970s, mostly due to the oil boom, Syria lost a great deal of  this income 
during the 1980s. The decline in oil prices and the decreasing level of  financial aid, due to Syria‘s 
isolation from the Arab world, resulted in an increasing budget deficit and unemployment.67 The 
country‘s foreign exchange reserve also dwindled in late 1980s and the external debt was estimated 
around 5 billion dollars, not including that owed to the Soviet Union for military support, which was 
estimated to be around 15 billion dollars (Meyer, 1994). The studies and the reports on the Syrian 
economy indicated major weaknesses in the economy and pointed out the Syrian government‘s 
practice of  ignoring the structural problems inherent in the economy.68 One of  the scholars on the 
Syrian economy described the impact of  the government on the economic conditions in Syria by 
stating, ―The country has no fiscal or monetary policies: economic plans and the national budget are 
almost wholly notional‖ (Jansen, 1988 Cited in Meyer, 1994). This lack of  planning also caused 
problems in the new projects that the Syrian government initiated. Most of  these plans did not fit 
with the structure of  the Syrian economy. Perthes (1992) in his analysis asserted: 
The new projects were capital intensive and needed a comparatively small but well-
trained labor force, and were highly dependent on imported raw materials, semi 
finished products, and spare parts. Deficiencies…meant that production fell short of  
the projects‘ capabilities and the resulting products were of  poor quality and largely 
unsuitable for competition in foreign markets. (45) 
                                                          
67 The total amount of  contributions from Arab neighbors was 1.819 billion dollars in 1981 and it fell to the 
level of  1.061 billion dollars in 1985 (Meyer, 1994). 
68 See. Syria: A Country Study, 1988. Washington DC, United States Government and EIU Syria Country 
Profile 1989-1990. 
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The reform and liberalization laws of  the late 1980s were not very successful. According to 
Robinson the main reason of  this failure was the lack of  any major change in the handling of  Syrian 
economy. For instance, there was no major personnel change in the regime or bureaucratic reform to 
push the liberalization. Those ministers and bureaucrats who did support reform have been unable 
to implement needed measures (Robinson, 1998: 165). 
In 1991, because of  Syria‘s participation in the international coalition against Iraq, Gulf  countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, extended 2 billion dollars to Syria in financial aid and Western countries 
declared their readiness to extend credit and technical help to the Syrian economy. However, most 
of  this assistance failed to bring any good to the lives of  ordinary Syrians, and was instead 
transferred to the defense budget. Assad felt the necessity to strengthen his own military against 
possible Israeli aggression, especially after seeing the military technology of  Western countries 
during the Gulf  War. He focused on building effective defense strategies that could stop or slow 
down the Israeli military in a possible attack and acquiring better weaponry and more long- range 
missiles for the Syrian army.  In fact, although Syria recovered from political isolation and gained 
economic aid after the war, it did not help the Assad regime to recover from domestic economic and 
social problems. When the war ended, Syria‘s economy continued to suffer from the same economic 
and financial problems that it had faced earlier. In 1991, an observer of  the Syrian economy 
described the situation as follows: 
Syria is slipping into economic decrepitude…Any visitor to Damascus can testify to 
the visibly worsening economic situation. (The Middle East, September 1991, 20) 
The inflation in Syria was still over 50 percent a year. This constant high inflation together with the 
cuts in public spending lowered the living standards of  the Syrian people. Even the developmental 
investments, such as investments in power generation and water, were suspended (Hawwa, 1993: 95).  
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Unemployment was also increasing during this period, due to the lack of  job opportunities, return 
of  Syrian workers from the Gulf  countries and high population growth.  In addition, there was over-
centralization and a high level of  corruption in the Syrian economy. In fact, as stated by Zisser 
(2001), 
the regime‘s efforts were insufficient to overcome the growing backwardness 
resulting from years of  neglect, the lack of  technological infrastructure, and the 
shortage of  skilled and professional manpower. Moreover the progress achieved fell 
short of  meeting the rise in demand for these services because of  the rapid 
population growth. Infrastructural problems of  water and electricity supply, 
transport and communications thus continued to preoccupy the regime in Damascus 
and draw sharp public criticism. (190) 
In the first months of  1990, the shortage of  foreign exchange also became an important problem 
for Syrian economy. The government started to ration its foreign exchange reserves to those 
enterprises most likely to generate export earnings (Lawson, 1994: 49).  According to Pipes (1991): 
These problems create a vicious circle: a shortage of  foreign exchange leads to 
missing spare parts, and this in turn leads to factories working at a fraction of  
capacity, the effect, of  course, in less foreign exchange. Foreign currency reserves 
have at times been down to a mere 20 days‘ worth. Such ordinary items as toilet 
paper are missing for long stretches of  time. (11) 
The public sector was hit particularly hard by these shortages and economic shortcomings. In 1990, 
the Damascus Workers‘ Annual Conference prepared a report about the Syrian economy and raised 
some red flags. According to this report, it was clear that within a short period of  time, it would be 
impossible to renovate, renew, or develop the public sector‘s establishments. The public sector‘s 
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production capacity was paralyzed because of  the scarcity of  production requirements, such as raw 
materials and equipment. This also increased the costs of  maintenance in the public sector‘s 
establishments and made them extremely unproductive (FBIS-NES-90-079, 24 April 1990). 
The social reflection of  the economic problems was threatening stability in Syria. For instance, the 
widespread shortages in various sectors of  the economy made it difficult for the central government 
to close the quality-of-life gaps among the segments in society. The economic liberalization reforms 
of  the late 1980s had already created a new upper class in Syrian society, as well as a massive group 
of  have-nots. A possible conflict between these classes could cause marginalization of  the members 
of  lower classes, which could in turn, result in strong anti-regime movements around politically 
organized groups (Polling, 1994: 25). In addition, most of  the losers of  new economic reforms were 
the social groups that had defended the regime for decades now. In fact, according to Zisser (1990), 
―These left behind belong to precisely those sectors of  the population which in the past had been 
the main bastions of  support for the regime:  the lower social classes, workers, peasants, residents of  
rural areas and the periphery and finally the government and party bureaucracy.‖ (193-194)  
During this time, in the political sphere, the left-wing Ba‘athists and Communist deputies were 
extremely critical about the structure of  the budget and the increasing income gap between the rich 
and poor sectors of  the Syrian society. The federations of  workers and farm laborers also stated 
their opposition to planned reductions in social welfare spending and subsidies to private enterprises 
(Lawson, 1994: 60). The General Federation of  Trade Unions (GFTU) of  Syria was among the most 
vocal organizations during this period. In its congress, it compiled a lengthy list of  grievances about 
the adverse effects of  the economic policies in Syria. According to GFTU, since the inception of  the 
reform programs in the economy: 
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Skilled industrial workers were deserting the public sector in growing numbers to 
take higher paying jobs in private manufacturing companies; price increases on 
staples continued to outpace wage increases for government employees; private 
schools and hospitals had become clearly better-equipped and better administered 
than those operated by the state; and the gap between the ostentatious rich and 
struggling poor appeared to be widening at an alarming rate…..The potential for 
widespread worker disaffection continued to escalate…..as the managers of  public 
sector industrial enterprise began laying off  more experienced, higher paid 
employees and replacing them with younger laborers in an effort to cut production 
costs (Lawson, 1994; 60). 
In sum, although the economic reforms of  late 1980s and the financial incentives of  joining the 
international coalition against Iraq had bought the Assad regime some breathing space, the regime 
continued to experience problems pertaining to the structural deficiencies in the Syrian economy. 
The public reaction to the consequences of  market reforms and to the increasing democratization 
movements in different parts of  the world also worried Assad, who had been resisting all demands 
for political reform in Syria. In addition, Assad‘s policy during the Gulf  War had tarnished the image 
that he had cultivated in two decades as a Pan-Arab leader. 
ASSAD: THE PRESIDENT/THE PREDOMINANT LEADER 
Hafiz al-Assad was the predominant leader of  Syria during the Gulf  Crisis and its immediate 
aftermath. He was the ultimate political authority and had the authority and power to commit the 
resources of  his country to particular foreign policy and domestic policy goals. Although different 
constitutional institutions also existed in Syria during his leadership, he held the final say in all critical 
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decisions in Syrian politics. After the coup that brought him to power, he adopted coup-proofing 
techniques and did not allow anyone to challenge his authority for more than three decades.  
Historical accounts and biographies of  Assad demonstrate that Assad began to build his powerbase 
during his years as the commander of  the air forces of  Syria. According to Ma‘oz (1988): 
He began to turn the air-force into his power-base by lavishing special privileges on 
its officers, appointing his confidants to senior and sensitive positions and 
establishing an efficient intelligence network, independent of  Syria‘s other 
intelligence operations and given assignments which were not all of  immediate air 
force concern. (34) 
While Syria was struggling with internal and external conflicts, Assad shrewdly empowered himself  
and extended his influence beyond the air force to the whole military. The studies about his 
ascendance to power demonstrate that he was extremely cautious and did not share his plans with 
anyone around him. He trusted only a few people who proved their total allegiance and loyalty to 
Assad throughout years. These careful and strategic political moves helped him to win the defense 
minister position in the cabinet. He extended his power in the army during these years. After the 
1967 war with Israel, Assad accelerated the process of  strengthening and expanding his authority 
within the country. Following the defeat in the war, most of  the army came under the direct control 
of  Assad‘s leadership. He also eliminated possible rivals and worked on creating the necessary 
conditions for his rise to country‘s leadership. After a brief  struggle within the party, he succeeded in 
becoming the sole power-holder in Syria. During his presidency Assad continued to be the supreme 
leader of  the army, party, and the country. According to Rabinovich (2001): 
[T]he Syrian regime was a personal one that surrounded President Assad, and to a 
significant extent was the work of  his own hands. At the same time, it was also a 
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family and even a tribal regime, owing to the central role played by members of  
Assad‘s family…and likewise members of  his tribe, the Kalbiya. Notwithstanding 
Syria‘s close-knit relations with the communist regime of  the Soviet Union, it was the 
personal, family-dominated regimes of  Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania and Kim Il 
Sung in North Korea that influenced and inspired the Syrian regime. Thus it was no 
surprise that Ceausescu‘s fall in December 1989 was a difficult experience for 
Assad…Assad‘s regime was also a sectarian one: it depended on the support of  the 
Alawi community… (19) 
Assad achieved his predominance in Syria through a series of  different mechanisms. One of  his first 
methods was generating a personality cult in Syria, which was intended to be the bastion of  the 
legitimacy of  his rule in Syria. With this cult, he built an image that extended beyond a leader or a 
president. He became a hero, a mythical figure, and a father for his country. The first step in building 
this cult was making Assad‘s image ubiquitous around Syria. As in other authoritarian regimes in the 
Middle East, every street corner in Syria and every public building and space was filled with the 
pictures and photos of  Hafiz Assad. For some scholars, the degree of  Hafiz Assad‘s presence and 
visibility was unprecedented in the history of  authoritarian regimes. According to Middle East Insight: 
In no other country in recent memory…not Mao‘s China, nor Tito‘s Yugoslavia, has 
the intensity of  personality cult reached such extremes. Assad‘s image, speaking, 
smiling, listening, benevolent or stern, solemn, reflective is everywhere. Sometimes 
there are half  a dozen pictures of  him in a row. His face envelops telephone poles 
and trucks, churches and mosques. His is the visage a Syrian sees when he opens his 
newspaper. (Cited in Ma‘oz 1988: 43) 
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These pictures and posters created the feeling within the Syrian population of  an ever-present and 
omnipotent leader and ruler. In fact, Lisa Wedeen (1998) argued: 
On any given day, Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad may be extolled as the nation‘s 
premier pharmacist, teacher, lawyer, or doctor; he may be pictured in the newspapers 
with foreign dignitaries, showing complete understanding of  all issues. Following 
elections he is congratulated for winning more than 99 percent of  the vote. 
Routinely in official discourse, Assad appears as the father, the combatant, the savior 
of  Lebanon, the leader forever, or the gallant knight, the modern-day Salah-al-Din, 
after the original who wrestled Jerusalem from enemy control in 1187. Religious 
iconography and slogans attesting to his immortality bedeck the walls of  buildings, 
the windows of  taxi cabs and the doors of  restaurants. (504) 
Assad also employed Islamic symbols in order to establish his authority over the Syrian masses. He 
was the Alawi leader of  the predominantly Sunni population of  Syria, but in his practices he 
constantly tried to close the sectarian gap with the Sunni people, in some instances at the expense of  
his own religious beliefs.  
In addition to employing these symbolic methods, Assad used formal and informal ways to maintain 
control of  the society and the state apparatus. The constitution of  Syria and the government 
structure that he created allowed him to lead, rule and control the bureaucratic machinery. As the 
president, Assad headed the formal state apparatus, and as the secretary-general of  both the regional 
and national commands, he led the Ba‘ath party hierarchy. As Hinnebusch (1996) stated, ―the party 
has been downgraded, deideologized, and turned into a patronage machine with little capacity for 
independent action. It has no key decisions, above all in the foreign policy field, for a long time. 
Rather the party largely approves and justifies Assad‘s policies‖ (45).  
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The Syrian constitution also gave him full control of  the military as commander-in-chief  of  the 
armed forces (Zisser, 1998: 16). In fact, he crafted the presidency to give him absolute power in 
political and military matters as well as legislative and administrative affairs (Ma‘oz, 1988: 50). 
According to the 1973 Constitution, Assad had the rights to:  ―lay down the state's general policy 
and supervise its implementation‖ (Article 94); ―appoint one or more Vice Presidents and delegate 
some of  his duties to them…‖; ―… appoint the Prime Minister and his deputies and the ministers 
and their deputies‖; and ―accept their resignations, and dismiss them from their posts‖ (Article 95); 
―promulgate the laws approved by the People's Assembly‖; ―veto these laws through a decision, 
giving the reasons for this objection, within a month after their receipt by the President‖ (Article 
98); ―declare war and general mobilization and conclude peace following the approval by the 
People's Assembly‖ (Article 100); ―declare and terminate a state of  emergency in the manner stated 
in the law‖ (Article 101); act as ―the supreme commander of  the army and the armed forces‖ 
(Article 103); ―ratify and abolish international treaties and agreements‖ (Article 104); ― dissolve the 
People's Assembly‖ (Article 107); ―appoint civilian and military officials and terminate their 
services‖ (Article 109); ―assume legislative authority even when the Assembly is in session if  it is 
extremely necessary in order to safeguard the country's national interests or the requirements of  
national security‖ (Article 111); and ―in case of  a grave danger or situation threatening national unity 
or the safety and independence of  the homeland or obstructing state institutions from carrying out 
their constitutional responsibilities, the President of  the Republic can take immediate measures 
necessitated by these circumstances‖ (Article 113). 
In addition to this formal structure of  power, Assad crafted an informal network through 
appointing his family members, relatives, and loyalists to key positions in the government. For 
example, his brothers Rifat and Jamil played constitutive roles during the early years of  Assad‘s 
presidency. For many years, Rifat was the number two man in the regime. He was a member of  the 
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Regional Command of  the party and was commander of  an elite division, the Defense Companies, 
which had been created to protect the regime against internal threats and to prevent regular military 
forces from toppling the regime (Zisser, 1998: 19). Assad‘s other brother Jamil was the ruler of  the 
Alawite majority regions of  Syria. He also established a paramilitary organization called the Ali 
Murtada Forces, whose members were predominantly selected from Alawite villages and whose 
main mission was to protect the regime against the threat of  Islamic groups (ibid). 69   
Assad also groomed other close relatives to be in his inner circle. He used familial ties to secure the 
survival of  his regime. For example, he appointed his relative Adnan Makhluf  as the head of  the 
Republican Guards Unit, which in the late 1980s replaced the Defense Companies of  Rifat Assad. 
Assad‘s cousin Adnan Assad headed the Struggle Companies, an elite force like the Republican 
Guards with a mission of  providing internal security and stability. Finally, his son Basil was a 
prominent member of  Assad‘s inner circle until his death in 1994. He became a commander in the 
Republican Guards Unit at a very young age and also had influence in different governmental 
institutions. After the sudden death of  Basil in a traffic accident, his second son Basher was called 
back and appointed to the positions that Basil had occupied before his death.  
In addition to strengthening his grip on power in Syria through family ties, Hafiz Assad also 
strengthened his grip through tribal and clan ties. For example, he exploited sectarian ties in order to 
prevent the formation of  any coup attempt against his regime. He placed his co-sectarians in key 
positions of  power. Alawi army and security officers constituted a powerful group within internal 
security agencies of  the Syrian government. The Alawi soldiers and army officers in Syria were 
                                                          
69The role and influence of  Jamil and Rifat in the Assad regime continued until the early 1980s. After a 
confrontation with Rifat in the early 1980s, Assad became more vigilant and cautious about his brothers and 
his relatives. 
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regarded as the most significant guarantor of  regime stability and security in the country. As stated 
by Ma‘oz, Assad: 
…relied heavily on his fellow Alawites in controlling the army, especially its combat 
units. Those officers, mostly members of  the his family clan and tribe, who are in 
charge of  security and intelligence networks are at the top of  a pyramid whose 
higher, middle and even lower levels are filled with Alawites. They also hold senior or 
sensitive positions in the armored, mechanized and infantry divisions and brigades. 
…Alawites constitute some 60 percent of  the entire officer corps, about 50 percent 
of  the senior officer corps holding commanding positions of  most tank, artillery, 
infantry, navy and air defense units, most sensitive posts (i.e. operations and 
intelligence) in the General Staff  Command as well as in personnel and 
indoctrination departments. Likewise, Alawite officers and NCOs staff  most of  the 
commandos and crack troops wearing distinct uniforms and enjoying special 
privileges. Finally, the majority of  the cadets in military academies are Alawites and 
so are most of  their commanders. (1988: 65) 
Scholars and researchers have compared this power structure within Syria to the Italian mafia and 
Assad himself  to a godfather. According to Zisser (1998), ―the Alawis surrounding the president are 
then cast in the role of  the musclemen who guard the godfather‘s preeminent position. Most 
particularly they come into play during the power struggles following a godfather‘s death‖ (22). 
According to Seale, Assad chose everyone around him carefully and after they kept the positions 
that he gave them for decades. In fact: 
Just as he was consistent in his political principles, so he seemed extraordinarily 
reluctant to change the faces around him: it was in Assad‘s temperament to put a 
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high price on loyalty. His personal staff  at the presidency, even clerks and coffee 
makers, remained unchanged year after year and repaid his trust with devotion. 
(1988: 179) 
In addition, almost half  a dozen intelligence agencies, which were formed by Assad in order to spy 
on enemies of  the regime as well as on one another, were controlled by trusted Alawi leaders. The 
leaders of  these agencies directly reported to Assad any suspicious activities. According to Ma‘oz, he 
was the best protected Middle Eastern leader during his lifetime (1988: 57). 
In addition to creating parallel armies and appointing close friends as commanders of  different 
units, Assad provided substantial material subsidies to the members of  officer corps to satisfy their 
corporate interests. Petran (1972) reported in those years: 
They receive higher salaries than individuals of  comparable civilian status….get 
medical care and generous travel allowances. Army co-operatives provide them with 
every conceivable article at cost price as well as duty-free foreign imports not 
available to the rest of  the population. Interest-free loans enable them to buy houses 
and villas…Every city has its officers‘ club, invariably best in town. Careers involving 
social prestige and good salaries are open to officers on a wide scale (after 
retirement). Some move into the diplomatic service…government ministries and 
departments and to state enterprises. (253) 
Through these economic incentives, Assad aimed to prevent the emergence of  any form of  
opposition within the military against his regime and coup-proof  his rule in Syria. 
It has been stated by scholars of  Syrian politics that the form of  centralization that Assad organized 
was unprecedented in Syrian history. He did not share power with others and instead preferred to 
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monopolize power over the Syrian government and society (Ma‘oz, 1988: 51). Nobody could 
overturn or repeal his decisions during his presidency. His decisions were usually regarded as final 
decisions. According to scholars, like Perthes (1995), Assad during his tenure served as ―decision 
maker of  last resort where subordinate policy-makers like the Prime Minister, despite their legal 
competences, do not want or dare to take certain decisions‖ (224). Assad used this predominance in 
Syrian politics in both domestic and foreign policy realms. He was interested in running the foreign 
affairs of  Syria from the first day he was in office. It was his main pre-occupation during his reign. 
He formulated, designed, and implemented every one of  Syria‘s major foreign policies. As 
Hinnebusch (1998) stated, ―foreign policy making in Syria is the reserved sphere of  the Presidency. 
It is not subject to bureaucratic politics in which hawkish or dovish factions can shape or veto the 
president‘s decisions. Periodic rotation of  office holders prevents regime barons from staffing their 
domains with durable clients and establishing independent power bases‖ (177).  He was the ultimate 
decision maker of  Syria during the foreign policy crises that his country faced, including the 
Lebanon conflict, wars with Israel, skirmishes with Iraq and Jordan, and conflicts with Turkey. He 
was the main negotiator during the peace process with Israel and seldom delegated authority in 
relations with Western countries. As Hinnebusch stated, foreign policymaking in Syria was a reserved 
sphere of  Assad and no bureaucratic politics could veto his initiatives (2002). After conducting field 
research for a long time in Syria, Seale summarized Assad‘s dominance of  Syrian foreign affairs with 
the following words: 
Assad‘s sense of  limited resources and permanent siege have undoubtedly had an 
impact on the way he runs his country and conducts his diplomacy. His regime is a 
very personal one. He insists on controlling everything and in particular foreign 
affairs and information because, unlike more powerful leaders who walk away from 
their blunders, he can ill afford to make a mistake. At every stage he risks being 
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knocked out of  the altogether, and that remains the main hope of  his enemies. 
(1988: 494) 
ASSAD’S LEADERSHIP STYLE 
During the Gulf  Crisis and in its immediate aftermath, Hafiz Assad was one of  the most visible 
state leaders among the Middle Eastern leaders. After many years of  international isolation and 
demonization during the Cold War by Western media and governments because of  his alignment 
with the Soviet Union and because of  his support for militia groups, for the first time Assad was at 
the center of  attention in world politics. His support of  the coalition forces during the Gulf  Crisis 
and his later participation in the peace negotiations and Madrid process raised his stature in Western 
countries. After the Gulf  War, almost every Western country‘s leader or a representative visited 
Damascus and met Assad, including Secretary of  State James Baker. Arab leaders, including Egypt‘s 
President Mubarak who for years had not been on good terms with Assad, came to Damascus to 
meet with Hafiz Assad. The leaders of  Gulf  countries and the King of  Saudi Arabia also met with 
Assad and pledged support and financial assistance to Syria.  
The leadership trait analysis for Hafiz Assad is also based on a content analysis of  his interview 
responses during the Gulf  Crisis and its immediate aftermath. Although like other authoritarian 
leaders of  the Middle East, Assad mostly preferred to address the Syrian people via radio or 
television and make long speeches during ceremonies instead of  accepting interview requests, there 
exist several domestic interviews with him. In addition to this, his interviews with Western 
journalists which were later translated into Arabic and published or broadcasted in Syrian journals 
and TV stations are also taken into account in this study.  
As in the cases of  Saddam Hussein and King Hussein, Assad‘s words are examined according to 
seven traits that have implications on how leaders conduct their foreign policies, including the types 
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of  actions they are likely to urge on their governments, and the way they structure and interact with 
their advisory systems (Hermann, 2005a). These scores are later analyzed in relation to other Middle 
Eastern and Arab leaders, who constitute the cultural subset of  world leaders comparable with Hafiz 
Assad.  
 
Hafiz al-Assad 
 
Interview 
 
Norming Group 
Mean Score 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Compared to 
Norming 
Group 
 
Belief in 
Controlling Events 
 
0.38 
 
0.32 
 
0.04 
 
High 
 
Need for Power 
 
 
0.28 
 
0.25 
 
0.03 
 
High 
 
Conceptual 
Complexity 
 
 
0.63 
 
0.58 
 
0.03 
 
High 
 
Self-Confidence 
 
 
0.40 
 
0.36 
 
0.10 
 
Moderate 
 
Task Orientation 
 
 
0.58 
 
0.59 
 
0.06 
 
Moderate 
 
Distrust of Others 
 
 
0.08 
 
0.18 
 
0.06 
 
Low 
 
In-Group Bias 
 
 
 
0.15 
 
0.13 
 
0.02 
 
High 
Table 4: Hafiz al-Assad‘s Leadership Style 
Challenging Constraints 
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According to the leadership trait analysis, Hafiz Assad‘s score on ―need for power‖ is high compared 
to other Middle Eastern leaders. His score on ―belief  in controlling events‖ is also high compared to 
his norming group. These scores demonstrate that Hafiz Assad was a constraint challenger during 
and in the immediate aftermath of  the Gulf  Crisis. His high score in need for power and high belief  
in controlling events also show that he is comfortable both in direct and indirect challenges of  
constraints. According to studies on leadership style, these leaders know what they want and take 
charge to see that it happens. They therefore prefer to choose strategies to challenge the constraints 
according to the contexts; however, they also always push the limits of  what is possible.   
Assad was a challenger of  constraints during the international crises in the region, including the 
Gulf  Crisis of  1990 and 1991 and the Madrid Peace Process.  He challenged both domestic and 
external constraints in different circumstances by using various mechanisms. At the very beginning 
of  the Gulf  Crisis, his support of  the coalition forces was a challenge to domestic public opinion.  
Since his rise to power, Assad had always aimed to be the leader of  the Arab world. His most 
important source of  legitimacy during his reign was defending Arab interests and territories against 
the Western-supported Israeli forces and being one of  the staunchest supporters of  the Pan-Arab 
ideology. Assad acted as the frontline leader of  the Arab world against Israel, particularly after the 
Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1979. Although his credibility as the Pan-Arab 
leader was damaged because of  his intervention in Lebanon and his support of  Iran during the Iran-
Iraq War in 1980s, he always tried to legitimize his policies by stressing the immediate threat of  
Israel to the Arab world. With Iraq‘s invasion of  Kuwait, Assad faced another important regional 
crisis at his door. Although the Arab regional order immediately condemned the aggression of  Iraq 
against its neighbor, the public opinion in Arab countries remained ambivalent about this action. 
Ordinary Arabs‘ dislike of  and resentment toward Gulf  countries‘ wealth, arrogance, and opposition 
to sharing their oil revenues curbed a possible public outcry against this aggression. These feelings 
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were most visible in countries without any natural resources, such as Syria. When US and foreign 
forces began to arrive on the Holy Lands of  Saudi Arabia, the reaction of  the Arab public grew 
exponentially. For ordinary Arabs, this was not only a source of  humiliation for the Arab world but 
also a disrespectful act to the sacred lands of  Muslims. The public opinion and opposition to the 
international coalition grew stronger with Saddam Hussein‘s verbal and physical attacks to Israel and 
with the initiation of  air attacks on Iraqi cities.  
Openness and Closedness to Information 
Hafiz Assad‘s score on ―conceptual complexity‖ is high in comparison to other Middle Eastern and 
Islamic leaders and his self-confidence score is moderate in comparison to his norming group. A 
high score in ―conceptual complexity‖ together with a moderate score in ―self-confidence‖ 
demonstrate that Hafiz Assad was open to information and contextual cues. He was patient and 
took his time to see what would succeed and then acted in accordance with that decision.  
Those who wrote biographies about Hafiz Assad and those who followed Assad during his 
presidency asserted that Assad preferred to learn the opinions of  some of  his close advisors before 
making certain foreign policy decisions. Hermann, in her analysis of  Assad‘s leadership style, 
underlined this trait of  Assad‘s leadership. According to her, Assad maintained control over policy 
making within the government ―by being the center of  the network of  information, and by 
consulting on important decisions with those likely to be affected by any policies or actions‖ (1988: 
74). Dawisha also mentioned this characteristic of  Assad‘s leadership: 
Very rarely, indeed extremely rarely, would the President take an important decision 
without prior evaluation and consultations within the Government and sometimes 
from outside it, such as university professors. Consultations usually centre on 
important members of  the Party and sometimes the Progressive National Front. If  
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there is no time, he will certainly make a point of  at least contacting by phone some 
members of  the party leadership. He rarely makes an instinctive decision. (1980: 52) 
In his study on the Assad regime, Salloukh also emphasized Assad‘s long consultations with the 
Regional Command of  the Ba‘ath Party before making foreign policy choices. According to him, 
Assad had a number of  very close advisors in the Regional Command whom he consulted before 
making foreign policy decisions. Chief  among them was Abdel Halim Khaddam, who was Foreign 
Minister and Vice-President for Foreign Affairs in the Assad regime. It was only after the 
appointment of  Farouq al-Shar as Minister of  Foreign Affairs that Khaddam lost his influence on 
foreign policy decisions. In addition, long time Chief  of  Staff  Hikmat al-Shihabi was a member of  
Assad‘s inner circle on foreign policy and security issues. Other important advisors to Assad 
included his brother Rifat Assad until his expulsion from the ruling group in 1984, Major General 
Naji Jamil, and Major General Muhammad al-Khuli who headed the Presidential Intelligence 
Committee and was the commander of  the air force (Salloukh, 2000: 408). According to Salloukh, 
Assad also received foreign policy advice from other experts in this field. According to him: 
…Assad is prone to thorough analysis and consideration of  any contemplated 
foreign policy choice. During the early years of  his presidency, he established a 
tradition of  eliciting executive papers from some forty Syrian academics on a range 
of  foreign policy issues. He was even known to consult with some of  them over the 
phone. (2000: 409) 
However, while he was receiving all of  this information and advice from those around him, he was 
acting very strategically. Despite the advisors around him and his openness to contextual cues and 
policy recommendations, he always remained the sole and final decision maker in the foreign policy 
making process. In fact, as stated by Seale (1989), although there were different forms of  state 
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apparatus, Assad‘s ―authority was so vast and his control of  detail so tight that he was without 
question the ultimate decision maker on matters big and small‖ (343). According to Maoz (1986), 
―such an absolute presidential is unprecedented and highly significant in Syrian political history‖ 
(51).  
Motivation by Problem or Relationship    
Hafiz Assad‘s trait analysis during the Gulf  Crisis and its immediate aftermath demonstrates that his 
score is moderate in ―motivation for seeking office‖, which indicates that Hafiz Assad was focusing 
on relationships or a task in different circumstances.  This score shows that he was evaluating 
situations on a case by case basis. Leaders with moderate task orientation score direct their attention 
to a specific problem when that is appropriate to the situation at hand or try to build relationships 
when that seems more relevant. Depending on the situation, they can push toward their political 
goals or focus their attention on keeping the loyalty of  their people. As stated by Hermann, these 
leaders can move between a concern of  solving a problem and a concern of  ensuring the unity and 
support of  his people. (Hermann, 2005c)  
To be motivated by a particular goal in some circumstances is not surprising for an authoritarian 
leader in a Middle Eastern country, like Assad, who always had had goals of  recapturing Golan 
Heights and gaining a definite victory in Lebanon. During the Gulf  Crisis, in some instances he 
focused his attention to Lebanon and tried to consolidate his authority in the region by sending 
troops to the Syrian and Lebanon border and by purchasing high amounts of  ammunition and 
weaponry from the countries of  Central and Eastern Europe. However in the same period, in other 
circumstances he reversed focus and again sought to strengthen its relations with his people in Syria. 
As stated in previous chapters Assad‘s score is surprising due to the common assumption that 
authoritarian leaders do not need to respond to public opinion and try to form relationships.  
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As mentioned above, during the Gulf  War and its immediate aftermath, Assad encountered some 
serious problems in Syria‘s economy and society. His regime was facing increasing societal pressure 
for democratization after the social changes in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, he had 
concerns about his popularity among the Syrian people since he was a member of  the Alawite 
minority, which constituted only 12 percent of  the Syrian population, and since he had been 
increasingly alienated from the society after the suppression of  the Sunni revolt in Hama. Under 
these circumstances, Assad‘s main preoccupations turned out to be providing group maintenance, 
keeping the loyalty of  his constituents, and unifying ethnically, politically and religiously diverse 
groups under his own leadership. An anecdote that was circulated among the Syrian population after 
the pseudo-presidential elections demonstrated the extent of  his interest in and concern about 
maintaining the support of  his people. After this election, in which Assad received almost 99% of  
the votes, he asked his aides to figure out who were the people within that 1% who did not vote for 
him. In fact, despite the authoritarian nature of  the regime in Syria and the legal, political and 
military power of  Assad to confront any form of  dissent activity, he was still eager to gain the 
support and backing of  his people.  
As other Arab leaders, Hafiz Assad, throughout his reign, took into consideration public opinion 
and stressed the necessity of  bettering relations between him and Syrians. For instance, when 
Kissinger met with Assad in the 1970s, he noticed that Assad was extremely concerned about public 
opinion. According to Kissinger‘s memoirs, Assad thought about the Arab public opinion at every 
turn of  the negotiations (Kissinger, 1982: 1087). Kissinger was convinced that the public mood was 
a genuine consideration in shaping Syria‘s decisions. As Zisser (1998) stated: 
He recognized an authentic need on the part of  Assad to satisfy Syrian public 
opinion, secure its support, and convince it of  the correctness of  his chosen part. 
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He sensed in Assad a genuine commitment to his overall worldview and believed 
that his concern for broad public support stemmed from his personal character and 
the character of  the regime he headed. In his memoirs, Kissinger points to Assad‘s 
habit of  convening very lengthy meetings with his principal associates; he does not 
regard that practice as a means to exhaust his interlocutor, but as a genuine concern 
for domestic reactions. (7) 
While interpreting Kissinger‘s comments and evaluations, Zisser underlined that Kissinger‘s 
interpretations revealed a vital side of  Assad‘s political personality. For Zisser (1998): 
It should be stressed that Kissinger‘s observations are not at all tantamount to saying 
that Assad is a weak leader. On the contrary, one might well regard Assad‘s quest for 
public support and the degree to which he had gained it as a source of  strength 
marking him off  from other Arab leaders.…True, his awareness has rendered Assad 
cautious, even hesitant, but it has also provided the basis on which his 
accomplishments rest. This is true first and foremost of  the achievement of  
domestic stability―and thus of  Assad‘s own political survival. (8) 
Seale also mentioned this dimension of  Assad‘s leadership. According to him: 
Assad‘s rule was not based on force alone, nor would it have survived had it been 
so…The factor of  public approval was not negligible, Arab regimes such as his, so 
often derided as oriental despotisms, in fact required a measure of  popular consent, 
and the importance of  public opinion could be gauged by the strenuous efforts 
made to mobilize it, by the repeated exercises in public self-justification, and the by 
the strident media campaigns which rival Arab states waged against each other. Both 
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the leaders and the led sensed that once popular consent was withdrawn, the 
substance went out of  a regime. (Seale, 1989: 178) 
Motivation towards the World 
Hafiz Assad‘s score on ―distrust of  others‖ is low compared to other Middle Eastern and Islamic 
leaders and his score on ―in-group-bias‖ is high compared to other leaders. According to these 
scores, Assad perceived world politics essentially as a  zero-sum game; however, contrary to those 
who see the world in Hobbesian terms, he also believed that the international system is bounded by 
some international norms. In fact, for leaders like Hafiz Assad, there are a set of  adversaries who are 
considered external others, including the Zionist threat and Israel, and confrontation with these 
external threats is viewed as ongoing. However, as they work to protect their countries against these 
threats, they also enhance their countries‘ capabilities and relative statuses. Their main focus is to 
deal with threats and solve problems at the same time. Assad chose to follow these multiple 
strategies during the Gulf  Crisis. While he was dealing with domestic problems caused by his 
support of  the international coalition and trying to stop the pan-Arabist propaganda campaign of  
Saddam Hussein, he always kept his mind on his eternal enemy -- the state of  Israel. Therefore, 
during the Gulf  Crisis, he tried to consolidate his rule in Lebanon and sent contingencies to the 
Israeli border in order to stop any kind of  military threat from Israel, despite repeated guarantees by 
the United States.  
THE USE OF DIVERSIONARY MECHANISMS 
Assad was aware of  the increasing number of  anti-regime voices in Syrian society as a result of  
Syria‘s economic and social problems. The unions and political parties, in particular, were expressing 
their criticisms more frequently and more vocally.  He knew what these complaints could mean for 
the survival of  his regime. Although he was ruling his country with an iron fist, throughout his rule, 
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he was also trying to respond to the demands on the streets. For example, his regime had always 
preferred to keep taxes extra low in the country in order to please the masses. As a result, the tax 
revenues had constituted only a small percentage of  the government budget. According to Pipes, 
unlike failed dictators in different parts of  the world, such as Romania‘s Ceausescu, Assad chose to 
go without money rather than to extract funds from his people (1998: 17). For other scholars who 
specialize on the Assad era and the policy makers who interacted with him, public opinion 
sometimes went beyond an issue of  concern for Assad and became an issue of  fear and anxiety for 
him. According to Pipes (1998): 
The Syrian leadership professes not only to take public opinion seriously but even to 
fear the consequences of  disregarding it. As Assad quotes himself  in conversation 
with a Western official, ―You always talk to us about Israel‘s public opinion and make 
us feel as if  we have no public opinion but are a herd of  sheep. I think you are way 
off  the mark in this assessment. Our public opinion supports us as long as we 
support public aspirations and just causes.‖…―I am confident that I enjoy massive 
popular confidence in our country, and yet, if  I did something the Syrian masses 
interpreted as being contrary to their aspirations, I might pay the price as others did.‖ 
(18) 
In fact, during his presidency, Assad witnessed that leaders who failed to understand the significance 
of  public opinion ended up bringing disaster to themselves and their countries. According to James 
Baker, who met several times with Assad during the Madrid Peace Process, Assad was extremely 
careful in his decisions and extremely considerate of  Arab public opinion. During the negotiations: 
255 | P a g e  
 
Assad repeatedly stressed the need for decisions to be understood properly and 
supported fully by the public at large. Assad once remarked ―if  you were in my 
place…you wouldn‘t be more flexible than I am now.‖ 
At another point…referring to a US proposal regarding the United Nations (UN) 
role in the future peace conference, he reportedly told Baker: ―We will lose Arab 
public opinion…They will know what is going on. This would not only be 
adventurism, it would be a form of  suicide.‖ (Zisser, 1998: 6) 
In order to win the hearts and minds of  the Syrian people, Assad constantly used issues related to 
Syrian foreign policy. He employed strategies to rally people in many different instances throughout 
his long career. Israel constituted an especially important and feasible scapegoat for Assad when he 
was confronted with domestic economic and social problems.  
Although every Middle Eastern leader used the threat of  Israel at least once for domestic political 
purposes, Assad had an advantage over other Middle Eastern leaders in the scapegoating of  Israel 
for domestic problems. Assad was the leader of  a frontline state in the struggle between Arabs and 
Israel and he had been the defense minister of  Syria during the Six-Day War and the president of  
Syria during the Yom Kippur War. In fact, according to scholars like Zisser, Assad‘s domestic 
prestige and strength derived from his stance on the conflict with Israel and from his attitudes on 
pan-Arab issues (Zisser, 1998: 17).  For him, ―Syrian foreign policy has…enabled the regime to 
maintain its domestic position in two ways: first by making use of  its achievements in this arena and 
second, by exploiting challenges and difficulties in the regional and international arena to mobilize 
support or to divert public attention from domestic problems‖ (Zisser, 2001: 70).  Ma‘oz also stated 
that Arab unity and rivalry with Israel were the major pretexts of  Assad‘s purge campaigns and the 
principal themes of  his public speeches. The Palestinian issue, in particular, constituted an important 
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part of  Assad‘s diversionary agenda. According to Ma‘oz (1989), ―He has essentially used this cause 
to advance his aims both domestically and externally…In Syria his support for the Palestinians‘ 
aspirations has been used to strengthen his legitimacy as an Arab ruler…‖ (84-119).  Pipes also 
indicated the diversionary motivations for Assad‘s pro-Palestinian policies. According to him, Assad 
conducted foreign policy mostly to strengthen his grip on power in Syria. As a result, ―Assad has 
propounded pro-Palestinian, anti-Zionist policies in the twin hopes of  diverting the country‘s 
attention from unpleasant realities at home and making common cause with the majority of  the 
Syrian population‖ (Pipes, 1998: 14). 
In the early years of  the 1990s when Syria began to witness domestic economic and social problems 
and his regime was on the verge of  a legitimacy crisis, Assad repeated this strategy of  employing 
foreign policy for domestic purposes (Lawson, 1994: 63). The two earlier chapters demonstrated that 
leaders may pursue both peaceful and conflict-prone external policies when they need to deflect the 
attention of  their domestic constituencies. In the aftermath of  the Gulf  War, Assad opted to use 
these strategies one after another and close in time to each other in order to boost his domestic 
support. 
The first strategy that he adopted after the Gulf  War was a peace-making strategy with Israel. 
Although a peace deal with Israel would be unpopular among some segments of  the Syrian 
population, it was dramatic enough to deflect the public‘s attention from domestic problems. Assad 
employed the state-controlled official media, including Damascus Radio and al-Ba’ath Daily to shift 
the agenda of  the people from domestic hardships to foreign policy issues. The state-controlled 
Syrian media launched a campaign for starting peace negotiations with Israel. It was something 
totally unexpected for the people of  Syria. The Syrian public, which was unaccustomed to this 
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discourse, suddenly shifted its focus from domestic problems to the news and analysis of  the peace 
process and the possibility of  an everlasting peace agreement with Israel.  
The official media was instrumental in presenting the peace process in a way that could both deflect 
the attention of  the domestic public and boost the popularity of  Assad within Syria. The same 
newspapers that used to publish threats against Israel and call on the people to unify against the 
state of  Israel changed their discourse and began campaigns to unite the people of  Syria in favor of  
a long-lasting peace in the region. Through the use of  editorials and commentaries and speeches by 
Assad to the Syrian population, the government succeeded in mobilizing the people in favor of  a 
peace agreement with Israel. Newspapers and politicians who used to express the unacceptability of  
any peace deal without Israel‘s total withdrawal from the occupied territories began to publicize 
more nuanced viewpoints and propagated the idea of  a victory through a peace agreement and also 
emphasized the leadership of  Assad in this process. They even characterized the peace process as a 
success of  Hafiz al-Assad‘s strategy. According to an editorial in al-Ba’ath Daily: 
Immediately after the cessation of  the Gulf  War, Damascus became the mecca of  
several Arab and international delegations. Damascus then embarked on a 
comprehensive move toward Arab and world capitals… 
Syria‘s intensive political moves at the current delicate and grave stage, led with 
wisdom, courage and pan-Arab concern by President Hafiz al-Assad, aims at 
enabling the Arabs to take the initiative before they are overtaken by events… (FBIS-
NES-91-070, 11 April 1991) 
The United States‘ invitation to Syria for an international conference at Madrid was also reflected as 
a victory for Assad‘s regime by the Syrian media. President Assad‘s positive response to the 
invitation, in particular, was publicized as a rallying point for the Syrian masses. Newspapers and 
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politicians called on the Syrian public to celebrate the triumph of  Assad over the Israeli state. In a 
commentary on Damascus Radio, it was stated that: 
…The Arab quarters in general, and the Palestinian quarters in particular, have 
welcomed leader al-Assad‘s letter with ardent satisfaction. 
President Bush expressed satisfaction with the Syrian response and so did the US 
Secretary of  State. Capitals of  the big nations also expressed satisfaction. Thus, the 
ball, as all observers say, is now in Israel‘s court… (FBIS-NES-91-137, 17 July 1991) 
In another editorial, al-Ba’ath applauded the leadership qualities of  Assad and considered his move a 
major success in world politics. According to al-Ba’ath: 
Throughout its long conflict with the Zionist enemy, the Arab nation faced many 
sharp political, military, and economic crises. These crises were aimed to prevent the 
Arabs, together or separately, from catching their breath. Through these known 
crises that need to be detailed, wagers were made on Syria because all people realized 
its size and role. And knew that under the leadership of  struggler Hafiz al-Assad it 
pioneers the confrontation of  the dangers surrounding the nation, and is capable of  
warding off  these dangers through positions gained world admiration and gathered 
the Arab masses from all arenas of  struggle… 
Syria…through leader al-Assad‘s wisdom and ability to deal with the changes, has 
blocked the road before the enemy and returned the ball to the enemy‘s court. Hence 
the enemy is confused, isolated, and exposed before all world countries that seek 
peace and justice, renounce injustice, war and aggression… 
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Leader al-Assad‘s great positions are not only for the sake of  Syria but also for the 
sake of  a nation that looks forward to its rights without making concession or 
bargains. Seeking peace and justice is a normal right of  all peoples. When the world 
stresses that we are peace advocates, this means that we have won one of  the most 
important rounds of  our ongoing conflict with the enemy until we attain our 
legitimate objectives which the world supports with conviction and respect. (FBIS-
NES-91-140, 22 July 1991) 
Another government-owned newspaper al-Thawrah interpreted the event as the confirmation of  the 
leadership of  Syria in the Arab world:  
It is natural for Damascus to assume this position. It has always been the center of  
regional and pan-Arab decision making. Hafiz al-Assad has always been an extra 
ordinary leader and a leader of  this decision making. In Damascus, the future of  the 
region is in the making and its content and direction hinge on Damascus. 
When the Arab media say that Hafiz al-Assad‘s Syria is the guarantee and the center 
of  pan-Arab decision making, the pan-Arab equation, and the comprehensive view, 
Arabs are in fact acknowledging an existing objective reality. Hafiz al-Assad has 
always been like this, and will remain so now and in the future. (FBIS-NES-91-140, 
22 July 1991) 
In fact, with the help of  the Syrian media, Assad launched a crusade for peace to rally people around 
his leadership. During this process, all domestic attention was diverted toward the peace process and 
away from domestic economic and social problems and political deadlocks. Assad and his regime 
also utilized his high-level meetings with foreign dignitaries, and especially with US envoys, as ways 
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to strengthen his legitimacy and consolidate his authority within Syria. For example, Damascus 
Radio reported a meeting between Assad and Baker as follows: 
Recognizing Damascus as the key to peace in the region and appreciating its 
constructiveness, Secretary of  State Baker made Damascus his first port of  call. 
Emerging optimistic from in-depth talks with President Hafiz al-Assad, Baker 
emphasized the importance of  Syria‘s constructive step to open new horizons and 
overturn old assumptions, placing the historic responsibilities on the shoulders of  all 
parties involved. (FBIS-NES -91-140, 22 July 1991) 
Through these methods, the Syrian regime succeeded in deflecting the attention of  Syrian people 
and more importantly, in mobilizing them around the leadership of  Hafiz Assad. As Lawson stated, 
everybody in Syria began to discuss this new phenomenon of  foreign policy. After constant 
mobilization of  country against the threat of  Israel for thirty years, Assad‘s peace policy resulted in a 
significant diversion among Syrian people.  For the prior thirty years, Assad, as well as all other Arab 
Middle Eastern leaders, had made use of  the Arab- Israeli conflict in many instances in order to 
divert the attention of  their domestic publics from recurring domestic problems. Considering Syria‘s 
position as a frontline state in the conflict with Israel, it had been easy for the Assad regime to 
convince the Syrian people of  the existential dimension of  this conflict and its predominance over 
domestic problems. Domestic opposition within Syria had always faced the danger of  being 
identified with the biggest enemy of  the Arab world―Israel. In light of  these factors, Assad‘s use of  
the start of  peace talks as a form of  diversion was a very brave political move. His foresight was 
correct in the sense that Syrian society suddenly stopped talking about other problems and focused 
on the possibility of  a peace agreement. The above quotations from government-controlled 
newspapers and radio stations demonstrate that Assad aimed to portray this situation as a well-
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planned and crafted strategy intended to corner Israel and win the battle of  peace as revenge for the 
war against Israel that he lost. As Hinnebusch stated Assad conducted the peace process just as one 
conducts a military campaign and as a result of  this his involvement in this process created a similar 
rally effect (2002: 160). During this period, Assad was portrayed domestically as the hero of  
diplomacy and negotiations. His strategic calculations and tactical struggles were praised and the 
peace process was depicted as the most significant nonviolent battle of  the Arab world. In fact, just 
going to the negotiation table was described as a success for the Syrian people.   
The positive impact of  Assad‘s diversionary peacemaking strategy did not last long. As stated by 
scholars of  diversionary studies, diversionary impact is never permanent. Diversionary strategies 
only provide temporary relief  for leaders troubled with domestic problems by distracting the public‘s 
opinion and shifting the agenda of  the country to a foreign policy problem. Newspaper headlines 
and society‘s attention will eventually return to the country‘s more troubling problems once the 
influence of  external developments declines. Many leaders must constantly mobilize society against 
an external other in order to continuously divert attention from domestic problems. In the Syrian 
case, Assad shifted his diversionary strategy from a peaceful one to a conflictual one once the impact 
of  peaceful diversion began to decline and the Syrian society began to raise their voices again about 
domestic problems.     
The main reason for the change in discourse was the deteriorating condition of  the economy 
after the Gulf  War. Popular dissatisfaction, particularly over the effects of  the regime‘s 
economic liberalization, intensified during this period. According to Lawson (1996), ―In 
April leftist deputies in the People‘s assembly criticized the planned reductions in social 
welfare spending and low tax rates on private enterprises contained in the draft 1992-1993 
budget‖ (153). The unions also became increasingly vocal about their disaffection with 
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Assad‘s economic policies. For instance, members of  the Farm Laborers‘ Federation 
expressed their resentment toward the government‘s plans to support private agricultural 
exports (ibid). Assad responded to these increasing and intensifying popular demands by 
emphasizing the urgency of  national security matters. He particularly underlined possible 
attacks by Israel and asked the labor unions to postpone their demands and prioritize 
national interest and national security. An excellent example of  this discourse was Assad‘s 
keynote speech at the assembly of  the General Federation of  Trade Unions. In this speech, 
Assad constantly stressed the need to defend the homeland and indicated the rising threat of  
Israel, especially after the Gulf  War and with the migration of  Jews from the Soviet Union. 
As Lawson (1996) described:   
The president began by praising the delegates for their many accomplishments in the 
areas of  factory construction, dam building and technical training. He then asserted: 
―Great as those achievements are, the greatest is our national unity, which is our 
pride.‖ The honor of  the nation, he went on to say, lay in the fact ―that the 
achievement was accomplished within the framework of  a coherent and strong 
national unity that achieved security and consolidated both stability and progress.‖ 
Finally, President Assad expressed his gratitude that the trade unionists ―understood 
freedom within the framework of  responsibility and distinguished between 
interacting in the context of  integration to reach a goal (on one hand) and 
contradiction and fragmentation which lead to wasted effort and crumbling power 
(on the other).‖ The necessity of  forging internal unity as a means of  ensuring 
external security could not have been stated more clearly. The assembled trade 
unionists undoubtedly got the message. (148) 
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In fact, after several similar speeches, the Syrian people, by and large, captured the meaning and 
significance of  these addresses. According to Lawson (1996), ―in the light of  the gravity of  the 
external security issues addressed by the president, it would have been trifling, if  not in fact 
seditious, to raise the more mundane matter of  restructuring trade union-party relations‖ (148). 
Every Syrian was called on to unite and rally around his president under these circumstances and 
forget about his resentments and problems. The external security issues were more critical for Syria 
and domestic issues could be shelved for the time being. According to Lawson 1996): 
Mobilizing industrial workers and farm laborers to carry on the struggle against 
Israel thus did more than distract these forces‘ attention from their rapidly 
accumulating domestic grievances; it also provided the al-Assad coalition with the 
resources necessary to win their continued allegiance to the regime. (156) 
Lawson in his study of  domestic politics and foreign policy interaction demonstrated that Assad 
shifted these strategies pretty frequently between 1990 and 1993. During the period of  peace 
negotiations, in particular, Assad continuously utilized different types of  diversionary strategies. 
According to Lawson, there were three periods of  thaw, in which Assad followed a more 
conciliatory approach in the negotiations with Israel, at least in public discourse. For Lawson, these 
periods coincided with phases of  economic or social problems.  In his study, he stated: 
It is worth noting that the dynamics of  this situation run almost directly counter to 
much writing on the general connection between domestic conflict and foreign 
policy, which presumes that growing internal difficulties tend to prompt regimes to 
undertake conflictual or aggressive foreign policies, rather than comparatively 
accommodative ones. In the case of  contemporary Syria, the Assad regime‘s long 
standing belligerence towards Israel made a further escalation in the level of  hostility 
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directed against the old enemy considerably less effective as a means of  galvanizing 
popular sentiment than adopting an uncharacteristic, and thus anticipated, softer line. 
(Lawson; 146) 
During these thaw periods, he shifted the debate and discussion to the peace process with Israel and 
then after a while, he abandoned this discourse. Rubin also stated the strategic nature of  this peace 
process for Assad. According to him, Assad already knew that a possible peace could be dangerous 
for the future of  his regime. For decades, Assad, as all other Arab leaders, had insisted that he would 
never pursue a peace deal with Israel. His position had been solidified after the peace agreement 
between Egypt and Israel. After this event, any attempt by an Arab state toward peace with Israel 
was perceived an act of  betrayal. Moreover, peace with Israel would bring significant threats to the 
survival of  the Syrian regime. According to Rubin (2007): 
Such a diplomatic achievement would open the door for most other Arab states to 
have relations with Israel and to work with it on matters of  common interest…In 
addition, an Israel-Lebanon agreement would follow any Israel-Syria accord, 
reducing Damascus‘s leverage in that country and bringing international pressure for 
a Syrian withdrawal. (107) 
Furthermore, this kind of  an agreement would damage Assad‘s ambition to be the leader or at least 
representative of  the Arab nation. In sum, the reason Assad adopted a more peaceful strategy with 
Israel several times between 1990 and 1993 was to deflect Syrians‘ attention from domestic 
problems. After a brief  period of  time, he abandoned this course of  action in favor of  a more 
classical form of  conflictual diversionary strategy. While following these zigzags in foreign policy, 
―Hafiz made no real political, social and economic reforms at home. All the country‘s problems 
continued to smolder but not to burn. His response made sense in terms of  the regime‘s interests. 
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Maneuvers on the foreign policy scene were enough to bring sufficient domestic support for the 
government‖ (Rubin, 2007: 102).  
Assad‘s foreign policy choices during the Gulf  Crisis and in its immediate aftermath and his 
motivations have been subjects of  contention among the scholars of  Syrian politics. Scholars 
offered different explanations about the changes in Syrian foreign policy during this period. 
According to some scholars the change in foreign policy was a result of  the transformation of  
international system from a bipolar one to a unipolar one (Hinnebusch, 1996). The proponents of  
this view argued that Syria was forced to bandwagon to the peace process after the fall of  the Soviet 
Union, the dramatic change in balance of  power in international politics. The end of  the Cold War 
confirmed US dominance in world politics and the rapid victory of  the US forces in the Gulf  War 
demonstrated the supremacy of  US power. Especially the military capabilities of  the US showed 
Assad that ―strategic parity‖ was no longer an option for Syria. After taking into consideration these 
developments, Assad started to change his foreign policy and participated in the peace process. So it 
was essentially international politics that determined the Syrian foreign policy during the peace 
process. However, although international politics may have led Assad to accept Bush‘s proposal of  a 
peace conference, it fails to explain constant changes in his foreign policy during the same period. 
Between 1991 and 1993 when Assad was following different sets of  foreign policies towards Israel, 
the US was consolidating its supremacy in international politics and international relations remained 
unipolar. As explained above, after a short rally around the idea of  peace agreement, he shifted his 
discourse on Israel and the peace process and followed a hardliner approach against Israel.  
The second alternative explanation is about the dire condition of  Syrian economy. According to this 
explanation, Assad made his foreign policy decisions by taking into account the situation of  the 
Syrian economy during this period. The proponents of  this argument argue that a peace agreement 
266 | P a g e  
 
with Israel would enable Syrian government to receive financial assistance and credit from the 
Western countries. After the end of  the Cold War, in the absence of  a socialist bloc which for 
decades had provided financial assistance for Syria, Assad needed the economic support of  the 
Western countries and one way to start this rapprochement was a peace agreement with Israel. So it 
was a strategic and calculated move by Assad to solve the immediate economic problems of  Syria 
(Hinnebusch, 1996). However the economic factors alone could not explain the changes in the 
foreign policy of  Assad during this period. Again, this motivation cannot explain constant changes 
in Syrian foreign policy in this time period towards Israel and towards the peace process. Moreover, 
a peace agreement would not only bring economic gains but it would also incur costs to the Syrian 
economy. Many oil rich Arab countries were providing financial assistance for Syria because of  its 
status as a front-line country against a possible Israeli aggression. A peace agreement would result in 
the stopping of  this financial assistance.   
LEADERSHIP STYLE AND THE SELECTION OF DIVERSIONARY STRATEGIES 
Hafiz Assad‘s leadership traits and his use of  multiple diversionary strategies reveal some important 
insights about the relationship between leadership traits and selection of  diversionary strategies. Like 
the previous two cases, Assad‘s case demonstrates that authoritarian leaders are as eager to use 
diversionary mechanisms as their democratic counterparts. The case also shows that small states, 
regardless of  their military capability and power, have the ability to employ diversionary mechanisms 
just like the great powers. The existence of  different forms of  diversionary mechanisms allows them 
to use less costly and risky foreign policy ventures in order to deflect the attention of  their domestic 
public and gain popular backing and support. However, more significantly this case demonstrates 
that a leader can use multiple diversionary strategies within a short period of  time and he can shift 
from one diversionary strategy to another when he deems it necessary and useful.   
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In terms of  the relationship between leadership styles and the selection of  different diversionary 
mechanisms, Assad‘s case shows that leaders who challenge constraints are likely to use diversionary 
mechanisms. As mentioned in Chapter Three, both diversionary use of  force and diversionary 
peacemaking are ways of  challenging the domestic constraints of  public opinion, opposition groups, 
and domestic institutions, such as the legislative assembly and the military.  The use of  diversionary 
strategies usually cause opposition groups within the society to delay or forget their ―less existential‖ 
demands and objections. Among the constraint challenger leaders, those who are skillful in 
challenging constraints both directly and indirectly, like Hafiz Assad, are able to successfully employ 
multiple strategies to deal with domestic opposition.  
The task orientation score of  Hafiz al-Assad reveals that he was relationship-oriented, which 
challenges previous assumptions regarding the lack of  accountability of  leaders in authoritarian 
regimes. It demonstrates that even in the most authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, leaders can be 
relationship oriented in some instances and motivated to obtain and maintain the support of  their 
own people. They can try to achieve this aim by engaging in foreign policy ventures. Middle Eastern 
leaders are not exceptions to this rule. Numerous leaders of  Middle Eastern countries have 
employed the strategy of  manipulating a foreign policy-related event in order to regain their 
legitimacy and standing. Assad also used different diversionary foreign policy mechanisms in order 
to gain support and popularity among his people. The quotations from newspapers and journals 
above demonstrated that Assad was trying to raise his stature and to make his people rally around 
his leadership by using mass media. Those articles and editorials in government-controlled media 
outlets were intended to increase the Syrian people‘s support of  and loyalty to Assad either because 
of  his diplomatic victories in peacemaking or his courageous leadership against a threat like Israel.  
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Assad‘s openness to information may also account for his selection of  diversionary mechanisms. As 
mentioned in Chapter Three, Saddam Hussein‘s openness to information and contextual cues helped 
him to shape his diversionary behavior throughout the Gulf  Crisis amid domestic problems. Saddam 
Hussein preferred to intensify his attacks against Israel when he realized that the Arab public was 
fairly responsive to his diversionary strategies. As stated in that chapter, a leader‘s openness to 
information allows him to adjust his policy preferences in accordance with contextual cues and 
incoming information. Assad, who was also open to information during the Gulf  Crisis and its 
immediate aftermath, tried to observe the reaction of  the public to his diversionary foreign policy 
ventures and modify his strategy in accordance with their reaction. When he realized that a more 
cooperative diversionary strategy lost its impact on the domestic public and that the Syrian people‘s 
attention was again drawn to domestic problems, he returned to a more mainstream diversionary 
strategy and raised the issue of  the imminent threat of  the state of  Israel to Syria in order to again 
mobilize the people around his flag and deflect the attention of  the people from domestic problems. 
In fact, his openness to contextual cues and incoming information from people allowed him to 
change his diversionary strategy within a very short period of  time.  
Finally, Assad‘s leadership analysis demonstrates that Assad was a leader who saw the world as a 
zero-sum game but who believed in the existence of  some international norms and the possibility of  
cooperation. This worldview broadens the foreign policy options for political leaders and extends 
the scope of  possible diversionary strategies. For leaders like Assad, although the state of  Israel 
constituted an external other, and although he continuously scapegoated this country for domestic 
problems, he also believed that there were cooperative foreign policy actions that could rally people 
around his leadership. He therefore utilized multiple strategies when he was trying to divert the 
attention of  his people.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
The diversionary theory of war has been one of the most debated theories in domestic 
politics/foreign policy interaction. For decades, scholars have tried to respond to questions 
regarding the different dimensions of political leaders‘ diversionary actions. This study was an 
attempt to contribute to this literature by trying to answer some of the unanswered questions in the 
field and more significantly by raising questions which have been neglected for decades. It also 
aimed to revise the diversionary theory, rescue it from the constraints of the use of force and 
integrate it with the different islands of theories on the public opinion and foreign policy nexus. 
Furthermore, the impact of leadership differences and leadership traits on the selection, formulation 
and implementation of diversionary action were analyzed for the first time in this study. Below, 
several outcomes of this study are summarized and some of the questions that need to be studied in 
the future are emphasized.   
Mainstream diversionary scholarship has been centered on the use of force by US presidents during 
times of domestic economic problems, political scandals, low approval ratings and election years. 
The  inordinate emphasis in the diversionary scholarship on using force for diversionary purposes 
and the predominance of scholarship on the United States have created strong assumptions on how 
to study the diversionary behavior of political leaders. According to these assumptions, public 
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distraction can only take place when that country is involved in an external conflict, and only 
through external conflict can a country sustain internal unity and ―rally round the flag‖ of its leader. 
For decades, these assumptions have created important research problems, which have included 
researchers solely looking for diversionary motivation in cases of international conflicts and 
assuming that when a leader is not involved in an international conflict, that leader does not have a 
diversionary motivation. Thus it was assumed that the relationship between domestic politics and 
foreign policy is worth studying when that particular country is involved in an international conflict. 
Because of that scholars of foreign policy in general and the diversionary theory of war in particular 
neglected the relationship between domestic and foreign policy interaction when leaders engage in 
peace-making ventures and cooperative foreign policy initiatives.   
Problems like these have limited the scope of the diversionary theory and have neglected alternative 
forms of diversionary strategies and domestic uses of foreign policy. These problems also limited the 
understanding of foreign policies of countries. While some of the aggressive foreign policy initiatives 
were interpreted as policies intended to influence domestic public opinion, the peace-making 
ventures and other forms of diplomatic initiatives were never evaluated as such. This study 
attempted to challenge these general assumptions of diversionary theory of war and revise the theory 
with the help of existing and emerging studies in the field of foreign policy making and foreign 
policy and public opinion interaction. Previous studies in these fields have proven that leaders have 
more than one way of creating the ―rally round the flag‖ effect and deflecting the attention of their 
domestic publics. According to these studies, it is also possible for political leaders to impact public 
opinion through diplomatic maneuvers and presidential dramas, including presidential speeches and 
foreign trips as well as peacemaking ventures. Most of these alternative forms are diversionary 
strategies are proven to be more feasible for many leaders due to their low risk and low cost. These 
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less costly and less risky alternatives also make it more possible for diversionary strategies to be 
employed by the leaders of countries other than superpowers.  
Most of these alternative diversionary foreign policy practices have been discussed in studies that 
focus on public opinion and foreign policy nexus. However, they have never before been integrated 
into diversionary scholarship. This study was an initial attempt to develop a more comprehensive 
theory of diversion. It highlighted and examined Saddam Hussein‘s engagement in classical diversion 
through the escalation of conflict with Israel and his armed aggression towards this country, King 
Hussein‘s use of more peaceful diversionary strategies and Assad‘s use of both cooperative and 
conflictual strategies. These cases demonstrated the multiplicity of diversionary options for political 
leaders and the necessity of considering these other forms of diversionary methods in order to 
understand the sources of international conflict as well as of international cooperation.  
This study also tried to overcome another problematic assumption of the diversionary scholarship 
regarding the relationship between regime type and the diversionary use of force. As mentioned 
previously, scholars like Gelpi (1997) who focus on diversionary behavior assume that only 
democratic leaders are likely to use diversionary strategies, since they would be the only leaders who 
would need such strategies. Accordingly, authoritarian leaders would not need this option since they 
are not accountable to any particular group or institution in their countries and can use force against 
any form of domestic opposition within their countries. Although one of the most prominent cases 
of diversionary use of force was the case of the authoritarian regime of Argentina and although 
recently scholars have disputed Gelpi‘s claims on the relationship between authoritarian regimes and 
diversionary use of force (Miller, 1995; Pickering and Kisangani, 2005), most of the scholarship in 
the field, particularly since the 1990s, has focused solely on the United States and the presidential use 
of force, which has essentially transformed the diversionary theory into a particularity of US foreign 
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policy. This study was also an initial attempt to overturn this assumption. The study demonstrates 
that authoritarian leaders may also employ diversionary strategies in order to either divert the 
attention of their publics from domestic problems or unify their people around their leadership.  
Although there are no elections or free civil societies in authoritarian countries, authoritarian leaders 
also need the support of their people or of particular constituencies. Such a constituency may be a 
group of individuals who has a say in the decision making of the government, such as the politburo, 
or an institution, such as the military, which has the power to overthrow the authoritarian leader 
with a coup d‘état. Authoritarian leaders also become particularly sensitive to the voices on the 
streets and feel vulnerable to public opposition when there is a recurring economic or social 
problem. Under these circumstances, diversion can be a helpful tool for them to change the political 
discussion within their countries and to regain domestic popularity.  
In addition to these different forms of constraints and accountability on the part of authoritarian 
leaders, scholars of decision making also assert the familiarity of decision making mechanisms in 
democratic and authoritarian regimes when there are recurring economic or social crises in a 
country. Scholars like Hermann asserted that, regardless of the regime type under the crisis 
situations, there is usually a form of shrinking of authority among the upper echelons of power 
(Hermann, 1979). This phenomenon has even led some scholars to "question the extent to which 
the foreign policy process of democracies differs from that of autocracies" under crisis conditions 
(Merritt and Zinnes, 1991: 227). Since diversionary strategies are employed when a country faces 
some sort of domestic economic or social crisis, we can expect that a form of shrinking of authority 
can take place among the upper stratum of government as well, which also demonstrates that there 
will be not much difference between authoritarian and democratic regimes in terms of the decision 
making process when they utilize one of the diversionary strategies.  
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In the case studies above, I showed that authoritarian rulers, such as Saddam Hussein, King Hussein 
and Hafiz Assad, were sensitive to public opinion during their rule. They paid particular attention to 
public opposition and popular demonstrations in the streets. Although in some instances they used 
force against demonstrators and cracked down on protesters, they were aware that the constant 
suppression of opposition movements was not a viable strategy to stay in power. In some instances, 
when the countries they ruled had domestic economic or political problems, they opted to use one 
of the diversionary strategies in order to distract the attention of their societies and unify them 
around their leadership. Of course, the success of this strategy depends on different variables that 
need to be studied in the future. However, even the presence of this option and practice of it by 
authoritarian leaders demonstrate that diversionary strategies may be employed by all leaders, 
regardless of the type of government.   
Finally, another reason for the hegemony of studies on the use of force by US presidents in the 
diversionary theory of war literature is the availability of data, such as presidential approval rates, 
economic indicators and election results, to conduct statistical analysis. It is almost impossible to 
reach this form of data in non-democratic and authoritarian countries, due to the lack of 
transparency and absence of elections and freedom of expression. However, this study aimed to 
show that despite the unavailability of this form of data in authoritarian countries, it is still possible 
to study the use of diversionary strategies by the leaders of these countries through the gathering and 
use of data from other sources, including studies of area experts and diplomatic historians. In this 
study I aimed to bridge this gap and create a dialogue between political scientists and diplomatic 
historians. Although the topics of war and international conflict have been widely covered by 
diplomatic historians, political scientists in general and foreign policy scholars in particular have 
ignored the findings of the scholars in this field. Especially, scholars of the diversionary theory have 
failed to utilize the causal explanations and evidences provided by diplomatic historians, which could 
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strengthen their hypotheses on the diversionary nature of some international conflicts. In this study 
I tried to overcome this lack of dialogue by using the arguments and findings of political scientists 
and diplomatic historians at the same time. The findings of historians, such as Efraim Karsh, Avi 
Shlaim, and Nigel Ashton and political scientists, such as Fred Lawson and Eyal Zisser are used 
together to strengthen the causal explanation for the diversionary argument. This dialogue 
demonstrated that the current data-driven nature of the diversionary scholarship is partly responsible 
for the predominance of the use of force by US presidents in the field and it is possible to overcome 
this problem by the effective use of data from other research programs and fields, such as 
diplomatic history. This study was an initial attempt to investigate possible venues of cooperation 
and collaboration in these fields but more studies are needed to create a stronger dialogue between 
these two fields in the future.  
Together these findings demonstrate that the diversionary use of foreign policy is not a particularity 
of US foreign policy but, in a broader sense, is a theory of domestic politics and foreign policy 
interaction. The availability of less costly diversionary strategies for political leaders shows that 
leaders of less resourceful countries may also employ this strategy when they confront domestic 
problems. Moreover, the argument about the relationship between regime type and the use of 
diversionary mechanisms maintains that, regardless of the government type, the leader may find 
himself needing to use diversionary strategies for domestic purposes. Thus, besides leaders of a 
democratic superpower, such as the US, leaders of authoritarian and less resourceful countries, such 
as Iraq, Jordan and Syria can also benefit from these strategies.   
In addition to these two revisions of the existing literature in the field, this study also contributed to 
scholarship on the diversionary theory by taking into account a long ignored variable, namely the 
role of leadership and leadership styles. Although the theory has argued that diversion is perpetrated 
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and implemented by a political leader to ensure his political survival, no study in the existing 
literature has ascertained the effect that the leader‘s characteristics and leadership traits have on the 
use of diversionary strategies. As a result, diversionary foreign policy action has been regarded as a 
mechanical reflection of domestic problems to the foreign policy realm and the effects of the 
leader‘s individual characteristics on this process have not been taken into consideration. The studies 
on leadership and foreign policy have demonstrated that leadership style makes a huge difference in 
terms of foreign policy decision making. According to the studies in this field, although domestic 
and international variables impact the decision making process in the foreign policy realm, these 
different variables are channeled through the prism of leaders and as a result, their leadership styles 
play an important role (Hermann, 1998, 2001, 2005). Despite these burgeoning studies on the 
relationship between leadership style and foreign policy, and although diversionary action can be 
considered a form of foreign policy, studies on the diversionary theory of war have neglected the 
possible relationships between leadership style and diversionary decision making. The studies in this 
field have not dealt with the effect of leadership styles on the formulation of diversionary strategy 
and the implementation of diversionary action. After making the two previous revisions to the 
theory, the rest of this study assessed the role of leaders and their leadership styles on the selection 
of diversionary foreign policy action during domestic economic or social distress. According to the 
outcome of this study, differences in political leaders‘ leadership styles may account for differences 
in the diversionary mechanisms that they employ.  
The study focused on three different leaders (Saddam Hussein, King Hussein, and Hafiz Assad) who 
employed different forms of diversionary strategies during the Gulf Crisis and in its immediate 
aftermath. The three leaders led countries in the Middle East that had similar historical backgrounds 
and that were artificially created by Western powers after the end of World War I. The people of 
these countries share common cultural characteristics and societal structures. In addition, all three 
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countries faced similar domestic economic, social and political problems in this time period. The 
leaders of these three countries belonged to minority groups within their country. Saddam Hussein 
belonged to the Sunni sect of Islam in a country with a Shi‘a majority. Hafiz Assad was an Alawite in 
a country with a Sunni majority and King Hussein was a Transjordanian in a country with a 
Palestinian majority.  
These three leaders were also predominant leaders in their countries and had the power and 
authority to commit the resources of their countries singlehandedly for a particular foreign policy 
goal. They were deeply interested in foreign policy issues, always tried to engage in foreign policy 
decision making, and participated in the process of implementing these decisions. During the Gulf 
War and its aftermath, they used their power and authority to draw the foreign policy road maps for 
their respective countries. In fact, in terms of the foreign policy decision unit model developed by 
Hermann and Hagan (2001) to conduct comparative research in the field of foreign policy, they all 
belonged in the same category. This commonality allowed me to control the differences in decision 
making mechanisms and the number of actors and institutions involved in decision making 
processes in these countries.   
The leadership trait analyses of these three leaders revealed some significant preliminary findings 
about the relationship between their leadership traits and the diversionary strategies that they 
selected during the Gulf Crisis and in its aftermath. As mentioned at length above, it was discovered 
that all three leaders had some sort of interpersonal emphasis during and immediately after the Gulf 
Crisis. Saddam Hussein was totally focused on relationships during this period whereas King 
Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad were motivated by both tasks and relationships. King Hussein and Hafiz 
al-Assad preferred to focus on a particular task when they thought it was more appropriate and 
opted to focus on forming relationships when they believed it was more useful for their regime. In 
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fact, both of these leaders had certain foreign policy goals in their mind during this period but in 
addition to these goals, they were also trying to ensure the support of their population. When they 
needed the support of their people, King Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad were more focused on 
strategies that could mobilize their people and boost their popularity within their country. In these 
instances, both of these leaders used some sort of diversionary strategies to provide the ―rally round 
the flag‖ effect.  
Previous studies in the field of leadership studies and diversionary scholarship report that the 
diversionary process, which entails a willingness to regain popularity among the constituency and 
unifying the people, is very much related to the relationship focus. As opposed to task-oriented 
leaders, who want to solve particular problems, leaders with interpersonal emphasis or those who 
are mostly motivated by relationships, depending on the circumstances, prefer to focus on their 
relationship with their constituents. As a result, instead of trying to solve domestic problems that 
they were facing, leaders with relationship orientation, such as Saddam Hussein, Hafiz al-Assad and 
King Hussein, opted to use diversionary strategies to win the loyalty and allegiance of their people.  
Strategies Relationship vs. Task Focus 
Use of Conflictual Strategies 
Saddam Hussein 
Relationship Focus 
Use of Cooperative Strategies 
King Hussein 
Relationship or Task Focus 
Use of Multiple Strategies 
Hafiz al-Assad 
Relationship or Task Focus 
Table 5:  Task vs. Relationship Focus and Use of Diversionary Strategies 
A second leadership trait that was expected to be common for all leaders that use diversionary 
strategies was challenging constraints. Although Saddam Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad were constraint 
challengers during and in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf Crisis, King Hussein turned out to be 
a leader who respects constraints. These results somewhat challenge my expectation about the 
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relationship between diversionary behavior and challenging or respecting constraints. Scholars who 
have focused on respecting or challenging constraints, such as Jonathan Keller (2005), have 
emphasized that diverting the attention of the public in and of itself is a way of challenging 
constraints. According to these scholars, leaders who face some form of domestic constraint, which 
may include strong domestic opposition, domestic institutions, and popular protest have multiple 
options to deal with such constraints. They can either respect the constraints and adopt policies that 
take into account the policy preferences of the opposing groups or they can challenge the 
constraints and find a way to deal with the opposing groups. Those who choose to challenge 
constraints can either suppress the dissenting groups or find a way to divert their attention from 
domestic problems.   
Strategies Respect and Challenge of Constraints 
Use of Conflictual Strategies 
Saddam Hussein 
Challenges (directly) 
Use of Cooperative Strategies 
King Hussein 
Respect 
Use of Multiple Strategies 
Hafiz al-Assad 
Challenge (both directly and indirectly) 
Table 6: Respect and Challenge of Constraints and Use of Different Diversionary Strategies 
According to these scores there were differences among these political leaders in terms of their 
challenge of constraints. According to the leadership trait analyses, Saddam Hussein was too direct 
in challenging constraints and open to using force, whereas Hafiz Assad was skillful in both indirect 
and direct ways of challenging constraints. On the other hand King Hussein respected constraints. 
These results demonstrate that 1) the leaders who respect constraints can also use diversionary 
strategies and they most likely use peaceful mechanisms and 2) the way that these leaders challenge 
constraints may account for differences in the selection of diversionary strategies. Leaders who are 
more direct in challenging constraints and open to using force, such as Saddam Hussein, prefer to 
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use conflictual diversionary strategies, such as scapegoating, escalation of conflicts, or use of force; 
whereas leaders who are capable of challenging constraints both directly and indirectly, like Assad, 
may employ both conflictual and cooperative diversionary strategies within the same period of time. 
Although more studies may need to confirm this relationship, this initial study demonstrates that 
there may be a relationship between the leader‘s style of challenging constraints and his selection of 
diversionary strategies and that the form of challenging constraints may account for the variation in 
diversionary methods.  
The leaders‘ openness to information was another leadership trait that was analyzed in relation to 
the selection of diversionary mechanisms. According to the earlier studies on the relationship 
between openness to information and foreign policy making (Hermann, 2001, 2005; Hermann and 
Preston, 1997), leaders who are closed to information prefer to depend on their own instincts and 
their own experiences on foreign policy issues when making foreign policy decisions, whereas 
leaders who are open to information prefer to follow contextual cues before making critical foreign 
policy decision. Since the diversionary engagement of a political leader is a form of foreign policy, 
his/her openness to information and contextual cues may also impact the way that he makes 
diversionary decisions.  
Strategies Openness and Closedness to Information 
Use of Conflictual Strategies 
Saddam Hussein 
Open or Closed to Information (Case by case 
basis) 
Use of Cooperative Strategies 
King Hussein 
Closed to Information 
Use of Multiple Strategies 
Hafiz al-Assad 
Open to Information 
Task 7: Openness and Closedness to Information and the Use of Diversionary Strategies 
The leadership trait analyses of the three Middle Eastern leaders above demonstrate that during the 
Gulf Crisis and in its immediate aftermath, Hafiz Assad was open to information, Saddam Hussein 
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was open to information on a case by case basis whereas King Hussein was closed to information 
and contextual cues. Of these three leaders, King Hussein, who was closed to information during 
the Gulf Crisis, opted to follow a more cooperative diversionary strategy. He had continuously used 
cooperative diversionary strategies throughout his tenure as King of Jordan when confronted with 
domestic economic, political and social problems and throughout the Gulf Crisis he did not change 
his strategy. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein, who was open to information on a case by case 
basis, opted to intensify his scapegoating strategy throughout the crisis when he observed that his 
strategy had struck a chord with the masses in the Arab world and that his popularity among the 
Arabs was rising. Thus, in addition to verbal attacks, Saddam Hussein used the threat of using force 
and used actual force against Israel. Hafiz Assad, who was open to information, chose to assess the 
incoming information and shifted his strategy dramatically from a cooperative to conflictual one 
when he recognized that the cooperative diversionary strategy was no longer bringing the expected 
results. Both of these leaders made decisions to revise or intensify their diversionary strategies in 
accordance with the contextual cues that they received. On the other hand, King Hussein, who was 
closed to information, opted to use the same strategy throughout the crisis. He neither intensified 
nor shifted his strategy during the crisis. 
Finally, according to this study, a leader‘s motivation towards the world may also influence the 
selection of diversionary mechanisms. Earlier studies on the relationship between leadership and 
foreign policy have shown that the leader‘s perception of the world may shape his handling of 
foreign policy. Since diversionary action is a form of foreign policy, this trait may also influence the 
way in which leaders choose to divert the attention of their people. Saddam Hussein, who saw the 
world as a conflict-prone place, and who believed that leaders must vigilantly monitor developments 
in the international arena, employed conflictual diversionary strategies and verbally and physically 
attacked to the state of Israel, whereas Hafiz Assad, who perceived world politics as a zero-sum 
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game in which conflict could be contained in some circumstances, chose to use both conflictual and 
cooperative strategies in order to distract the attention of his people in Syria. On the other hand, 
King Hussein, who thought that the world was not a threatening place and recognized that 
cooperation among states was always possible and feasible, employed more peaceful strategies to 
deflect the attention of domestic public.  
Strategies Motivation toward the World  
Use of Conflictual Strategies 
Saddam Hussein 
The world is a conflict-prone place 
Use of Cooperative Strategies 
King Hussein 
Cooperation is both possible and feasible  
Use of Multiple Strategies 
Hafiz al-Assad 
The world is a conflict-prone place but conflict 
can be contained 
Table 8: Motivation toward the World and Use of Diversionary Strategies 
The preliminary outcomes of this study reveal that there may be a relationship between leadership 
styles and the selection of diversionary mechanisms. In fact, one should not assume that all 
individual leaders act uniformly when they decide to use diversionary strategies and in order to 
better assess the variance in diversionary strategies, one needs to understand the leadership style of 
the individuals who interpret information and make foreign policy choices. Nevertheless, additional 
studies in this area are necessary for the following reasons: to provide a more comprehensive 
account of this relationship; to ascertain whether certain leadership traits are more significant than 
the others; to confirm, amend or rectify the results of this study; and to understand the true extent 
of the impact of leaders on the selection of diversionary mechanisms. In particular, the leadership 
styles that may account for variation in the use of diversionary strategies according to this study, 
including the motivation towards the world, need to be analyzed in order to assess the level and 
intensity of these relationships. While further studies are still needed in this field, this study suggests 
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leadership styles of political leaders may be one important factor influencing the selection of 
different diversionary strategies.    
Strategies Challenging 
Constraints 
Openness to 
Information 
Relationship vs. 
Task Focus 
Motivation 
toward the World 
Use of 
Conflictual 
Strategies 
(Saddam 
Hussein) 
Challenge (directly) Open to 
Information (On a 
case by case basis) 
Relationship Focus The world is a 
conflict-prone 
place 
Use of 
Cooperative 
Strategies 
(King Hussein) 
Respect Closed to 
Information 
Relationship / 
Task Focus (case 
by case basis) 
Cooperation is 
both possible and 
feasible  
Use of Multiple 
strategies 
(Hafiz al-Assad) 
Challenge 
(both directly and 
indirectly) 
Open to 
Information 
Relationship/ Task 
Focus (case by case 
basis) 
The world is a 
conflict-prone 
place but conflict 
can be contained 
Table 8: The Relationship between leadership styles and the selection of different diversionary 
strategies  
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In addition to these theoretical contributions, this study also brings forth some practical issues that 
need to be taken into consideration by policy practitioners. The study demonstrates that political 
leaders can use different foreign policy events for domestic purposes throughout their tenure. As the 
scholars of diversionary theory of war report these leaders can create international crises and even 
military confrontations with other states in order to boost their popularity and approval rate within 
their countries. This study extends the diversionary theory a step further and argues that, in addition 
to some international crises, some peaceful and cooperative foreign policy ventures can also be 
manipulated by political leaders for domestic purposes. Leaders of countries with significant 
domestic economic and political problems may not be genuine in their peace-making discourse and 
instead follow these policies strategically for domestic consumption. This finding shows that the 
observers and mediators of international disputes need to be cognizant of the domestic 
circumstances in a country while interpreting peaceful and mixed messages of political leaders.  
During the research and writing of this dissertation, some other questions came up about the 
diversionary theory and they need to be studied in the future. One of the most critical questions is 
how to figure out whether a foreign policy venture is really diversionary in nature. In this study, the 
opinions of authoritative sources in the politics of the region on the motivations of political leaders 
in their foreign policy actions were considered accurate. However, during the process of writing this 
dissertation, I also realized that there are no generally accepted standards or criteria which may be 
employed in order to determine whether an action is diversionary or not. Early attempts by scholars 
like Hendrickson (2002) and Cramer (2004) focused solely on the foreign policy making process in 
the context of the US and therefore the standards that they tried to develop may not be applicable to 
other countries and other political leaders. As a result, there were constant questions from skeptics 
about the validity of diversionary claims and about proving the existence of diversionary motivation 
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It is extremely difficult to prove that a leader is engaging in an act of foreign aggression or is 
attempting to establish peace not for the sake of national interest but to ensure his/her political 
survival. Even after a leader‘s tenure, he would be unlikely to confess that he spent the resources of 
his country and risked the lives of his country‘s citizens in order to boost his approval ratings or to 
be reelected. However, scholars may and can create some standards and measurements that may be 
applied to multiple leaders to analyze and assess whether their foreign policy action was intended to 
be diversionary in nature. In order to be able to conduct more comparative studies in the future, 
these standards need to be applicable for multiple cases and countries. The findings of this study 
contribute to the future studies by providing some preliminary insights about the relationship 
between leadership styles and the use of diversionary strategies. As mentioned at length above, this 
study shows that there is a relationship between some of the leadership styles and the use of 
diversionary mechanisms. According to this study, the leaders with relationship focus and those who 
challenge constraints are more likely to use diversionary strategies. However, some other additional 
conditions need to be developed in order to create a comprehensive account of diversionary foreign 
policy making.  
In addition, considering the existence of peaceful ways of diverting the attention of a domestic 
public, further studies need to be conducted on the mechanisms that link domestic politics and 
foreign policy. In its classical form, the diversionary theory of war utilized Simmel (1955) and 
Coser‘s (1956) ―in-group/out-group‖ hypothesis, which claims that a conflict with an out-group can 
bring unity within an in-group. With the findings of the instant study and the extensions of the 
diversionary theory of war, scholars must find new mechanisms to link domestic politics to foreign 
policy. Since early studies in this field utilized the sociological theories of conflict and cooperation, 
more interdisciplinary studies are necessary to discover the mechanism that we are looking for. In 
addition, we saw that state-controlled media, especially in the context of authoritarian regimes, play 
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an important role in mobilizing or rallying the people of a country around a foreign policy goal and 
in diverting their attention from domestic problems. Considering the impact of the media, future 
studies must pay more attention and research more deeply the relationship between diversionary 
behavior and the media.  
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      Appendix 1 
Interviews and Speeches 
SADDAM HUSSEIN 
Saddam Domestic Interviews 
1-) Saddam, Egypt‘s Mubarak Conduct News Conference 
FBIS-NES-90-068, 9 April, 1990 
 
2-) Saddam Makes Statement to Iraqi Journalists 
FBIS-NES-91-009, 14 January, 1991 
 
3-) Baghdad Radio Airs Saddam‘s Interview with CNN 
FBIS-NES-91-021, 31 January, 1991 
 
 
KING HUSSEIN 
King Hussein Domestic Interview 
1-) King Hussein Comments on Arab and Domestic Issues 
FBIS-NES-90-026, 7 February 1990 
 
2-) King Hussein on Summit, Democracy and Eastern Front 
FBIS-NES-90-094, 15 May, 1990 
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3-) King Interviewed on ACC Goals and Arab Affairs 
FBIS-NES-90-037, 23 Feb 1990 
 
4-) King Comments on Recent Unrest 
FBIS-NES-90-102, 25 May 1990 
 
5-) King Hussein on Israeli Plans and Peace Process 
FBIS-NES-90-012, 18 Jan 1990 
 
6-) King Hussein, Baker Brief Press 
FBIS-NES-91-150, 5 August 1991 
 
7-) King , Baker Brief Press 
FBIS-NES-91-183, 20 September 1991 
 
 
HAFIZ ASSAD 
Assad Domestic Interview 
1-) Al-Assad Interviewed by Egyptian Newspaper Editors 
FBIS-NES-90-089, 8 May 1990 
 
2-) Brief Press on Talks 
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FBIS-NES-91-138, 18 July 1991 
 
3-) Al-Assad Adresses Clergy on Pan-Arab Unity 
FBIS-NES-90-076, 19 April 1990 
 
4-) More on Mubarak, al-Assad News Conference 
FBIS-NES-91-140, 22 July 1991 
 
5-) Al-Assad and Al-Hirawi Hold Press Conference 
FBIS-NES-90-204,  22 Oct 1990 
 
6-) Al-Assad Reviews the Gulf Situation and Role in Lebanon 
FBIS-NES-91-008, 11 January 1991 
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